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of action on the Pyrenees; that it does actually give the French a large and well appointed disposable force which they would not otherwise have possessed; these considerations are to be regarded as triding when compared to the main object." We have got Portugal, though not all belonging to it: we have got rid of the French there; no matter what becomes of them-charity begins at home - and if these same French should march over the Pyrenees and help to beat the Spanish Patriots, why we are very sorry for it, but, cur business was to get them out of Portugal: and as to the few little advantages which the French obtained in the course of the negociation and in wording the Conventions, besides that they also are very subordinate considerations, is it our fault that Kellermann was the best negociator of the two? Sir Arthur is a soldier, not a statesman; he has shewn that he could fight and beat the French too; is he to be blamed because he cannot wield the pen as well as the sword, or because Kellermann, who is probably some dull plodding German as his name indicates, and never fought a successful battle in his life, should get and keep the whip hand of him in the course of a long, intricate, and most difficult negociation?"-This, I make no doubt, is the sort of reasoning with which we shall be hereafter edified. But it will not, I dare say, Sir, have escaped your observation, that your correspondent C. has, in your last number, brought forward some

secret motives, and those very strong ones, to influence the determination of our commanders to agree to a conditional surrender." This Mr. C. must surely be one of Sir Arthur's indiscreet injudicious friends, or be never would even have hinted at secret motives in a case, from which, of all others, secrecy seems most necessary to be banished. What, in the name of heaven, could be the secret motives in such a case. auless they consisted in the very convenient, though not very honourable, preference given to the sort of service that was to follow the Conventions, over that which musthave been undertaken to force Janot and his army to unconditional surrender? As to C.'s quibbling about your expression of "next arrival," it may, together with his other miserable shifts and subterfeges, be safely left to the corrective energy of your own pen, which has very properly characterized him and the cause in which he is embarked. The whole nation will bear you testimony? that it did expect (and not without reason), that the next advices of any importance from the army would announce the surrcn

der of the French at discretion, and that the vessel that brought those advices would also bring two or three of the principal French generals by way of a sample of what ours had been able to achieve. This, I can at least vouch, was the general sentiment throughout the metropolis, and it should seem that the counties were to the full as sanguine. But, since we are on ila subject of secret motives," I will suggest for your consideration one which I think more likely than any other to have influenc ed the determination of our commanders; one which must not only have embarrassed them greatly at the time of framing the Conventions, but which will, if they are good courtiers as I take them to be, einbarrass them still more when they come to unfold their motives to the people of England.

Did you never hear, Mr. Cobbett, of such a thing as an INSTRUCTION to a commander drawn up with studied ambiguity, or so en cumbered with a multitude of expletiveswith paragraph within paragraph-parenthe sis within parenthesis-hypothesis bul upon hypothesis--and the whole so inter larded with ifs and buts that it might le construed any and every way save into direct, clear, and positive meaning? A did you never hear, Sir, that Lord Casti reagh was famous for giving such Instac tions? There is no act of any descrip for which a saving clause may not be in such a dispatch; and there is no ch in it by which any one act can be positively justified. Yet it is such a dispatch unde whose influence I am told our commanders acted; and if my information be correct, as I have no doubt it is, their embarrassment, as to what defence they shall set up, will be most naturally accounted for.-But, Sir, let us now look a little farther forward into the consequences of this business; let us see whether it be not possible to extract some eventual good out of the evil that we thus grievously lament. I quite agree with you, that to lose our time in fruitless whining and complaints is to act in a manner very unbecoming men and good citizens. We are, if we do our duty, to see if some prac tical good may not hereafter result from the confidence of the nation having been thes shamefully abused. We know from the language of the throne that an inquiry is to take place. Whatever may be the sen tence pronounced in a military view, it must be obvious to every body that the source of the evil is not altogether of a mi litary nature, and that it is one which a military court of inquiry is not very likely to notice or to animadvert upon with much

