their guns. As soon as the provisional government was organized, three rebel commissioners were appointed to proceed to Washington to negotiate for "recognition," for "adjustment of differences," and for possession of the federal forts. Two efforts to obtain Sumter by intrigue had failed; nevertheless, they still had faith a third attempt might succeed with the new administration. Through a conspirator who still professed loyalty, they presented their application to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State. Mr. Seward answered courteously, but decidedly, that the new administration could have nothing to do either with the rebel government or its emissaries; and to a written paper sent to the State Department by the commissioners, he wrote an unofficial "memorandum" reply of the same purport. This properly finished the negotiation; but the commissioners, authorized to do so by the government they affected to represent, sought excuse to delay their departure, and Associate Justice Campbell, of the Supreme Court of the United States, volunteered to act as an unofficial intermediary in continuing to press their errand upon the Secretary of State. Campbell had at the beginning publicly opposed secession and still professed loyalty; and in that friendly and patriotic guise was admitted by the Secretary of State to an intimacy he could never have gained under his true colors. It seems that Seward, in this unofficial intimacy, did not hesitate to tell Campbell of his own willingness to give up Sumter, and of his belief that the President, upon the recommendation of General Scott, would order its evacuation. This was about the time of the first Cabinet discussion of the direct proposition, when five members voted for evacuation and only two against it, and the general situation of affairs strongly supported Mr. Seward's course of reasoning. Whatever may have been his language, a patriot could not have misunderstood it. But Campbell had meanwhile become so far committed to the cause of the conspiracy, that he conveyed his information to the commissioners as a virtual pledge of the evacuation of Sumter, and they sent the news to Montgomery in high glee. As a matter of fact, President Lincoln had not at that date decided the Sumter question; he was following his own sagacious logic in arriving at a conclusion, which was at least partially reached on the 29th of March, when, as we have seen, he made the order to prepare the relief expedition. By this time, Campbell, in extreme impatience to further rebellion, was importuning Seward for explanation; and Seward, finding his former prediction at fault, thought it best not to venture a new one. Upon consultation, therefore, the President authorized him to carry to Campbell the first and only assurance the Administration ever made with regard to Sumter-namely that he would not change the military status at Charleston without giving notice. This, be it observed, occurred on the 1st of April, about which time the policy of Seward favoring delay and conciliation finally and formally gave way before the President's stronger self-assertion and his carefully matured purpose to force rebellion to put itself flagrantly and fatally in the wrong by attacking Fort Sumter. CHAPTER V SUMTER. GOVERNOR PICKENS, of South Carolina, began about the 1st of January to build batteries to isolate and reduce Fort Sumter; and the newly made General Beauregard was on the 1st of March sent by the rebel government to Charleston to assume direction of military affairs and to complete the preparations for its capture. The Governor had been exceedingly anxious that the capture should be attempted before the expiration of Mr. Buchanan's presidential termthat is, between the 12th of February and the 4th of March. "Mr. Buchanan cannot resist," wrote the Governor to Jefferson Davis, "because he has not the power. Mr. Lincoln may not attack, because the cause of quarrel will have been, or may be considered by him, as past." But the rebel President doubtless thought it unwise to risk offending and alienating his party friends at the North by placing the responsibility of such an affront and loss upon their administration. Even when General Beauregard came, the Governor was admonished that no attack must be attempted without mature preparation, as a failure would seriously demoralize and perhaps prematurely wreck the rebellion. Beauregard found, as he reports, that Sumter was naturally "a perfect Gibraltar," and that only the weakness of the garrison rendered its capture reasonably feasible. He therefore set himself to work, first of all, to devise obstructions and defences against expected reinforcements, and secondly, to build batteries to breach the walls. He was himself a skilful engineer; many of the works were already well advanced; there was an ample supply of guns and mortars; he had but to make requisitions to obtain unlimited slave labor to do the drudgery of ditching and raising embankments; his improvised volunteer army could give all their time to drill and artillery practice; and, most favorable of all, this work went on in certain immunity from any molestation except through the chance of a relieving expedition to come by sea. The commander was ambitious, the men were enthusiastic, and the Governor untiring in his revolutionary ardor and impatience. It is, therefore, little wonder that, after a month of laborious effort and co-operation, Beauregard telegraphed (April 1st) to Montgomery: "Batteries ready to open Wednesday or Thursday. What instructions?" Up to this time the rebel government indulged the pleasing hope that Lincoln would give up the fort and save them the dreaded ordeal of war. Justice Campbell had ingeniously misreported the sense and purport of Seward's conversations; and the commissioners and their Washington cronies, with equally blind zeal, sent rosy despatches on the strength of exaggerated street-rumors. So confident were they of such a result that Governor Pickens, Secretary Walker, and General Beauregard found some difficulty in settling among themselves the exact conditions upon which they would permit Anderson and his garrison to depart when the order to evacuate Sumter should be sent him. The illusion began to fade away on the 1st of April, when Commissioner Crawford telegraphed to Governor Pickens: “I am authorized to say this Government will not undertake to supply Sumter without notice to you." This language did not resemble the order for evacuation they had been impatiently expecting, and the rebel authorities at once determined to make Anderson feel the pressure of the siege. Next day, orders were issued to stop all courtesies to the garrison; to prohibit all supplies from the city; to permit no one to depart from the fort, and to establish the rigid surveillance of hostile lines. Anderson himself, relying upon rebel rumors and Crawford's baseless despatches, appears to have made up his mind that the garrison would be withdrawn; and he expresses himself as being "greatly surprised" when on April 7th he received a confidential letter, drafted by Lincoln, but copied and signed by Cameron, under date of April 4th, informing him that a relieving expedition would be sent; requesting him to hold out, if possible, till its arrival; stating also, however, that the President desired to subject him and his command to no unusual danger or hardship beyond those common in military life, and therefore authorizing him to capitulate when in his judgment it might become necessary. One of the few faults chargeable to Anderson is that to this thoughtful and considerate instruction, framed by Lincoln himself (but which he supposed to be the language of Cameron), he replied in a petulant and ill-natured spirit, writing: "I frankly say that my heart is not in the war which I see is to be thus commenced." His subsequent gallantry, and steadfast loyalty, however, justify his countrymen in a liberal forgiveness of the passing indiscretion. It turned out curiously enough that Anderson's letter was, through a dishonorable trick of the rebels, captured by them and sent to Montgomery, where during the whole war it remained buried in the Confederate archives, and hence the offensive sentence never came to the knowledge of the kind-hearted and generous Lincoln. |