Operation of Statute.-In an action
instituted by a citizen of Louisiana
against a citizen of Indiana, the time
that intervened between the 16th of
August, 1861, and the 20th of August,
1866, is to be excluded, in determin-
ing whether the action is barred by
the statute of limitations......... Ibid.
17. Same.-New Promise.-A letter
written during the existence of the
war of the rebellion, by a citizen of
Indiana to a citizen of Louisiana,
cannot take a case out of the opera-
tion of the statute of limitations. Ibid.
18. Review of Judgment.-Want of
Jurisdiction of Courts over Suits be-
tween Citizens of States at War.-An
action was brought by a citizen of the
State of Virginia against a citizen of
the State of Indiana, in a state court,
on the 14th day of May, 1861, for
an accounting of a long standing
trust for the sale of a large quantity
of lands, for setting aside contracts
and conveyances for fraud, recover-
ing money alleged to be due, enforc-
ing liens, &c., and judgment was
rendered on the 21st day of August,
1863, and a suit was brought by the
plaintiff to review the proceedings
and judgment on the 19th day of
April, 1866.

Held, that the courts must take judicial
notice of the fact that before, at, and
after, the rendition of the judgment
sought to be reviewed, Virginia, one
of the Confederate States, was at
war with Indiana, one of the adher-
ing or loyal states of the Union;
and that it was error of law to ren-
der the judgment in the proceeding
which had been commenced in the
state court, no jurisdiction remain-
ing in said court for that purpose;
and the plaintiff was therefore enti-
tled to a review of the judgment.
Brooke et al. v. Filer et al.........402

WARRANTY.

See SALE, 3, 5.
WIFE.

See FIUSBAND AND WIFE.

WIDOW.

See DESCENT, I; EXECUTOR AND AD-

MINISTRATOR, 5.

I.

2.

4.

Same.-Repair. - The voluntary
expenditure of money by a stranger
in repairing the wharf of a city will
not create a liability against the city.
Ibid.

3. Same-Duty of City to Repair.-
A city can be compelled to repair
her wharves, and may be liable in
damages for failure to do so......Ibid.
Same.-Liability of Parties who
Use the Wharves.
- A party who
uses the wharvès of a city cannot de-
feat the city's claim for wharfage by
showing that the wharves are out of
repair
.Ibid.

-

1.

Rule in Shelley's Case.-A. made
his will, as follows: "And it is my
will that my son John shall have that
land as follows: the south-west quar-
ter of section twenty-two, in town
twenty-two, north of range one west,
to be for his use his life, and then to
fall to his heirs."

Held, that this gave to the devisee the
fee simple, according to the rule in
Shelley's case. McCray et al. v.
Lipp et al........
Evidence.

2.

3.

-

..116

Where the law fixes
the intention of the testator from the
terms of a will, parol evidence of
the condition, character, and habits
of the devisee, as well as declarations
made by the testator at the time of
making the will, in order to show
that the testator only intended to
give the devisee a life estate, are in-
admissible............ .......... Ibid.
Construction.-It is a well settled
rule, that all the parts of a will are
to be construed together and in rela-

tion to each other, so as, if possible,
to form one consistent whole; and
that words and limitations may be
transposed, supplied, or rejected,
where warranted by the immediate
context or the general scheme of the
will, but not merely on conjectural
hypothesis of the testator's intention,
however reasonable, in opposition
to the plain and obvious sense of the
language of the instrument; and
such a construction should be placed
upon the will as to sustain and up-
hold it in all its parts, if this can be
done consistently with the established
rules of law and construction.
Grimes Ex'rs v. Harmon et al...198
4. Same.-Parol Evidence.-Mistake.
Ambiguity. The general rule is,
that parol evidence of the intention
of a testator is inadmissible for the
purpose of explaining, contradicting,
or adding to the contents of a will,
but that its language must be inter-
preted according to its proper signi-
fication, or with as near an approach
thereto as the body of the instrument
and the state of circumstances exist-
ing at the time of its execution will
admit of. The doctrine in reference
to mistakes in wills is, that courts of
equity have jurisdiction to correct
them when they are apparent upon
the face of the will; but they must
be so apparent, and must be such as
may be made by a proper construc-
tion of the terms of the will; other-
wise there can be no relief. Parol
evidence, or evidence dehors the will,
is not admissible to vary and control
the terms of the will, although it is
admissible to remove a latent ambi-
guity......
.Ibid.
Bequest for Life.-Heirs.
Children.-A testator bequeathed all
his real and personal property to his
wife, "for her use and benefit during
her natural life," and after her death
all that remained unconsumed was
to be sold, and one thousand dollars
paid to his daughter S., and the
balance was to be divided among
the heirs of his daughter S., share
and share alike; the wife to have
the right to sell and dispose of said
property, both real and personal, as
she wished.