this sort should be made, was absolutely to say to ourally the Prince Regent," You shall be no longer master of your country. We have done yout he favour of driving out the French for you, but you have no business to inquire how they came there, or by whom they have been aided or abetted, You shall be nominal sovereign of Portugal, but we will carry on the police for you.' In short, it is as completely dethroning the Prince Regent as if we had sent him word that he should not return to Europe now, that he has a comfortable home at the Bra zils.-You, Sir, have asked a very pertinent question : "What would the French government have done had its generals made such a Convention as ours have made?" In the first place, Buonaparte, who knows how to choose his men, would hardly have employed a general capable of such a transaction; or if, from favouritism or any family consideration, for these do sometimes prevail at St. Cloud also,--he did send such a person to command an army, he would have placed a proper check upon him in the second in command, or in the chief of the staff. If, however, after all, such an act had been committed, I have very little doubt that he would have instantly disgraced all the parties concerned in it.

barshness. What I allude to, Sir, is the practice that has obtained of late years of military and naval commanders negociating and binding their country to stipulations which are altogether beyond the competency of their functions. It is a question in my mind how far the country is, in honour and good faith, obliged to abide by conditions thus subscribed to. I am very much of opinion that the country is under no such obligation; for if you carry the same principle but a little farther, it would be a necessary consequence that if Lord Cathcart, or Gen. Whitelocke, or Sir H. Dalrymple, or any other of your Convention-making generals had, besides giving up the advantages they respectively possessed, chosen to surrender Portsmouth, or Chatham lines, we must equally have been bound to admit an enemy's garrison into them. The Duke of York's stipulating for the surrender of 8,000 French prisoners who were well and securely lodged in our prison-ships and barracks does come has near as possible to such a supposition. But if this be a question open for the discussions of the learned in the law of naitions, imagine that it is not a matter of doubt whether it would be better to restrict our generals in future from committing Le their country by similar engagement.-Some sch discretionary power is no doubt necessary -The warning he has given Depont de to the command of an army but then that of what is to be his fate sufficiently indicates net power should be as much as possible of a what would have been his conduct in the mintary nature. The extreme of an evil case you have contemplated. I think then, is in some cases its best cure; and it will Sir, that some practical good may arise out now be felt that there is a point beyond of the Conventions; because I think that which a general may not transgress the li- they will serve as a warning to ministers what mits of his command. --To apply this ob- Instructions they give generals; and as a servation to the Conventions, I would ask, waruing to generals not to exceed the pow what could be so entirely extra military, so ers intrusted to them. They must, I think, exclusively a political consideration as the be productive of a new system in these resacknowledgement contained in the first arti- pects; for even if Lord Castlereagh should, dle of Sir A. Wellesley's armistice, of his for the misfortune of the country, continue imperial and royal majesty Napoleon I. ? to direct the war department, he must still It is no matter whether the said Napoleon see that he will, in the end, run too great a would or would not, at some future day, risk should he always give obscure unintelli. have been acknowledged by us in that capa-gible instructions, and should his generals, city; it could never belong to a general Commanding an army on a foreign station to determine the time or mode of so doing.If I am told that it is an unmeaning complimentary article, and that Buonaparte is not the more an emperor because Sir A. Wel lesley chose to call him so, I have only to reply, then why do not you upon the same plea get rid of the Conventions altogether? Again, what could be more an un-military and political concern than the inquiry, into the conduct of the Portuguese during the French occupation of their country To stipulate moreover that no inquiry of

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for want of a better guide, always blunder over their business in the way we have so often witnessed.-The inquiry that will take place about the Portugal Conventions will set these matters in their proper light, and it will also, I trust, expose to public reprobation that other part of our intercourse with foreign powers, which, under the specious name of conciliation, moderation, &c. would sacrifice the dignity and often the best interests of the country to a mistaken notion of personal feeling and propriety.-I expert to hear upon this subject, that it was perfectly genteel and well-bred to treat Junut and his

army in the manner we have done after having beat them in the field: that it was the bias of a great and generous mind, soaring above little narrow and vulgar national prejudices, to shew that as we were great so we could be merciful; and that it might conciliate the good-will of other countries of France and of Russia, for instance--to let them see that when victorious we could set bounds to our triumphs, and aot carry our resentment to extremes. You may believe me, Sir, it is not with this amiable part of the British character that the nations of the world want to be made acquainted. They give us full credit for disinterestedness, moderation, and generosity; they know that we would never strike or insult a fallen enemy; but they are not so certain of our acting with that vigour that would convince both friends and toes that we are not to be insulted with impunity; that we are resolved to obtain satisfaction proportioned to the injuries that

