would indicate, the Rebel forces, on the inside of the circle, were so skillfully handled, and so obstinately fought as to postpone, if not wholly defeat this purpose. The Army of the Potomac had thus far, though not defeated, been kept in check, with its triumphs chastened, and its anticipations deferred. The movements of Butler and Sheridan had thus but the secondary importance of subsidiary operations, instead of constituent parts of the grand design.

The advance of Sigel up the Valley of the Shenandoah, and of Crook and Averill into the salt regions, and on the railroad in South-western Virginia, manifestly had but this secondary object, of destroying communications and supplies, and weakening the well concentrated force of the enemy by drawing his attention to the circumference. Gen. Sigel had met with but feeble opposition as he moved toward Staunton, breaking lines of transportation and destroying depots of supplies, until he encountered a more formidable force under Breckinridge at New Market, on the 15th of May. The battle was lost, the enemy capturing from him five pieces of artillery and fifty prisoners; and his killed and wounded numbering six hundred or more. Sigel manifested his customary skill in effecting a retreat across the Shenandoah, without further loss, his force reaching Strasburg in good order.

The operations in South-western Virginia were more successful. On the 10th, Gen. Averill's cavalry attacked the Rebel forces under Jones at Wytheville, routing him, and advancing to the destruction of the railroad, in the direction of Lynchburg. Simultaneous with this movement was that of the raiding party under Gen. Crook, who struck the railroad near New river, still farther eastward. He fought the Rebel guarding force near Newbern, on the 10th, capturing seven guns and a number of prisoners, and destroyed the valuable bridge across New river.

These successes were vigorously followed up, inflicting serious damage on the railroads and government works in the south-western portion of Virginia. Gen. Hunter was soon after placed in command of the Department of West Virginia, including the Shenandoah Valley, and immediately assumed

the direction of all une forces hitherto under Sigel, Crook and Averill, and speedily organized a movement upon Lynchburg, which created no little alarm at that important strategic point and depot, drawing away a considerable force from the vicinity of Richmond. The advance of Hunter, however, did not commence until some days later than the date to which the operations under the immediate supervision of Grant have been brought down.

On the 19th of May, at about six o'clock in the evening, a sudden and furious attack was made by Ewell, on Grant's rearguard, this side of Spottsylvania, with the purpose of capturing his transportation train, and, by a flank movement, interposing a force between the National army and Fredericksburg. This assault was promptly met by the divisions of Birney and Tyler, aided by a portion of the Fifth Corps. The assailants were repulsed, leaving their killed and wounded on the field, and with a loss of about three hundred prisoners. The total Union loss was about seven hundred and fifty.

During the week intervening since the severe battle of the 12th, Grant had been receiving heavy reinforcements and putting his army into good condition for the work still before it. More than twenty-five thousand veterans had been sent him since the commencement of the campaign, including a large force from the Department of Washington under Gen. Augur. As the present movement covered the national capital, a large force could thus be spared from the defenses of Washington, without endangering its safety. Mr. Lincoln had earnestly pointed out this advantage in the first campaign against Richmond, but his advice had been disregarded by the commander who, on that occasion, led the army of the Potomac to defeat and disaster. The native sagacity of Grant had led him to adopt this course at last, without dictation, however, or counsel from the President. This is not the only occasion during the campaign of 1864, in which the intuitive military judgment of President Lincoln was vindicated, and the fatal errors of his first subordinate general-in-chief, when differing in his opinions, were demonstrated. To reach the fortifications of Richmond without loss, and there to encounter the Rebel army not only

unharmed, but trebly intrenched, concentrated, and strengthened, was evidently no gain. The enemy was to be encountered, and his strength broken, sooner or later. While this must necessarily cost heavily, the plan of campaign pursued by Grant was such that his losses could be readily supplied and his numbers kept up, while the army of his opponent was crumbling away under constant attrition. The protraction of the struggle between the Rapidan and Richmond was thus telling no less positively on the final result-but rather the reverse than a lengthened siege of Richmond. The test of comparative strength and resources might as well come here as elsewhere. It was thus no mere bravado, but the expression of sound practical wisdom, when Grant declared it to be his purpose to "fight it out on this line," though it should "take all the summer." It was for a campaign against Lee and Richmond, fought out in this resolute spirit, with no postponement or evasion of the struggle that must inevitably come at last, that the country had long been waiting. It was nothing less than this that could bring the war to a close. People had occasional misgivings. The loss of life was felt to be fearful. But, through all, there remained an abiding faith in the course pursued, and a conviction that unwise cconomy, even of life, at this juncture, could only end in more terrible sacrifices in the final aggregate.