5. Same.

-

Held, that the wife took only a life

estate.

Held, also, that the evident intention of

the testator was to secure his widow
a competency, and if it was neces-
sary that she should sell the land,
she might do so; but the balance of
the estate unconsumed at her death
she could not devise.

Held, also, that the word heirs, as used
in the clause of the will which gave
the estate, except one thousand dol-
lars, to the heirs of his daughter S.,
meant children.

Held, also, that real estate purchased
with the proceeds of the sale of the
real estate devised by the will to the
wife for her life, after the death of
the wife and the payment of the one
thousand dollars to the daughter S.,
belonged to the children of S. Rapp
et al. v. Matthias.........
.332

2.

.....

WITNESS.

I. Impeachment.-A party whose wit-
nesses are impeached by evidence of
bad character, or by evidence that
they have made statements contrary
to the testimony given upon the wit-
ness stand, may sustain them by evi-
dence of their general good charac-
ter for truth und veracity. Seeger v.
Pfeifer
..13
Action by Heir.-In an action
brought by a widow as the heir of
her hushand, where she claims that
under and by virtue of a contract
made with her husband by the de-
fendant, her husband became the
owner of certain property in contro-
versy, and that she, as the heir of her
husband, has the right to compel the
defendant to charge himself with the
property as administrator of the hus-
band, neither the plaintiff nor de-
fendant is, by the last exception of
the second section of the act defining
who shall be competent witnesses,
competent to testify as a witness as
to any matter that occurred prior to
the death of the husband, unless re-
quired by the opposite party or by
the court. Pea v. Pea........ ..387
3. Husband and Wife.-On the trial
of an action by husband and wife for
injury to the wife, the husband is in-
competent to be a witness. New-
house v. Miller et ux................463
4. Expert.--Insanity.-Physicians who
are engaged in practice, and have
given the subject of medical juris-
prudence some attention, by reading

8.

and by attending lectures, may be examined as experts on the subject | of insanity. Davis v. The State..496 5. Same.-Evidence.-The extent of a witness's acquaintance with the subject about which he testifies as an expert may always be inquired into, to enable the jury to estimate the weight of his evidence............ Ibid. 6. Same.-Court.-Jury.-Whether a witness is competent to testify at all as an expert, is a question for the court; but after he has been allowed 9. to testify, the weight of his evidence is a question for the jury.........Ibid. 7. Same.-Iypothetical Case.-Practice. If there is no dispute as to the facts on which a witness is to base his opinion as an expert, it is proper to require that the question propounded shall embrace them all, and that the witness shall take them all into consideration in giving his answer. But if the facts are in dispute, the question propounded may be based upon the facts which the evidence tends to prove; and the jury may decide ultimately whether

the facts are established by the evidence or not........ ....... Ibid. Same.-When a witness examined as an expert expresses an opinion based on facts assumed by the party introducing him to have been proved, or upon a hypothetical case put by such party, then the other party may cross examine the witness by taking his opinion based on any other set of facts assumed by him to have been proved, or upon a hypothetical case. Ibid. Administrator.--In a suit where judgment is sought against the administrator of an estate, and the answer brings the defense within the exception of the statute relating to a case where an action, is brought by an heir upon a contract made with the ancestor, the plaintiff is not a competent witness, unless called by the administrator or the court. Bishop, Adm'r, v. Welch................521 Same.-Admissions.-The claimant was not a competent witness to disprove the making of admissions by him, testified to by a third party, that such a contract existed as was set out in the answer.... .... Ibid.

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