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pedition, had no other thought in his head than how he should land his army; when that is done he must take time to look about him; and if unmolested by the enemy be sits quietly down upon the shore to consume the provisions brought for him in a fleet of victuallers. It is then fortunate if he does not think it necessary to send home for fresh instructions before he proceeds any farther. At length, up comes the enemy-You ob served, no doubt. at the time, that on the 21st August our army was the attacked not the attacking party; and I have been informed, from very credible authority, that our general knew so little of his opponent's movements, that the troops were three times put under arms and as often dismissed in the night of the 20th; and that it was only at six o'clock in the morning, when Juno's main body was seen within a very short distance of ours, that we discovered what his intentions really were. If it had not been for Junot's adopt

we receive; that our exertions will not slacking the spirited resolution of marching out of en until the just object of our undertakings be accomplished; and that, at any rate, we are not to be gulled by the artifices of the first intriguer with whom we may happen to have to deal. This is what the people of the continent want to see; they feel that instead of our being Machiavelists, as Buonapaste calls us, all the Machiavelism is on his side, and that we have too often carried on our concerns with other powers with an awkwardness, and a want of system bordering upon silliness.-They think that we make immense efforts to produce very trifling comparative benefits. The nation gives with profusion money and men; the government is at times active in employing them; our soldiers and sailors fight most valiantly; and yet, in the end, what does it all avail us? -We either fail in our object as at the Helder, or obtain it but partially as in the case of Portugal. What can this be owing to but to a defect or to a total want of system? We see things through too small a medium, or we do not look far enough into the conse quences of them. Hence it follows, that when we are successful, what with surprise and joy, we are so confused that we know not what to do next.-The actions of the 17th and 21st August, do infinite honour to the bravery of our troops, and we certainly were not behind-hand in bestowing a full measure of applause upon their commanders; but it is clear to me that those actions will be noticed in history, more for the inadequate effects which they produced than for any credit that may be due to the persons engaged in them. It really seems as if a British general, going on the command of an ex

Lisbon to give us battle, he might, according
to our mode of proceeding, of which the
having three different commanders-in-chief
in the course of 36 hours is no immateria
trait, have puzzled them all three so as pe
haps to be at this moment in possession
that capital. As it was, we were forced
fight, and our soldiers fought as they
have done. But was it enough to beat the
enemy in an encounter which in the sec
years' war would have been considered as 10
mo
more than a sharp affair of advanced guardi
Where would Buonaparte now be, if, after
the battle of Auerstadt, he had sat himself
quietly down before the town, concluded an
armistice, and enjoyed for ten days the
tickling compliments which one of the king
of Prussia's generals might have paid him co
the bravery of his troops, or the distinguish
ed conduct of any part of them?-Why, it
is probable that the Prussians would have re-
covered from their panic; collected their
scattered corps; and taken up some position
in which to arrest the conqueror's march: at
all events they would not have been devour.
ed piecemeal, or compelled to surrender at
discretion, before they could reach any tena-
ble position. But Buonaparte's business was
to take all possible advantage of his victory,
and to reach Berlin by the shortest road.
Qurs was to reach Lisbon. He marched his
distance in a shorter time than the Prussians,
We let the French escape and never stirred
from our ground. He then exemplified the
principle which we altogether neglect, and
the neglect of which is, in my opinion, the
cause of much of our distress.-With an
exultation, which is only pardonable when it

