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the floor or in the galleries, will refrain from all demonstrations whatever; that nothing shall transpire on this occasion to mar the dignity and moderation which have characterized these proceedings, in the main so reputable to the American people, and worthy of the respect of the world." The request is observed. In five minutes from the time of entering the hall, the declaration is pronounced that Hayes and Wheeler have been elected President and VicePresident. The Senate now files out of the hall. One minute later, the House refuses Mr. Atkins' request to "take up the army appropriation bill." It adjourns and the weary crowds of nocturnal watchers wend their weary way in the early dawn of that March morning homeward. The stars and stripes, which for thirty days had floated uninterruptedly over the Capitol, denoting a continuous session, are appropriately lowered.

Then for the first time in our history sprang into existence, new and peculiar relations in our polity. They are epitomized in two Latin phrases de facto and de jure. These terms were then more familiar to other nations than to us. Was it not Daniel Webster who, in speaking of the Great Charter, said, "though it was written in a dead language, it was vital with liberty?" De facto and de jure, discordant as they seem in sound and sense, should be one; and both should be concordant with freedom. The genius of good government is in making them interchangeable. By melting fact into right, the actual into the ideal, Practice walks hand in hand with Justice. It is then that we have Utopia. It is then that we have the ne plus ultra of our political hopes. It is then that fact is founded upon undimmed and unchangeable relations. It is then that both are eternal. Right cannot move except in harmony with its omniscient Author. Facts isolated may be transient, temporary and ill-omened. The shifting, treacherous waves symbolize them, but beneath repose the everlasting deeps of Right. What do we mean by de jure and de facto? De jure means by right, by justice, or by law, as distinguished from that which is existent, irregularly, and temporarily. De facto, as the word signifies, is something made-factum. We speak of something manufactured, like a threshing machine, or an electoral return, when distinguished from that which is essential. In one case, the man who uses the machine without the patent right is no less a trespasser than the one who holds an office upon a false, manufactured return, made to order. It is still believed by more than one-half of our people that the fact accomplished in the formal inauguration of a de facto President, and in the repression of the popular choice, was an outrageous wrong. All nations have an abstract right to be free. But the divine order which establishes this right is almost universally violated. Few nations and few men are de facto free. This is because of ignorance, violence, selfishness, treachery, and tyranny. During our Civil War, the Southern States, when out of their Federal relation to the Constitution, were regarded by all as de facto regular states, if not by all, as de jure states.



The states preserved their statehood, and even when irregular governments subvened, the temporary local governments remained. Why? For human convenience and necessity; because worse might or would have happened: for must not courts run, debts be collected, and prisoners be tried, acquitted or convicted, and murderers hanged? Must not judgments be entered, property transfers executed, marriages performed, production go on, that subsistence may be had, and all the duties and responsibilities of a quasi government, as the agent of society, be exercised, if only temporarily? He who would propose to crush such a wise arrangement, or to upturn such results would bastardize the issue of marriages, unsettle honest titles, and declare the hanging of the murderer to be itself murder. He would be the enemy of mankind. The rule de facto in such stress, is, therefore, justifiable. It is justified by publicists and courts, by reason and right; for when the interests of the people—of the young and innocent, especially, and of society generally—are jeopardized by human passion and selfishness, a government of some kind is necessary to their defense and protection.

It frequently occurs, as in the case of Don Carlos, in Spain, or as in the case of the rival claimants for the French crown, that divers dynasties make contest. Bewildered subjects are expected to fight under the ensign of one or the other, all swearing, like good knights, to avouch the quality of the title which appears to them. For years England divided under the emblem of the Rose; and each adherent was ready, to the death, to contend for the peculiar aroma, hue, and beauty of his favorite. Such contests arise from the nature of human society and the self-preferences of the few, competing against each other. They depend, as in France, upon the Salique law, which forbade women the throne; or, later, upon the selfish caprices of the citizen, or a coup d'etat by an Emperor. In America, peace depended on a fateful day upon the submission of the Democratic party to the decree of an Electoral Commission of doubtful legality, based on the frauds of a notoriously corrupt and unconstitutional returning board.

In so far as the question of the legitimacy of the acting Executive, Rutherford B. Hayes, was concerned, it had no foreign or hereditary aspect. All the nations, by the jus gentium, recognized him; and, for certain purposes, all the people of this country also. He held the emblems and reins of power. Congress had to hold its co-ordinate relations with him, or with no There was no


No armed or other conflict pretended to test his title. attempt to do so. Was there any constitutional or other provision, by quo warranto or otherwise, to test it? It was doubted whether any constitutional power existed to use that writ, even if a law for it were passed. It was an anomalous hiatus. Adequate provision is made in many of the states to test the title of their chief executive. In Ohio and New-York a quo warranto suit may be instituted by the competing candidate, and a judgment ousting the incumbent may be extended to the seating of his com

