no proof that it was not strong when Junot entered it at first; and with you rests the onus probandi. I do not purpose to enter into a detailed account of the circumtances under which Janot entered, and took pos session of Lisbon; nor do I intend to quote the Prince Regent's Manifesto, and a variety of other documents to prove how he could have been resisted; and I am not aware of any reason why it may not be admitted, though contrary to the fact, that there was not, at the time Junot entered Portugal, one parapet in the whole kingdom, from behind which resistance could have been made with greater advantage than in the open field, if resistance had been determined on. can, indeed, be no analogy between the situation of the French and English armies at the times they respectively entered the country. But since when did these places become so very strong? There is no reason to be astonished; Junot has been in Portugal long enough, and has not wanted means, without supernatural aid or the interposition of a necromancer, to erect fortifications, from which to dislodge him by the next arrival would require all the skill of English officers, and all the intrepidity of British sol fdiers. But, Sir, every account since Ju

There

not's arrival most fully concurred in representing him as particularly sedulous in repairing the old, and erecting new fortifications, and that he had rendered his position almost impregnable; and I never saw any statement, which tended in the slightest degree to invalidate their claim to general belief; and, certainly, there were not a few individuals who, previous to Sir Arthur's landing, entertained very alarming apprehensions as to the result of the attack, if such had been found unavoidable, Υστι then ask, "Was Junot's army to be fed by ravens ?" I cannot immediately find the passage, but something to this effect. If you were as successful in proving that Junot was not supplied with, nor had any means of procuring provisions for his army, as you are in exposing the hollow and groundless reasons entertained by our generals as to the impracticability of obtaining a supply for the English army, I should determine not to trouble you with these observations, although the question, as it respects the public, would still remain the same. The newspapers, however, furnished us with various accounts of Junot's having collected a large quantity of provisions; and there was no great reason to believe, that a French ariny would starve while there were between 2 and 300,000 Portuguese inhabitants in Lisbon, people whom we went to assist, not to distress, to

defend, and not to assail. This was a most perplexing situation for our army, and Junot would take especial care to increase the difficulty to his utmost. Now, had the beforementioned statements of the immense strength of Junot's position, and his abundant supply of provisions been disproved instead of meeting with a confirmation, in the unqualified assertion, "that Junot could easily have consumed time in a protracted defence," it would avail nothing to your argument. And unless you convince us that every individual of the public, who naturally expected an unconditional surrender was, in forming such opinion, convinced that Junot had no formidable entrenchments to fly to, and no supply of provisions, it will not assist you, if you can even prove that Sir Arthur could have marched into Lisbon with no more obstruction than one of your readers into Mr. Bagshaw's shop, and would have been as cordially and politely welcomed. You proceed" Well, then," say you, "if "it be true that Sir Arthur Wellesley, with

only 9000 men, beat the whole of the "French force, in spite of all their advan"tages, have we not a right to expect, nay, "had we not a right to claim and to de"mand, at the hands of the commander in

cure.

Portugal, when he had 30,000 men, the capture or the total destruction of the French army in Portugal, and if any na"tion had any right to expect any thing, "this nation had a right to expect a result "such as bere described ?": It is true policy in a general to whom the defence of a strong place is entrusted, and who has at his disposal a force more than necessary for its defence, to march out and attack the army advancing to the siege, if the circumstances, nuder which he is to make the attack, are such as to justify him in expecting a favourable result; and in the event of his sustaining a repulse, retreat to his position is seOn the contrary, it would evince a great want of skill in the general, who would march out when his force was scarcely sufficient to garrison the place, where success was not certain. Junot, in his plan of attack on the 21t, and in his resistance at Roleia, appears to have been perfectly satisfied that he should succeed. It fortunately was not the case, but his retreat was not prevented. What was the effect? The English army was enabled to blockade him, and prevent his incursions into the country; be could not again meet them in the field; but it did not follow that an English army would be able to expel him from bis forts. A crowd of instances might be collected to prove, that men who had been beater in