is successful, he cries: "Nothing is done
whilst any thing remains to be done;" and
instantly his troops march on to farther con-
quest and take rest only when their enemy
is utterly annihilated. We, on the contrary,
always take time to surfeit ourselves with joy
and congratulations; the enemy is always
active, and after a due portion of expectation
and conjecture the public is astonished with
the information that our first success not
having been followed up, it has been either
counterbalanced by some success of the ene-
my, or tarnished by some want of proper
exertion on our own part.-You, Sir, were
amongst those who approved of our proceed-
ings last year towards Denmark. It was at-
tempted by men of high political considera-
tion in this country, to maintain that those
proceedings alienated from us the affections
of the continent. Sir, it was no such thing.
The politicians on the continent, many even
who did not wish well to this country, were
unanimous in exclaiming: "At last the En-
glish are roused from their lethargy; at last
they assume the tone and attitude that be-
comes them; we shall now see, at least in
the north of Europe, something like a coun-
terpoise to Buonaparte's overbearing ambi-
tion." They admired the wisdom of our
plan, and would have admired the energy
of the execution, if they had not seen
us in the month of September drawing
in our horns, and hiding ourselves within
our shells as if afraid of the cold of October
and November. They then thought that we
had put ourselves to a great expence, made
an amazing uproar in Europe, and subjected
our moral character as a nation, at least to
some sort of imputation, without obtaining
any object adequate to so much risk.-If the
Conventions, and the inquiry that is to be in
stituted concerning them, should lead to a
correction of this most capital defect in our
system of foreign policy, I shall think that
the disgrace, which they have otherwise.royalty; but as an unhappy and abandoned
brought upon us, is not without its counter-
vailing advantage. -I am, yours, &c.—An
ENGLISHMAN.Oct. 19, 1803.

with Portugal, I entertained the hope that
he would not abandon the sentiments of es-
teem and friendship which he had always
manifested towards me. But when I per-
ceived that his troops advanced towards my
capital, I felt the urgency there was for col-
lecting my army round my person, to pre-
sent myself before my august ally in a man-
ner worthy of the king of Spain. I should.
have removed all his doubts, and have se-
cured my best interests. I gave orders to
my troops to leave Portugal and Madrid, and
I united them in various parts of my mo-
narchy, not to abandon my subjects, but
honourably to support the glory of my
throne. Besides, my extensive experience
convinced me that the emperor of the French
might very well entertain wishes conforma-
ble to his particular interest, and to the po-
licy of the vast system of the Continent,
but which might be inconsistent with the
interests of my house. What was, in such
circumstances, your conduct? You intro-
duced disorder into my palace, and infused
a spirit of mutiny into my body guard, against
my person. Your father was your prisoner;
my prime minister, whom I had appointed
and adopted into my family, covered with
blood, was driven from one danger to an-
other. You dishonoured my grey hairs-
you despoiled me of the crown, possessed
with glory by my ancestors, which they had
preserved without a stain. You seated your
self upon my throne, and placed yourself at
the disposal of the people of Madrid, and of
foreign troops, who were then entering the
capital. The conspiracy of the Escurial had
already accomplished its purposes. The acts
of my administration were brought into
public contempt.
public contempt. Old, and oppressed by
infirmity, I was not able to surmount this
new misfortune. I resorted to the emperor
of the French, not as a king at the head of
my troops, surrounded by the pomp of

EXPOSITION OF THE PRACTICES AND MA

CHINATIONS WHICH LED TO THE USURPATION OF THE CROWN OF SPAIN, AND THE MEANS ADOPTED BY THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH TO CARRY IT INTO EXECUTION: BY DON PEDRO CEVALLOS, FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE AND DISPATCHES TO HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY, FERDINAND VII. (Continued from p. 610.) While these occupied the right bank of the Ebro, and appeared to have for their object the maintaining the communication

prince. I have found refuge and protection in the midst of his camp. I owe to him my own life, that of the queen, and that of the prime minister. I have arrived at last at Bayonne, and you have so conducted this negociation, that every thing depends upon the mediation and protection of this great prince. The idea of resorting to popular agitation would tend to the ruin of Spain, and expose yourself, my kingdom, my subjects, and my family, to the most horrible catastrophes. My heart has been fully unfolded to the emperor; he knows all the injuries I have received, and the violence that has been done to me; he has declared to me, that you shall never be acknowledged

