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and ordered, that communication should be at once re-established with Pope, and Pope re-enforced in time to be of service.
Why did not McClellan re-establish the communication, and re-enforce Pope in time to be of service? Why did he halt Franklin's Corps at Anandale ?
He gives reasons for this in his telegram to Halleck of August 29th. "By referring to my telegrams," he says, "of 10.30 A. M., 12 M., and 1 P. M., together with your reply of 2.48 r. M., you will see why Franklin's Corps halted at Anandale." Let us examine these telegrams in connection with the circumstances then existing. The first is follows:
"Franklin's Corps are in motion; started about six A. M. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Upton's Hill to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna via Freeman Hill and Hunter's lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the Engineer Brigade, to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached last night two regiments to the vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meagher's Brigade is still at Aquia. If Sumnermoves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington; yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived. rons belonging to the Army of the Potomac. rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in a condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night. What have you from Vienna and Drainsville?
Have but three squadFranklin has but forty
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General.
Major-General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
To this Halleck replies:
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 29, 1862.
Upton's Hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons and ammunition to Franklin as fast as they arrive. Meagher's Brigade ordered
up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on good authority, in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I hear nothing from Drainsville. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
"Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria. To this McClellan sends the second of the dispatches he refers to, as follows. There are two telegrams of the same date. HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, August 29, 1862, 12 M.
Your telegram received. Do you wish the movement of Franklin's Corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition, and without transportation. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Mafor-General.
Major-General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA, Aug. 29, 1862, 12 M. Have ordered most of the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry to report to General Barnard for scouting duty toward Rockville, Poolesville, etc. If you apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of river, I had better send a brigade or two of Sumner's to near Tennallytown. Would it meet your views to post rest of Sumner's Corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, where they can either support Cox, Franklin, Chain Bridge, and even Tennally town?
Franklin has only 10,000 to 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish the force to advance?
GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. U. S. Army.
Major-General HALLECK. General-in-Chief.
Then follows the telegram of 1 P. M.:
HEAD-QUARTERS NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
I anxiously await reply to my last dispatch in regard to Sumner. Wish to give order at once. Please authorize me to attach new regiments permanently to my old brigades. I can do much good to old and new troops in that way. I shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marsh, at least with strong advanced guards. I wish to hold the line through Prospect Hill, Marshall's, Miner's, and Hall's Hills. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who I really think ought not, under the present circumstances, to proceed beyond Anandale ? G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General.
General HALLECK, General-in-Chief,
It certainly is not easy to discover in these dispatches any indications of a strong desire to re-enforce the Army of the Potomac, then fighting a battle in his front and within his hearing, but under another commander. They evince no special interest in the result of that battle, or the fate of that army-the army for which, while under his command, he had expressed so much affection, and whose defeat he afterwards declared, when he was again at its head, would be incomparably more disastrous to the nation than the capture of Washington itself. We find in these dispatches, which he cites in his own vindication, no evidence to sustain the declaration of his report, that from the moment of his arrival at Alexandria he "left nothing in his power undone to forward supplies and reenforcements to Gen. Pope." On the contrary, they seem to show that he had decided to do, what in a telegram of the same date he had suggested to the President," leave Pope to get out of his scrape," and devote himself exclusively to the safety of Washington.* He thinks any disposition of Franklin's and Sumner's troops wise, except sending them forward to re-enforce Pope. He is anxious to send them to Upton's Hill, to Chain Bridge, to Tennallytown, to Arlington, and Fort Corcoran-anywhere and everywhere except where they were wanted most, and where alone they could assist in getting
* On the 29th he had telegraphed to the President as follows:
I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it.
To this the President had thus replied:
WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862-4.10 P. M. Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit, แ to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope" is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels. A. LINCOLN. Major-General MCCLELLAN.
Pope "out of his scrape," and in saving the Army of the Potomac. It was natural and proper that he should give attention to the defence of Washington, for he had, as Gen. Halleck says, "general authority over all the troops" that were defending it. But his special duty was "sending out troops from Alexandria to re-enforce Pope." Why did he give so much attention to the former, and so little to the latter duty? Why was it that, from the time of his landing at Alexandria, not another man of his army joined Pope, or made a diversion in his favor, till after Pope had fallen back from Manassas and fought four battles without the aid he had a right to expect, and which Gen. McClellan was repeatedly and peremptorily ordered to give?
Those of McClellan's forces which had reached Alexandria before him, or were there before his arrival, Sturgis, Kearney, Hooker, and Heintzelman, had all gone forward and joined in these battles. Why could not Franklin-all of whose movements were controlled by McClellan-do as much with him as his brother commanders had done without him?
The first thing that McClellan did, on reaching Alexandria, in the discharge of his duties to send forward troops, was to stop those actually going! In his dispatch of August 27th, 9 o'clock P. M., he says to General Halleck—“I found part of Cox's command under orders to take the cars: will halt it with Franklin until morning!" And Cox never went out, though anxiously expected and under orders to move. What are the reasons given by McClellan for not sending, or not permitting Franklin to go? On the 27th, at 11.15 P. M., immediately after the positive order was issued for Franklin to move by forced marches and carry three or four days' provisions, McClellan says:
"Franklin's artillery has no horses except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. * * I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know."
A part of the perplexity he seems to have been in was removed that day at 6 o'clock, P. M., when he received, as he says, a copy of a dispatch from Pope to "All forces now sent forward
The next day, at 1 P. M., he telegraphs,
Halleck, in which
should be sent to
"I have been doing all possible to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he shall go."
Again, at 4.40 of the 28th, he telegraphs,
General Franklin is with me here. the condition of artillery and cavalry. move; may be by to-morrow morning.
A few moments later, he says:
I will know in a few moments
Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's Corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now! I have sent aids to ascertain the condition of Colonel Tyler: but I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent out."
The small force (?) to which he refers consisted, as beretofore stated, of Sumner's Corps of 14,000 and Franklin's of 11,000, a total of 25,000-not going to fight a battle by itself, but to re-enforce an army already engaged, and constituting certainly a handsome re-enforcement on any field. On the 29th, he says:
Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in a condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night.
On this same day—
Do you wish the movement of Franklin's Corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation.