law-Messrs. Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine; Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts; William H. Seward, of New York; Lewis Cass, of Michigan; Salmon P Chase, of Ohio; and Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois. Mr. Rockwell, of Massachusetts, the colleague of Mr. Sumner, moved that the bill pass, and it was passed accordingly without debate, the ayes and noes not being called for. Why did none of these gentlemen rise and disclose the disorganizing political heresy, which we are now told is contained in the act referred to? Is it not clear that it was because the discovery of that heresy dates from the period when State rights became an inconvenient obstacle to the success of particular personal or political schemes? In truth, I have at hand evidence, in the published writings and speeches of each of the gentlemen whom I have designated by name, except Messrs. Hamlin and Chase, of his full concurrence in the doctrine of State sovereignty; and I doubt not that sufficient research would enable me to adduce evidence that those two gentlemen also hold, or at least held, the same doctrine.

Did space permit, I could furnish innumerable extracts to the same effect from the writings and speeches of the most illustrious jurists and statesmen from the earliest times to the present day. And it is a curious and significant fact that the researches of the author of "Our Domestic Relations" have enabled him to fortify his argument with no

citations to the point, except extracts from speeches made in the Constitutional Convention by members who, in their zeal for the new system of government, were betrayed into saying that, even under the then existing system, the States were not sovereign.

But a fear of wearying my readers at the very commencement of my work, confines me to a few extracts from a single speech, that delivered by Senator Sumner, in the Senate of the United States, on the twenty-third of February, eighteen hundred and fifty-five. The subject of the speech was the fugitive slave law, and the extracts will suffice to show in what a different light he viewed "the pestilent pretension of State rights" as well as "the miserable pretension of State sovereignty," whenif the force of the expression will excuse its homeliness-the United States bull was goring Mr. Sumner's ox. The author of "Our Domestic Relations" then spoke as follows:

"Suffice it to say that it [the fugitive slave law] is an intrusive and offensive encroachment on State rights, calculated to subvert the power of the States in the protection of their citizens.

"There is an argument against it which has especial importance at this moment, when the fugitive act is made the occasion of a new assault on State rights. This very act is an assumption by Congress of power not delegated to it under the Constitution,

and an infraction of rights secured to the States. You will mark, if you please, the double aspect of this proposition, in asserting not only an assumption of power by Congress, but an infraction of State rights. And this proposition, I venture to say, defies answer or cavil.

"And yet, sir, in zeal to support this enormity, senators have not hesitated to avow a purpose to break down the legislation of States, calculated to shield the liberty of their citizens. "It is difficult,' says Burke, 'to frame an indictment against a whole people.' But here in the Senate, where are convened the jealous representatives of the States, we have heard whole States arraigned, as if guilty of crime. The senator from Louisiana has set forth, in plaintive tones, the ground of proceeding, and more than one sovereign State has been summoned to judgment.

"And now, almost while I speak, comes the solemn judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, a sovereign State of this Union, declaring this act to be a violation of the Constitution."

Verily the author of "Our Domestic Relations" should have prefixed to his ingenious essay a quotation from a poetic collaborateur—

"Weep not that the world changes-did it keep

A stable, changeless course, 'twere cause to weep."

CHAPTER II.

The Constitutional Power of the General Government to suppress a Rebellion-That Power not affected by the unwarrantable sanction of a Rebellion by a State-The impossibility of a Constitutional Collision between the State and National SovereigntiesThe course of the General Government in the Nullification Controversy-A similar course in this Controversy will not expose us to the charge of coercing Sovereign States-Consideration of the Doctrines of Forfeiture of State Rights by State Treason, of State Suicide, and of the Abdication by a State of its Place in the Union.

LET us now proceed to inquire what effect the doctrine of State sovereignty has upon the constitutional right of the general Government to use its military power for the purpose of reducing to obedience rebels against its authority, who plead the mandates of their own States in justification of their rebellion, and what objects the general Government can lawfully propose to accomplish by the use of force in such a case.

And first, has the general Government power to employ its military arm against rebels in any case whatever? I do not understand that there is any conflict of opinion among us upon this point. It is true that there is no express grant of any such

power in the Constitution-the provision authorizing Congress to provide for calling out the militia "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions," being generally regarded as limiting the power of the Federal Government over the militia to those three cases, rather than as an affirmative grant of authority to do the several acts specified. Still those words lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the power "to suppress insurrections" is in fact lodged in the central Government; and their connection with the rest of the sentence, and the ample powers which the States enjoy over their own militia, indicate very conclusively that the insurrections referred to, are those against the authority of the Union, and not of the several States. In truth, it is not necessary to resort to this clause, to justify the use of force to suppress a rebellion. Such a right results, by necessary implication, from the establishment of a government empowered to require the obedience of all its citizens, to the extent of the authority conferred upon it, and consequently entitled to their allegiance to that extent. Any such government, possessing a military arm, has the unquestionable right to use that arm to compel its subjects to obey its laws and respect its rightful authority, whenever the civil power proves to be insufficient for tha purpose. We find accordingly in that part of the Constitution which treats of the powers of Congress,