The object of his despatch, Mr. Fish goes on to say, is to state calmly and dispassionately what the Government of the United States seriously consider to be the injuries it has suffered; it is not written in the nature of a claim, for the United States now make no demand against Her Majesty's Government on account of the injuries they feel they have sustained. Although the United States are anxious for a settlement on a liberal and comprehensive basis of all the questions which now interfere with the entirely cordial relations which they desire should exist between the two Governments, yet they do not now propose or desire to fix any time for this settlement. They prefer to leave that and the more important question of the means and method of removing the causes of complaint, of restoring the much-desired relations of perfect cordiality, and the prevention of the proba bility of like questions in future, to the consideration of Her Majesty's Government; but they will be ready, whenever Her Majesty's Government shall think the proper time has come for a renewed negotiation, to entertain any propositions which that Government shall think proper to present, and to apply to such propositions their earnest and sincere wishes and endeavours for a solution honourable and satisfactory to both countries.

I have recited at length the concluding passages of Mr. Fish's despatch because they express many sentiments which Her Majesty's Government most cordially and sincerely reciprocate. The Government of Her Majesty equally with the Government of the United States earnestly desire that all differences between the two nations may be adjusted amicably and compatibly with the honour of each, and that all causes of future difference between them may be prevented; and they would heartily co-operate with the Government of the United States in laying down, as between themselves, and in recommending for adoption by other maritime nations such principles of maritime law as might obviate the recurrence of similar causes of difference between them.

And it is because they earnestly desire to hasten the period at which these important objects may be accomplished that Her Majesty's Government have determined not to follow Mr. Fish through the long recapitulation of the various points that have been discussed in the voluminous correspondence that has taken place between the two Governments for several years.

Her Majesty's Government had indeed hoped that by the Convention which, under the instructions of his Government, and with their full and deliberate concurrence, Mr. Reverdy Johnson signed with me on the 14th of January of the present year all correspondence between the two Governments had been brought to an end, and that all matters in dispute would be referred for settlement to a dispassionate tribunal. With a view to that result, Her Majesty's Government had in some degree departed from their deliberate convictions and declared resolves; they agreed to the mode of settlement proposed by the United States' Government, which was more than once in the course of that negotiation modified to meet the wishes of that Government; but they did so willingly, because they thought the restoration of a good understanding between Great Britain and the United States might well be purchased by concessions kept within bounds, and not inconsistent with the honour of this country.

Her Majesty's Government learnt with deep concern that the Senate of the United States, in the exercise of the powers unquestionably conferred upon it by the Constitution, repudiated the acts of the Government under whose authority that Convention was concluded, and by rejecting it had left open the whole controversy between the two countries, and had indefinitely prolonged the uncertainty attendant on such a state of things.

Her Majesty's Government regret no less sincerely that the President of the United States concurs with the Senate in disapproving that treaty; but their regret would in some degree be dimi nished if Mr. Fish had been authorized to indicate some other means of adjusting the questions between the two countries, which, as long as they remain open, cannot be favourable to a cordial good understanding between them. This, however, Mr. Fish has not been empowered to do; but he expresses the readiness of the President to consider any proposal emanating from this country. It is obvious, however and Mr. Fish will probably on reflection admitthat Her Majesty's Government cannot make any new proposition or run the risk of another unsuccessful negotiation until they have information more clear than that which is contained in Mr. Fish's despatch respecting the basis upon which the Government of the United States would be disposed to negotiate.

But Her Majesty's Government fully agree with Mr. Fish in considering that

it would be desirable to turn the difficulties which have arisen between the two Governments to good account, by making the solution of them subservient to the adoption, as between themselves in the first instance, of such changes in the rules of public law as may prevent the recurrence between nations that may concur in them of similar difficulties hereafter.

You may assure Mr. Fish that Her Majesty's Government will be ready to co-operate with the Government of the United States for so salutary a result, which would redound to the mutual honour of both countries, and, if accepted by other maritime nations, have an important influence towards maintaining the peace of the world.

You will read this despatch to Mr. Fish, and give him a copy of it if he should desire to have one.

THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO MR.
THORNTON.