the field, had successfully defended a fortified place; but those of more recent occurrence, will perhaps be more convincing. We have not yet ceased to deplore the fate and admire the courage of the Spaniards, defeated at Rio Seco, and our tongues still vibrate with the praises of the undisciplined defenders of Valencia, Gerona, and Saragossa; places certainly not more formidable than the forts and entrenchments of Portugal. Now, I do not mean to insinuate that our troops could not reduce Junot; but their amounting to 30,000 would not prevent less bloodshed. Do you believe, that if Lisle, Maestricht, or Brissac, were properly garrisoned and commanded, that the besieging army would experience less loss, if they were ten times the number of the blockaded garrison? We also know, that in the battle of the 17th, when our army forced the passes of Roleia, only 6000 men could be brought to bear; and it is probable, that if Loison and Laborde had effected their junction before the attack was made, we should have experienced a very alarm ing loss. I think no one will deny, that the public had the means of satisfactorily ascer taining that Junot effected his retreat after the battle of the 21st; that the places to which he retired were strong by nature and art; that he had a plentiful supply of provisions, and that his force after his defeat was still formidable; and the probability of reducing him not much greater than when the forces first sailed, recollecting, that at that time it was generally reported and believed, that Sir Arthur Wellesley would land at Peniche, and immediately invest the place. Impressed with the belief of these facts, I really cannot see how the public could anticipate the result, such as they did anticipate, and as you have related, till the public will declare that conditions might not be granted which would be preferable to the eertainty of great loss in the attack of these places, and the chance of failure; till it can be proved that it was the public conviction, that our army would have been able to continue the blockade without much difficulty, that their services were not wanted in any other quarter; till, in short, it can be proved, that the public was certain that there were no secret motives, and those very strong ones, to inAuence the determination of our commanders to agree to a conditional surrender. So far, I think, you will allow unconditional surrender could not reasonably be expected by the public, and that our commanders were, so far, prematurely disgraced; but I most perfectly concur with the now

general opinion, that except in the most distressing circumstances, nothing can justify our commanders for having acceded to the present Convention; it is, I fear, a Convention which has affixed to the British army and nation a stigma so indelible, that no event, however favourable, can wholly remove it, or prevent its suggesting the most agonizing reflections. We are, however, well aware, that great public calamities and individual misfortunes, have not unfrequent ly given rise to, or been accompanied by circumstances which, in the progress of time, have very materially contributed to diminish the pernicious effects apprehendad at the occurrence; and it is some consolation, that the people have not suffered their reputation to be sullied without a mur mur; that the same page of history which records this infamous and insulting Conven tion, will also relate the virtuous indignation felt by a people jealous of their honour; will rouse the lethargic, and animate the torpid of succeeding ages, by a glowing de scription of the patriotism which prevailed in every rank; will detail the people's ve hement and unceasing cries for vengeance on those who dared to degrade their charac ter, and debase their dignity. And although it is highly probable, that the inmede consequences of this Convention wi highly disastrous, it is not impossible it may produce some beneficial effects. will shew the world the feelings and ca racter of Englishmen; it will powerfully instruct our military commanders, that the honour of a nation is not to be surrendered with impunity. Since the commencement of the French revolution, no treachery however base, no infamy however atrocious (and unfortunately many equally, nay, more iniquitous than the Convention of Lisbon may be enumerated), ever produced in the countries where they happened complaints so general and unqualified as in the present instance. The consideration of these circumstances will afford more than a transient gleam amidst the immense gloom; will prove more serviceable than a solitary spar, when threatening waves surround. I feel confident that I have been considerably too prolix and tedious, that many of my remarks are totally unnecessary, and others not sufficiently elucidated; but as I have not time to condense and arrange them, I shall leave them to your candid and unpre judiced consideration. I cannot, however, conclude without expressing my regret, that any circumstances should exist which could prevent our having, what we certainly very much wanted, and which you have energe