petitor. In Wisconsin, the supreme court, through Chief Justice Whiton (4 Wis., 792), declared that the election, and not the canvass, of the votes determined the right to office. The Court went behind the canvass, and, on the just principle, ubi jus, ibi remedium, took jurisdiction to declare the respondent chosen. If remedy be found for a wrong to one of the members of our Union, why not for a wrong to the whole body? The protest of the popular branch of Congress remains. That body, by resolution, declared that the State of Florida had given its votes for the Democratic candidates. On the 3d of March, in a most solemn resolution, offered by Mr. Knott, of Kentucky, it declared, by 146 to 82, that they were duly elected. In spite, therefore, of the action of the Electoral Commission and the farce of its confirmation by the Senate, the defeat of the Presidential succession, at least de jure, was of such gravity that no lapse of time can suppress, no sneer belittle, and no compliance with Democratic policy obliterate the criminality of those who plotted for it. How far may discussion of that crime be opened for historic reference? How many anodynes may be given to drug it to sleep? Is it now too late to expose wrong, even if it cannot be repaired or punished? Time cannot so veneer it as to make it right. The question will recur: "Had not the Democrats the true majority in the Electoral College?" Is it argued, that by the mode of its ascertainment by the Electoral Commission-this question was decided authoritatively? In answer, let it for a moment be assumed that the Commission was authorized by the Constitution. However doubtful the right of Congress to delegate to such a body the duty delegated to itself; however uniform the practice and certain the duty, that each house held the negative on the count of any state; however unwise to give the power away to a third body, even if the power to devolve it existed; nevertheless the fact remains, that the question of who was or was not the choice of the Electoral College was never decided! The truth was never declared, nor pretended to be declared. It was ignored-deliberately and intentionally. It was avoided. That Commission ostensibly passed only upon certain papers furnished them by the President of the Senate. These papers were merely prima facie writings of those interested in the result certified. The Commission did not entertain the merits. It did not allow the impeachment of falsehood, nor the rebuttal of concocted certificates. To have done so would have conferred right and repressed wrong. It would have executed the will of the States and the People—the summa jura imperii! That will was not executed, and hence the relations de facto and de jure hung in ominous unrest for four years over the land.






HE result of the electoral count of 1877 did not dishearten the Democratic people and party. It stimulated them to renewed exertion. The administration of Rutherford B. Hayes, as has been shown, was that of a de facto Executive. As such he was the nineteenth President of the United States. He was lacking in certain elements of power. He was a man of amiable and complaisant disposition. He and the author of this book, practiced law together, at Cincinnati, in their early days. He won a fair reputation as a lawyer; but he won more reputation in the Civil War, by honorable service in the Union cause. He became a major-general. He was elected to Congress in 1864, while in the field. It was his success in contesting the gubernatorial chair with Allen G. Thurman in 1869, and his re-election in 1875, that gave him the good or the ill fortune of the nomination for the Presidency at Cincinnati, in 1876. His inaugural utterances were suave and plausible; but they did not conciliate the vindictive feeling which his peculiar accession to power occasioned. His best purposes were nullified. Had he refused to accept the office of President in 1877, in all probability he would have been the Executive for eight years after 1880. The era of good feeling did not come in his administration, because of the questionable character of his credentials. He had able men in his cabinet. Such men as Evarts, Sherman, McCrary, Thomp

son, Schurz, Devens, and Key are rarely matched for executive skill and art. During his term there was much trouble connected with the labor movements.

In 1877, the agitation for the remonetization of silver disturbed the finances of the country. By the first coinage regulations the standard unit of value was the American silver dollar. The act of April 2, 1792, which established the Mint, designated the coins of the United States. The gold coins were "Eagles," "Half Eagles," and "Quarter Eagles." The silver coins were "Dollars or Units,”— each to be of the value of a Spanish "milled dollar” (the same that was then current), and to contain 371 1-4 grains of pure silver or 416 grains of standard silver; "Half Dollars," of half the value of the dollar or unit; “Quarter Dollars,” of one-fourth the value of the dollar or unit. There were "Dimes” and “Half Dimes" of proportional value, and "Cents" and "Half Cents." The eagles were "each to be of the value of ten dollars or units," and to contain 247 1-2 grains of pure or 270 grains of standard gold. The half and quarter eagles were to be of proportional weight and value. Coinage was free, and all gold and silver coins of these denominations were declared to be “a lawful tender in all payments whatsoever." The same act prescribed that "the money of account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars or units, dimes or tenths, cents or hundredths, and mills or thousands."

The standard for all gold coins of the United States was fixed by this act; eleven parts in twelve of the entire weight of each coin were to consist of pure gold, and the twelfth part of alloy, the alloy to be of silver and copper in convenient proportions, not exceeding one-half silver. The standard fixed for all silver coins was 1485 parts fine (pure) silver, to 179 parts alloy, the latter to be wholly of copper. The proportional value of gold to silver in all United States coins was fixed at fifteen to one, according to quantity in weight, of pure gold or pure silver; that is to say, every fifteen pounds of pure silver was to be of equal value in all payments with one pound weight of pure gold, and so in proportion as to any greater or less quantities of the respective metals.

By the act of Jan. 18, 1837, the standard for both gold and silver coins was thereafter to be nine hundred parts of a thousand of pure metal, and one hundred of alloy, the alloy to be the same as that previously prescribed. The weight of the silver dollar was fixed at 412 1-2 grains, and that of the gold eagle at 258 grains. The smaller denominations were to be of proportional weights, and the gold and silver coins issued under both acts were made a legal tender at their nominal value for the payment of all debts. This act provided for the coinage of gold double eagles and gold dollars of proportional weights, and it made these new coins also a legal tender. By the act of Feb. 21, 1853, the weight of the silver half dollar was reduced to 192 grains, and that of the quarter dollar, dime, and half dime, pro

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