Foreign Office, November 6, 1869. Sir, With reference to that passage of Mr. Fish's despatch of the 25th of September in which he says that the object of his despatch, which Mr. Motley is at liberty to read to me, is to state calmly and dispassionately, with a more unreserved freedom than might be used in one addressed directly to the Queen's Government, what the Government of the United States considers the injuries it has suffered, I have to say that, looking upon this despatch as not being of a strictly official character, and as being communicated to me personally rather than as the representative of the Queen's Government, I have not thought it necessary, in my official reply to the communication made by Mr. Motley, to express my dissent from those statements.

I desire, however, to place before Mr. Fish, in the same manner as Mr. Motley was instructed to place before me, some observations that have occurred to me to make on the statements in his despatch; and I accordingly transmit to you a paper to that effect, which you will read to Mr. Fish, giving him a copy if he should desire to have one; and you will explain to him the reasons, as stated in his despatch, which have induced me to adopt this course.

Mr. Fish recapitulates the arguments previously used by Mr. Seward, as to the "precipitate recognition" of belligerent rights, which, he says, "appears in its having been determined on the 6th of May, four days prior to the arrival in London of any official knowledge of the President's proclamation of the 19th of April, 1861," and "signed on the

13th of May, the very day of the arrival of Mr. Adams, the new American Minister; as if in the particular aim of forestalling and preventing explanations on the part of the United States."

The facts are,—

The President's proclamation of blockade was published April 19. Intelligence of its issue was received by telegraph (see the Times) on the 2nd of May.

It was published in the Daily News and other papers on the 3rd of May. Mr. Seward in his despatch to Mr. Adams of the 12th of January, 1867, says it "reached London on the 3rd of May."

A copy was received officially from Her Majesty's Consul at New York on the 5th; another copy from Lord Lyons on the 10th. It was communicated officially by Mr. Dallas to Lord Russell on the 11th, with a copy of a circular from Mr. Seward to the United States' Ministers abroad, dated the 20th of April, calling attention to it, and stating the probability that attempts would be made to "fit out privateers in the ports of England for the purpose of aggression on the commerce of the United States."

The reason of the delay in receiving the copy from Washington was in itself a proof of the existence of civil war, arising, as it did, from the communication between Washington and Baltimore being cut off in consequence of the Confederate troops threatening the capital.

"The prematureness of the measure is further shown by the very tenour of the proclamation -"Whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced between the Government of the United States of America and certain States styling themselves the Confederate States of America." Exception is also taken to the use of the word" contest as distinct from "war." It will be seen on referring to the Report of the Royal Commission for inquiring into the Neutrality Laws (Appendix) that the form of words used is

taken from previous proclamations-"Whereas hostilities at this time exist (June 6, 1823); "Engaged in a contest (September 30, 1825, Turkey and Greece); Whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced" (May 13, 1859, Austria, France, and Italy). The same form was used in the case of Spain and Chili (February 6, 1866), and Spain and Peru (March 13, 1866); "Hostilities have unhappily commenced" (Austria, Prussia, Italy, Germany, June 27, 1866).

The order prohibiting prizes from being brought into British ports, for which the United States' Government thanked the British Government, as being likely to give a death-blow to privateering, speaks of "observing the strictest neutrality in the contest which appears to be imminent" (June 1, 1861).

It is remarkable that, in the case of Turkey and Greece, British subjects were warned to respect "the exercise of belligerent rights." This is omitted in the United States' case, the belligerents being spoken of as the "contending parties."

The expression "States styling themselves the Confederate States of America was purposely adopted to avoid the recognition of their existence as independent States, and gave them great offence.

coast; with the exception of Forts Pickens and Munroe, all the Federal posts and forts had been evacuated, including Harper's Ferry, the arsenal of the Potomac valley. Fort Sumter, the only one which had offered resistance, had fallen a month previously, April 13. The Confederate troops were in occupation of the Shenandoah lines, and threatening Washington. The Confederate President had declared war, and called for a levy of 32,000 troops, to which all the seceded States had responded promptly. On the other hand, the Federal President had called for 75,000 volunteers on the 15th of April, and for 42,000 more on the 3rd of May, and as fast as the regiments could be armed they were hurrying to the defence of Washington. The contending armies were, indeed, face to face.