as king, and that the enemy of his father can never acquire the confidence of foreign states. He has, in addition to this, shewn me letters written with your own band. which clearly shew your aversion to France, -Things being thus situated, my rights are clear, and my duties are much more so. It is incumbent on me to prevent the shedding of the blood of my subjects, to do nothing at the conclusion of my career, which shall carry fire and sword into every part of Spain, and reduce it to the most horrible misery. Certainly, if faithful to your primary obligations, and to the feelings of nature, you had rejected those perfidious counsels, and placed yourself constantly at my side, for the defence of your father, you had waited the regular course of nature, which would have elevated you in a few years to the rank of royalty. I should have been able to conciliate the policy and interests of Spain, with that of all. For six months, no doubt, matters have been in a critical situation; but notwithstanding such difficulties, I should have obtained the support of my subjects; I should have availed myself of the weak means which yet remained to me, of the moral aid which I should have acquired, meeting always my ally with suitable dignity, to whom I never gave cause of complaint; and an arrangement would have been made which would have accommodated the interests of my subjects to those of my family. But in tearing from my head the crown, you have not preserved it for yourself; you have taken from it all that is august and sacred in the eyes of mankind. Your behaviour with respect to me, your intercepted letters, have put a brazen barrier between yourself and the throne of Spain, and it is neither your own interest nor that of the country that you should reign in it. Avoid lighting a fire which will unavoidably cause your complete ruin, and the degrada. tion of Spain. I am king by the right given me by my forefathers: my abdication was the result of force and violence; I have nothing to receive from you; nor can I consent to the convocation of the cortes, an additional absurdity, suggested by the inexperienced persons who attend you.-I have reigned for the happiness of my subjects, and I do not wish to bequeath them civil war, mutiny, popular jaatas, and revolution. Every thing should be done for the people, and nothing by the people: to forget this maxim, were to become the accomplice of all the crimes that must follow

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its neglect. I have sacrificed the whole of my life to my people; and in the advanced age to which I have arrived, I shall do nothing in opposition to their religion, their tranquillity, and their happiness. I have reigned for them; I will constantly occupy myself for their sakes; I will forget all my sacrifices; and when at last I shall be co vinced that the religion of Spain, the inte grity of her provinces, her independence, and her privileges are preserved, I shall descend to the tomb, forgiving those who have enbittered the last years of my life. -Ditel from the imperial palace of Bayonne, called the Government Palace, May 2, 1808. No. IX.-Letter written by King Ferdinand VII. to his angust Father, in answer t the preceding.

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My honoured Father and Lord; -I re ceived the letter that your majesty conde scended to write to me, dated yesterday, and I will endeavour to answer all the particu hrs with that moderation and respect which is due to your majesty.-Your majesty speaks, in the first place, with respect to the alteration in your political conduct to wards France, after the peace of Basle; and in truth, I believe there is no individual is Spain who has complained of it; rather all were unanimous in praising your majer your confidence in, and fidelity to the p ciples you had adopted. Mine, in part Jar. were entirely similar to your own; I have given irrefragable proofs of it from the moment when your majesty abdicated the throne in my favour.-Had the affir of the Escurial, which your majesty states, originated in the hatred with which my wife inspired me against France, your ministers, my beloved mother, and your royal self, been examined with all the legal forms, it would have evidently proved the contrary. Notwithstanding I had not the least influence, and no liberty beyond the shew of it,-guarded, as I was, by domestics whom you pat round me, yet the eleven counsellors chosen by your majesty were unani mously of opinion, that there was no ground for the accusation, and that the supposed criminals were innocent. -Your majesty talks of the distrust created by the entrance of so many foreign troops into Spain; and that if your majesty recilled from Portugal your troops, and united those that were in Madrid, at Aranjuez, and its neighbourhood. it was not to abandon your subjects, but to support the glory of the throne. (To be continued.)

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