small

SIR;-The Edinburgh Reviewers, in their bulky pamphlet of April, 1808, under the guise of reviewing two publications, written by gentlemen, whose names, I believe, are wholly unknown to the public, a Mr. Rylance and a Mr. Lingham, are pleased to enlighten the world with their thoughts, upon the subject of the late emigration to the Brazils. Upon this topic, I feel no interest in controverting their opinions, as they are of course the echo of the speeches in parliament, of that faction upon whose fortunes their own depend; it being now no secret to any one that the positive overbearing and dogmatical paradoxes, which have so peculiarly distinguished the Edinburgh Review, proceed from a knot of young friends, who hunt after the good dinners and other good things of those accomplished statesmen, Lords Holland and Henry Petty. The subject, upon which I at present address you, Mr. Cobbett, is the language, which, in the article above-mentioned, these gentlemen have made use of upon the subject of Libel; language betraying At once the base slavish spirit of which they are composed, and the determined hostility which animates them against all the assertors of the Liberty of the Press. It seems, that these authors, whose pamphlets form the pretence of the review, Mr. Rylance and Mr. Lingham, unfortunately agreed in nothing but in each dedicating his work to the Liverpool Solomon, Mr. Roscoe. Upon every point, felating to the subject of the Portuguese emigration, they differed in their sentiments. Mr. Lingham, to use the words of the review," kept quite clear "of the least appearance of faction; while "Mr. Rylance, without any material quali"fication, except perhaps his praise of "Mr. Roscoe in the dedication, adopted "the precise line of argument, taken by "the persons in opposition to the present

ministry." This was difference enough to regulate the judgment of these candid, and impartial critics. Mr. Rylance became, of course, the favourite, and Mr. Lingham, as a man swayed by no party motions, but bold and independent enough to write from his own understanding, was, of course, to be run down. If, however, on the present occasion, the Edinburgh Reviewers had confined themselves to literary strictures only, however partial and corrupt those strictures

might have been, I should not have called your attention to them. But will you be lieve it, Mr. Cobbett? in consequence of Mr. Lingham, who in his book, according to these critics' own account, "kept quite "clear of the least appearance of faction," having characterised the other gentleman by a few expressions not by any means unusual in political controversy, and none of which, from their analysis of his publication, I think it is pretty clear, were misapplied; such as obscure pamphleteer," "unauthorized tool of a party," and the like; I say, will you, Sir, believe it, that these worthy disciples of the Whig school, these pains-taking underlings of the present Opposition, these Scotch preachers of political liberty, are actually for letting loose the dogs of law upon poor Mr. Lingham, and amercing him with fines, penalties, imprisonment, and the pillory, for having failed to acknowledge the eminent consequence of this Mr Rylance and his perfect independence, (which, be it observed, these reviewers themselves impeach) for having dared to publish the truth of him, and to speak of him as he deserves. They introd ce their whining complaint, and garbled quotations of Mr. Lingham's "abusive language" with this sentence: "Some passages, we are pretty sure, would subject him to punish"ment in a court of justice: and having finished their extracts, they conclude :"We have little doubt that the above pas

66

sages, are themselves libellous." Is not this monstrous? Why, the action lately brought by the Duke of Bedford's Knight, (I forget his name) was nothing to this. Irritated feelings in being shewn to be a dunce, and disappointed expectations in not getting from his task-master his usual hire, to a certain degree palliated the resentment of that wretched book-maker. But what have these reviewers to urge in extenuation of this gratuitous recommendation of legal proceedings? Mr. Lingham did not charge them with a systematic and scandalous perversion of their duty, with a base and profligate bias either for or against every author whom they noticed; Mr. Lingham did not say of them, that their malignity against most authors was to be equalled only by their interested adulation of a few; that their wanton and scurrilous attacks on respectable writers in gencral, were balanced only in infamy by their gross and unblushing panegyrics upon the members of their own fraternity; that, throughout the whole of their career, their pens have been vilely prostituted to party purposes, in which task their inconsistency has been as notorious as their corruption,—