At

So much for the hostilities on land. The operations at sea, in which British interests were more directly affected, had been carried on with equal vigour. On the 17th of April the Confederate President issued his Proclamation offering to grant letters of marque, which was followed, two days afterwards, by the Federal Proclamation of blockade. the date of the Queen's Proclamation of neutrality both these had been carried, or were being carried, into effect. The Federal Government had instituted the blockade of Virginia and North Carolina, which was declared to be effective on the 30th of April, and were rapidly despatching all the merchant vessels which they could procure, and which they were able to convert into ships-of-war, to the blockade of the other ports. The “General Parkhill," of Liverpool, was captured by the United States' ship "Niagara' while attempting to run the blockade of Charlestown on the 12th of May; and the British vessels "Hilja" and Monmouth" warned off on the same day. Confederate privateers were already at sea. One was captured at the mouth of the Chesapeake river on the 8th of May by the United States' ship Harriet Lane." On the 15th the Federal barque "Ocean Eagle," of Rockhead, Maine, was taken by the Confederate privateer “ Calhoun off New Orleans. At the same port Captain Semmes had already received his commission and was engaged in the outfit of the "Sumter."

Could any explanations which Mr. Adams might have had to offer alter such a state of things as this? Can any other name be given to it than that of civil war?

It is stated that there was no fact of continued and flagrant "hostilities" to

justify the action of Great Britain in issuing a Proclamation of neutrality.

Mr. Seward, writing at the time, and previously to the Queen's Proclamation (May 4), characterized the proceedings of the Confederates as open, flagrant, deadly war," and as civil war" ("Congress Papers, 1861," p. 165), and in a communication to M. de Tassara, the Spanish Minister, referred to the operations of the Federal blockade as belligerent operations which would be carried on with due respect to the rights of neutrals.

Judge Betts, in the case of the "Hiawatha," &c., said, "I consider that the outbreak in particular States, as also in the Confederated States, was an open and flagrant civil war."

It was also judicially decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the " Amy Warwick" and other prizes, that "the Proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized such a measure." Moreover, the joint resolution of Congress in July, 1861, approving and confirming the acts of the President ("North America, No. 1, 1862," p. 57), commences, "Whereas, since the adjournment of Congress on the 4th of March last, a formidable insurrection in certain States of this Union has arrayed itself in armed hostility ;" and a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 22nd of July, 1861, speaks of the present deplorable civil war," and of "this war."

The date at which the civil war actively commenced has, therefore, been fixed by the published despatches of the Secretary of State, by proceedings in Congress, by the formal judgment of the United States' Prize Courts, as well as by the universal assent of all the neutral Powers concerned; but it is urged that, nevertheless, there was no necessity for Great Britain to take notice of it, as no ship of the insurgents had appeared in British ports, no collision occurred at sea, nor did the nearness of Great Britain to the seat of hostilities compel her

to act.

With regard to the latter point, it is difficult to see how one nation can be much nearer to another than England to the United States, seeing that the British dominions touch the United States on two sides, while the British islands of New Providence, &c., lie immediately in front. As to a collision at sea, it was apparent that British commerce must be interfered h the moment the blockade came into ion, as indeed was the case, several

British vessels having been captured before there was time for the intelligence of the Proclamation of Neutrality to reach America. As to the arrival of Confederate ships in British ports, such ships were afloat and might at any time be expected. As Mr. Dana, in the notes to the eighth edition of Wheaton," expresses it (p. 35), "it is not fit that cases should be left to be decided as they may arise by private citizens or naval or judicial officers, at home or abroad, by sea or land."

The British Government were compelled to take action of some sort; was that action really unfriendly? Was it intended to be unfriendly?

No one who recollects what actually passed, or will consult "Hansard," can suppose that the Proclamation was intended to be unfriendly. On the contrary, as was stated by Mr. Forster in his speech at Bradford, it was absolutely pressed upon the Government by the friends of the Northern States, who were afraid lest Confederate privateers should be fitted out in British ports.

Nor was its immediate result injurious to the Federal States. Far from being so, it legitimatized the captures of the blockading squadron, and, in the language of the Prize Court, "estopped' the British merchants, whose vessels were seized, from making reclamation.

While the intelligence of the issue of the Queen's Proclamation was still fresh, and almost immediately after hearing of the French and Spanish Proclamations of Neutrality, the President, in his Message of the 4th of July, 1861, stated that he was "happy to say that the sovereignty and rights of the United States are now practically respected by foreign Powers, and a general sympathy with the country is manifested throughout the world."

