AVERILL WOUNDED.

409

close range of the Gap, constantly under murderous fire, extorted the admiration of the enemy, and won that of its own command by its splendid conduct. It was firm as a rock; every movement was executed with the ease and precision of a dress-parade, and the moral effect of its splendid bearing infused the strength of another regiment. On the field, as in general orders, it received from General Averill the warmest praise.

"General Averill was constantly at the front of the first column, and on its falling back, at the front of the command, encouraging and stimulating it to the noble heroism displayed by his own fearless exposure and dauntless courage. About midway of the fight, he was struck in the middle of the forehead by a musket ball, which, glancing, passed off over the left eye, inflicting a deep wound; with the blood flowing profusely, his face undistinguishable from gore, he continued in his saddle until, by weakness, he was compelled to retire to the rear. Here the blood was staunched, the wound dressed, and, after a few moments' rest, he was again in the saddle and at the front, there remaining until the close of the fight."

When night closed the contest, Averill withdrew, leaving his dead and wounded in the hands of the enemy.

"When Walker Mountain was reached, it was found that there was but a bridle-path over it, and the wearied men dismounting, dragged 'themselves and their jaded horses up the steep ascent. The advance reached the top at midnight, and here the guide irrecoverably lost his way. To continue in the pitchy darkness was impossible. The order was given to halt, and the worn-out men and horses, stretched in single file from base to summit, on the precipitous, rocky moun tain's side, lay down to rest.

แ

'Singularly enough, yet confirmatory of the terrible punishment the enemy had received, they were not disturbed,

and at daylight were on the march again. The mountaïr: vas passed, and a forced march made, during the day, of thirtytwo miles, to Dublin. Here was a sad disappointment, for, though the good work of destruction which General Crook had done, was seen, yet he was not met. Remaining over night, an early march was made of seven miles to New River; it was greatly swollen, but was crossed with the loss of two men, four horses, and destruction of all the ammunition, and ten miles further on, the Virginia and Tennessee railroad was struck at Christiansburg. Some scattering rebel forces were found here, but were charged on and driven through and beyond the town, giving no after trouble.

"The depot here, stored with large amounts of flour, bacon and forage, was burned, the telegraph office instrument and wires destroyed, the railroad torn up and the rails rendered useless, and the bridge, two miles below, burned. Two field-pieces were captured in the village. The command occupied the town over night, moving nineteen miles to Gap Mountain the next morning, where fifteen hundred rebels, under Colonel (or General) W. E. Jackson, were found strongly posted in a gap, and strengthened by two pieces of artillery.

"General Averill's command was now entirely without ammunition. What little was left, after the battle at Cave Mountain, had been destroyed while crossing New River. A fight, therefore, was hopeless. So, by a strategic and hasty movement, he turned the enemy's left flank, seeking a bridle path over the mountain, and thence to Sinking Creek Valley, twelve miles distant; Jackson making no pursuit. On the next day, the 14th, he pushed on twenty-nine miles toward Union, and, within five miles thereof, fell in with the rearguard of General Crook's command. It was a gladdening sight and hailed vociferously."

The two commands now joined Hunter. The latter, after

HUNTER'S DEFEAT.

411

the battle near Staunton, occupied the town. Destroying here a vast amount of property, he advanced with his force, now about seventeen thousand strong, to Lexington, which was held by McCausland. The latter finding himself threatened in flank and rear, evacuated the place, and Hunter marched in and sat down, to wait the arrival of Sheridan from Gordonsville, which point, we have seen, he was unable to reach.

Receiving no tidings from him, he moved forward toward Lynchburg, the grand end of his expedition. If he could reach and hold this place, one very important part of Grant's plan would be carried out, and the supplies for Richmond cadly interfered with.

On his arrival before the town, he found it too strong to be carried by assault; but on the 18th, the very day the Army of the Potomac was moving against Petersburg, he made an attempt to capture it, but was repulsed. Sheridan having failed to destroy the Virginia Central road, Lee was able to transport troops rapidly from Richmond and its vicinity to the point of danger, and hurried off Ewell's Corps, with a part of Hill's and Breckenridge's command.

Hunter, at this time, was fifteen days' march from his base of supplies, and hence depended, for subsistence, on the country. Advised of the approach of this formidable force, he, on the 19th, commenced to retreat down the Valley. He had not proceeded far, however, when he found himself so closely pressed by the enemy that escape, in this direction, was hopeless. He, therefore, hastily abandoned a great part of his trains and guns, and struck across the mountains to Kanawha Valley, from whence he designed to return by the way of the Ohio River.

Thus, of course, Grant lost the use of these troops for sev cral weeks. Hunter not only failed to accomplish the object ́of his expedition, but being compelled to flee over the

412

WILSON'S AND KAUTZ'S RAID.

mountains, he left the Shenandoah Valley as defenseless as though his entire army had been captured.

The enemy, now between twenty and thirty thousand strong, marched down it, unopposed, sending consternation into Washington. The failure of Hunter was another sad blow to Grant, whom fate seemed determined to try to the uttermost. Though disappointed, he did not blame him as he did Butler, yet says:—

"Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James River canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its defense. I have never taken exception to the operations of General Hunter, and I am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. The prompitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country."

The effort, by Sheridan and Hunter, to destroy, perma. nently, the enemy's communications, north and west, having failed, it was hoped that success would crown Grant's measures to sever those farther south. While the latter was fleeing over the mountains to the Kanawha Valley, a strong cavalry expedition was sent out against the Weldon and Danville railroad-the success and result of which, Grant in a few words. He says:

sums up

"On the 22nd, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of the James, moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond. Striking the

WILSON'S AND KAUTZ'S RAID.

413

Weldon railroad, at Ream's Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road and the South-side road-about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry; he reached Burksville Station, on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville railroad to Roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon railroad crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he made a detour from his left, with a view of reaching Ream's Station, (supposing it to be in our possession.) At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry supported by infantry, and forced to retire with the loss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, General Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River, and coming in safely on our left and rear. The damage to the enemy, in this expedition, more than compensated for the losses sustained by us. It severed all connection by railroad, with Richmond, for several weeks."

It is possible that the damage sustained by the enemy would "compensate" for our loss, though we apprehend that, on a careful estimate, the balance remaining in our favor would be hardly worth mentioning. The evil done was soon remedied, and Grant learned what Sherman found out at Atlanta, that the breaking up of railroads, by cavalry, inflicted only temporary inconvenience. They must be held to be of permanent service.

A more serious movement was made at this time against the Weldon railroad, by the Second Corns and Griffin's divis