the grovelling sycophants of power and place, the admirers of Pitt, when living, and of his opponents, when dead. These, or similar charges, Mr. Lingham never insinuated against the Edmborgh Reviewers. One does not see therefore why they should feel so sore, why they should so strongly sympathize with Mr. Rylance, cry out the senseless yell of libel, and call for punishment in a court of justice! Really, Mr. Cobbett, the coincidence between the time of this publication (April, 1809) and the commencement of the knight's law-suit, and the identity of their sentiments upon the subject of libel, are so marvellous," that I verily suspect some of these young friends, who perhaps may belong to the profession of the law, were his counsellors upon the occasion, advised the action, as the phrase is, and perhaps assisted in getting up the cause. The knight, 1 dare say, has since heartily repented of having acted upon the opinion, from whatever quarter it proceeded; and the Edinburgh Reviewers, since the unfortunate failure of his experiment, are pro-) bably now ashamed of the detestable persecuting spirit so wholly inimical to the liber ty of the press, upon the expression of which I bave animadverted. In making these animadversions I have no other object in view than to vindicate that palladium of aur rights. without the secure enjoyment of which you, Sir, have so often observed, that our boasted freedom is nothing worth the same time I feel an apology to be due, for the length to which my observations have extended, a length to be justified only by the importance of the subject itself, which will, I hope, plead my excuse, and bestow a temporary consequence even upon these insignificant individuals, Messrs. Rylance and Lingham.-Yours, &c.-P. D.— Sept. 24, 1909.

EXPOSITION OF THE

At

PRACTICES AND MACHINATIONS WHICH LEN TO THE USURPATION OF THE CROWN OF SPAIN, AND THE MEANS ADOPTED BY THE, EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH TO CARRY IT INTO EX

ECUTION, BY DON PEDRO CEVALLOS,

FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE AND DIS-
PATCHES TO HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY
FERDINAND VII.

At a period when the nation has made and continues to make the most heroic efforts to shake off the yoke of slavery attempted to be imposed upon it, it is the du ty of all good citizens to contribute, by every means in their power, to enlighten it with respect to the real causes that have brought it into its present situation, and to

keep up the noble spirit by which it is animated. To make known to Spain and the whole world the base means resorted to by the Emperor of the French to seize the person of our king, Ferdinand VII, and to subjugate this great and generous nation, is a duty well worthy of one who, like myself, is in a condition to discharge it; inasmuch as circumstances placed me in a situation to be an eye-witness of the events which preceded the catastrophe of Bayonne, and in which I bore a part It was not in my power to do this before, in consequence of personal restraint, and from not having col lected the documents necessary to accredit my statement. Some are still wanting, which it was necessary to burn, in consequence of dangerous circumstances, in which every thing was to be feared; others have disappeared through the various incidents connected with that unhappy period; but those which I now present are sufficient to prove the atrocious violence committed against our beloved king, Ferdinand VII, and the whole nation.-Though the conduct of Spain towards France since the peace of Basle, a very interesting portion of its pol tical history in these latter times, is inti mately connected with the important events which form the subject of this Exposition it is not necessary to dwell even upon principal periods. It will be sufficie state what the whole nation, and all Europ know, that the political system of Spai has constantly been during this time to pre serve friendship and the best understanding with France, and to maintain, at all ha zards, the ruinous alliance concluded in 1796. To attain this end, there is no sacri fice which Spain has not made; and as the preservation of the Prince of the Peace in the high degree of favour he enjoyed with Charles IV. depended in a great measure upon the continuance of this system, it was maintained with the greatest constancy and indefatigable attention., Fleets, armies, treasure, every thing was sacrificed to France; humiliations, submissions, every thing was suffered, every thing was done to satisfy, as far as possible, the insatiable demands of the French government; the idea never once occurred of preserving the nation against the macinations of an ally, who was overrunning Europe.-The Treaty of Tilsit, in which the destiny of the world seemed to be decided in his favour, was hardly concluded, when he turned his eyes towards the West, and resolved on the ruin of Portugal and Spain; or what comes to the same purpose, to make himself mas ter of this vast peninsula, with a view of

but