Does any one really believe that the Queen's Proclamation in the very least influenced the movements of the Confederate armies? All the preparations for war had been made long before, munitions collected, troops levied, and generals appointed. The proclamation reached America at the end of May, by which time the Confederates had taken up their position on the Upper Potomac, and the Federals had occupied Alexandria, in Virginia, with a force of 13,000 men (May 24).

The armies on both sides were in motion; skirmishes were daily occurring; engagements took place at Little Bethel on the 10th of June, at Carthage, Missouri, on the 6th of July, and at Centreville on the 18th, followed by the great

battle of Manassas Junction on the 21st. Can any one suppose that if the Proclamation had not been issued that battle would not have been fought?

The charge of premature recognition on examination reduces itself to this, that the Proclamation ought not to have been issued until Mr. Adams arrived, or until some event called for it. Against this is to be set the fact that the Proclamation was considered by some friends of the Northern States as a step taken in their interests, and that it was further pressed upon the Government by Mr. Dallas's communication of Mr. Seward's circular. Moreover, Confederate privateers were at sea, and British vessels being made prizes by the Federal blockading fleet.

Besides the assertion of the premature recognition of belligerent rights, the despatch states that maritime enterprises in the ports of Great Britain, which would otherwise have been piratical, were, "by virtue of the Proclamation," rendered lawful, "and thus Great Britain became, and to the end continued to be, the arsenal, the navy-yard, and the treasury of the insurgent Confederacy."

Mr. Fish, in a preceding passage, admits that national belligerency is "an existing fact," and he might have added that it exists independently of any official proclamation of neutral Powers, as is shown by the records of the American Prize Courts, which continually recognize the belligerency of the South American States; although, as Mr. Seward stated in one of his despatches, the United States have never issued a Proclamation of Neutrality except in the case of France and England in 1793. This was proved in the civil war by the reception at Curaçoa of the Confederate vessel" Sumter " as a belligerent cruiser, though the Netherlands had issued no Proclamation of Neutrality. It was this recognition of the "Sumter," after her departure from New Orleans (July 6, 1661), at Curaçoa, and at Cienfuegos, which first practically accorded maritime belligerent rights to the Confederates, a fact which is overlooked when it is alleged that Confederate "belligerency, so far as it was maritime," proceeded "from the ports of Great Britain and her dependencies alone."

Indeed, it is not going too far to say that the Confederates derived no direct benefit from the Proclamation. Their belligerency depended upon the fact (a fact which, when we are told that the civil war left behind it two millions and a half of dead and maimed, is, unfortu. nately, indisputable) that they were

waging civil war. If there had been no Proclamation, the fact would have remained the same, and belligerency would have had to be recognized either on behalf of the Northern States, by admitting the validity of captures on the high seas for the carriage of contraband or breach of blockade, or on the arrival of the "Sumter," or some similar vessel, in a British port.

In no case can it be really supposed that the recognition of belligerency, which, unless neutral nations abandoned their neutrality and took an active part in the contest, was inevitable, materially influenced the fortunes of such a fearful and protracted civil war.

What

At all events, if it did, the Confede rates never acknowledged it; the recognition of belligerency they regarded (as indeed was the case) as a right which Icould not be denied to them. they sought was not the mere technical title of "belligerents," but a recognition of independence; and when they found that it was hopeless to expect England to accord it, they cut off all intercourse with this country, expelled Her Majesty's Consuls from their towns, and did every thing in their power to show the sense which they entertained of the injury which they believed had been inflicted upon them. The result being that while one side has blamed us for doing too much, the other side has blamed us for doing too little, and thus an assumption of neutrality has been regarded both by North and South as an attitude of hostility.

As to the Queen's Proclamation rendering lawful the despatch of the "Alabama," Shenandoah," and "Georgia' from British ports, to which it is to be presumed the expression "maritime enterprises" refers, it is to be remarked that it is exactly against such enterprises that the Proclamation reciting the terms of the Foreign Enlistment Act was intended to warn British subjects. Instead of rendering them lawful it rendered them additionally unlawful, by giving notice of their illegality.

There would be no difficulty in show. ing by precedents from American Prize Courts that no proclamation of neutrality is required to confer belligerent rights on vessels commissioned by a de facto Government.

It is admitted that at the time these "enterprises" were undertaken "hostilities" in America were being prosecuted "on a scale of gigantic magnitude." After, therefore, the "Alabama" escaped, on the 29th of July, 1862, sho became, by virtue of her Confederate