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MCCLELLAN'S LETTER.

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features of the policy he recommended, were, no confiscation-no emaneipation act by the Government–hoping thus to bring about a reaction on the part of the South. These · views made him the leader of the Opposition, who immediately named him as the future candidate for the Presidency.

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CHAPTER II.

JULY-AUGUST, 1862.

POPE'S CAMPAIGN-POPE CALLED TO THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA-AIS ORDERS

CONCENTRATION OF IIIS ARMY-HALLECK MADE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF-HIS PLAN OF OPERATIONS-MC CLELLAN RECALLED FROM THE PENINSULA-HIS

LETTER OF REMONSTRANCE-LEE TAKES ADVANTAGE OF THE BLUNDER OF

HALLECK-BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN-LEE'S GREAT MOVEMENT BEGUN

ACCOUNT OF SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS-BATTLE OF BULL RUN-BATTLE OF GROVETON-THE LAST DAY'S BATTLE—THE ARMY FALLS BACK TO THE FONTS ---LEE MOVES TOWARDS THE POTOMAC-MIC CLELLAN'S TELEGRAM TO HALLECK

ASKING PERMISSION TO JOIN THE ARMY-PLACED ONCE MORE T THE HEAD OF THE ARMY-POPE'S FAILURE-REVIEW OF TIIE CAMPAIGN.

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CHILE these momentous events were passing in front

of Richmond, great changes were being introduced into the army around Washington. The President and the country, had had enough of the military strategy of the Secretary of War, and it became imperatively necessary to have some other head, to direct the corps of McDowell, Banks and Fremont, which had been taken away from the General-in-chief. General Pope was, therefore, called from the West, to take command of these, to be called the Army of Virginia, and also of all the troops, in garrison, around Washington. He entered on his duties the 26th of June, the very day on which commenced the seven days' struggle before Richmond. He began his career by issuing two orders, in which he ridiculed the idea of bases of operations and of "securing lines of retreat,” declaring that he should leave that for the enemy to do. This was regarded as an indirect stab at the General-in-chief, and hence excited a great deal of ill will against him throughout the country.

POPE'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

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Thoughtful men looked upon it as a bad omen, that he should, at the outset of the campaign, avow that he meant to disregard the soundest military maxims, and, like the First Napoleon, revolutionize the science of war.

The “Army of Virginia" numbered, at this time, about fifty thousand men fit for the field, with which Pope was to protect Washington, and co-operate, in some way, with the Army of the Potomac. This force was scattered all along, from Fredericksburg to Winchester, and his first object was to get it together. Adopting the theory, that if the enemy should attempt to advance on Washington by way of the Shenandoah Valley, it would be better, instead of meeting him there, to be more in front of Washington, so as to cut his force in two while on the march, he therefore, began to concentrate his army, in and about Sperryville. By occupying this position, he hoped to be able also, to operate on the enemy's line of communication, in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville, so as to draw off a part of the army arrayed against McClellan. It has been seen, however, that the movement was too late to effect the latter object. In the meantime the President began to see that to have two distinct armies operating against the same point, and yet entirely independent of each other, with no common head but the Secretary of War whose incapacity to direct movements in the field, had been tested to his satisfaction, would only complicate the difficulties of the situation instead of removing them, sent for General Halleck to assume the chief commånd. This officer, who had never fought a battle, and never conducted a campaign in person, except the extraordinaryone against Corinth, was, on the 12th day of July, placed at the head of the Américan armies, to control all the campaigns, and push the war to'a speedy issue. He at once adopted a plan of campaign in accordance with the President's original policy, which

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was to move on Richmond overland from Washingtori

. Ol course, it became necessary to recall the Army of the Potomac, and abandon the peninsula route altogether; and, on the 3d of August, Halleck sent an order to McClellan to withdraw his army at once, and come up to Acquia Creek, covering his movements the best way he could. McClellan was astonished at this unexpected order, saying in reply, that “it had caused him the greatest pain he ever experienced.” He sent in a strong remonstrance against it, demonstrating, in the clearest manner, that it was a suicidal policy, and closing with these remarkable words: “clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I ever have been, and still am, actuated solely by the love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order

may

be rescinded." The appeal was in vain. Halleck would not rescind the order, and McClellan, at once, began to obey it, and withdraw his

army, in such a way as to save it from being up in its retreat. But he was not molested. Such a huge blunder, as the General-in-chief had now committed, was sure not to escape the keen watchfulness of a man of Lee's sagacity. Richmond being so unexpectedly relieved from all danger, he determined to throw his army rapidly across the country, overwhelm Pope, before the Army of the Potomac could reach him, and move boldly upon Washington.

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BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN.

General Pope, being informed that Jackson was rapidly approaching the Rapidan, ordered Banks, commanding the Second Corps, nominally thirteen, but really only about eight thousand strong, to move to Culpepper Court House, where the whole army was being rapidly concentrated. On the

BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN.

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9th of August, he directed him to move forward towards Cedur Mountain, and take up a strong position, where he could resist the advance of Jackson, until the other corps could be brought up. Jackson, in the mean time, had already crossed the Rapidan, and occupied the sides of Cedar Mountain, in force. Banks, as he approached the mountain, about four o'clock in the afternoon, heard desultory firing from Bayard's cavalry, which was disputing the progress of the enemy, and from Crawford, who was engaged with his artillery. It was a warm August day, and the green trees that covered the mountain sides, effectually concealed the force of the enemy. From his masked batteries, Jackson immediately poured in a destructive fire on our advancing columns. Banks did not believe the enemy was in any considerable force, so, after suffering severely for a while, from the rebel batteries, he determined to charge those nearest him. General Williams held the right, and Augur the left, of the line of battle. General Prince, of the latter division, advanced his brigade from this part of the field, supported by General Geary, who moved nearly in a line with him. They swept past our artillery, entered a corn field in beautiful order, and moved steadily forward towards the hostile batteries, that all the while played fast and furiously into their exposed ranks. The brave men took the desolating fire with astonishing firmness, and, with their eyes bent on the deadly guns, kept grandly, devotedly on. But suddenly a heavy mass of infantry, till then concealed behind a low swell, rose before them and poured a fearful volley into their very

faces. This unexpected fire, combined with that of the batteries, was too much for them, and they were compelled to fall back, though not till they had left nearly two-thirds of their entire number on the field. Prince, while gallantly holding his men to their murderous work, was surrounded and taken

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