On the evening of the 20th, Grant began the new advance which he had been preparing for, to Guiney's Station, on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, and southward, flanking the enemy's strong lines at Spottsylvania. The movement was handsomely executed without opposition. The Rebel commander discovering what was transpiring, Longstreet's corps was started southward late the same night. Ewell's corps followed on Saturday, the 21st. The whole force of Lee made haste to get in a position, apparently heretofore fortified, between the North and South Anna, the rapid marches of Grant threatening an interception of his progress toward that stronghold. The Union army, on the other hand, proceeding by Guiney's Station and Bowling Green, reached Milford Station, the advance crossing the Mattapony, by the morning of

the 22d. Warren's corps had the lead, following the telegraph road southward from Guiney's Station, and capturing some prisoners in occasional skirmishes with the rear of Ewell's corps. Hancock had the advance on the Bowling Green road, and remained at Milford until the afternoon of the 22d, when his corps moved on and took position next day on the left of Warren, who had now crossed the Mattapony and advanced to the North Anna. The enemy's rear, under Ewell, was found intrenched on both banks of that river. Skirmishing began the same evening. The batteries in the center of Hancock's corps, on the left, commenced shelling the enemy at 4 o'clock, while Birney's division, charging through storms of bullets from the rifle pits, and of shells from the batteries on the opposite bank of the river, drove the enemy across the bridge and secured its possession. At 5 o'clock, Warren, who had proceeded out a road leading to Jericho Ford, a mile or two farther up the stream, threw a force across to the south bank of the river, which immediately intrenched itself, and successfully resisted a heavy assault of the enemy on the same evening, repulsing the assailants with serious loss, who left their killed and wounded on the field. At dark, the corps of Burnside arrived, and took its place between the Second and Fifth Corps, preparatory to the general advance intended for the next morning. Wright took position near the Fifth Corps, having crossed at the same ford as Warren. The Union losses in these spirited engagements were comparatively light, probably not exceeding seven hundred in the aggregate of killed and wounded. The Rebel loss was hardly less, exclusive of a number of prisoners taken by Birney.

Early on the morning of the 24th a general advance was inade to the south side of the river, when the fact was disclosed that the enemy had retired from his works, and no opposition was made. The impression, at first, prevailed that Lee was retiring beyond the South Anna, and hastening toward the Rebel capital. An order from Lee to Ewell directing him to fall back rapidly within the defenses of Richmond was found on the person of a captured orderly of the former general, but this appears to have been a ruse de guerre. In truth, Lee had

now taken up a stronger position than any he had held heretofore, since leaving Mine Run, and he desired Grant's entire force to cross the North Anna, to meet the unexpected reception which was thought to have been prepared for him.

The lines of Grant now extended from the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, near Chesterfield Station, westward some miles, to Jericho Ford of the North Anna. Three miles south of the point at which the railroads cross this stream, is Sexton's Junction, where the Fredericksburg and Gordonsville roads intersect each other. The latter road runs nearly parallel with the river, about three miles southward therefrom, for the distance of fifteen or twenty miles. Directly south of the Gordonsville railroad, again, is a stream called Little river, much of the way only two or three miles distant, though growing more remote as it approaches the point where the Fredericksburg railroad crosses. Further eastward it is crossed by the Gordonsville road, just before entering the North Anna, three or four miles above its junction with the South Anna, to form the Pamunkey. The complication of railroads and rivers in this vicinity is peculiar, remarkably well adapting this country between the Annas for defensive operations.

On the 25th, the firing between the two armies was chiefly by artillery. The enemy held his advance works north of the Little river quietly, for the most part, not caring to hasten an engagement-choosing, probably, in fact, to maintain the appearance of having only a feeble rear-guard left behind to delay pursuit. It was ascertained, however, by reconnoissances made beyond the Gordonsville road, that the three corps of Longstreet, Hill and Ewell were yet at hand. Meanwhile, the time was busily employed by detachments in destroying the Gordonsville road for several miles westward.

It now became manifest to Grant, if such had not from the first been his conviction, that an attempt to force the passage of fortifications and positions of such strength and complication, would involve too great a disadvantage to his army, and was to be avoided by drawing his opponent upon more equal ground. Under the cover of skillful demonstrations to the right and left, therefore, Grant withdrew the main portion of