ishable by imprisonment for not more than seven years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both.

§ 15. Punishment of misdemeanors.-A person convicted of a crime declared to be a misdemeanor, for which no other punishment is specially prescribed by this Code, or by any other statutory provision in force at the time of the conviction and sentence, is punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary, or county jail, for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by both. See 706, post.

TITLE I.

Persons Punishable for Crime.

SEC. 16. What persons are punishable criminally. 17. Presumption of responsibility in general. 18. Id., as to child under seven years.

19. Id., as to child of seven years or more.

20, 21. Irresponsibility, etc., of idiot, lunatic, etc.
22. Intoxicated persons.

23. Morbid criminal propensity.

24. Rule as to married woman.

25. Rule as to persons acting under threats, etc.

26. Id., when act done in defense of self or another.
27. Exemption of public ministers.

§16. What persons are punishable criminally. The following persons are liable to punishment within the

state:

1. A person who commits within the state any crime, in whole or in part;

2. A person who commits without the state any offense which, if committed within the state, would be larceny under the laws of the state, and is afterwards found, with any of the property stolen or feloniously appropria ted within this state;

3. A person who, being without the state, causes, procures, aids, or abets another to commit crime within the state;

4. A person who, being out of this state, abducts or kidnaps by force or fraud, any person contrary to the

laws of the place where such act is committed, and brings, sends or conveys such person within the limits of this state, and is afterwards found therein.

5. A person who, being out of this state and with intent to cause within it a result contrary to the laws of this state does an act which in its natural and usual course results in an act or effect contrary to its laws.

Ignorance does not excuse. Hamilton v. Peo., 57 Barb., 625. Criminal intent necessary to constitute breach of penal statute. Sturgess v. Maitland, Anth. N. P., 208. See Baker v. Richardson, 1 Cow., 77; Morris v. Peo., 3 Den., 381. Ignorance of penal statute is no excuse. Smith v. Brown, 1 Wend., 231. That defendant was illegally apprehended in foreign county, no objection to jurisdiction. Peo. v. Rowe, 1 Sheld., 81. Subs. 4, 5; Peo. v. Wright, 2 Cai., 213; Peo. v. Gardner, 2 Johns., 477; Peo. v. Schenck, id., 479; McCullough's case, 2 C. H. Rec., 45. See Peo. v. Adams, 3 Den., 190; S. C., 1 N, Y., 173. Peo. v. Bork, 91 N. Y., 5. Same act may be punishable under U. S. Stat. Abbott v. Peo., 75 N. Y., 602.

§ 17. Presumption of responsibility for acts.-A person is presumed to be responsible for his acts. The burden of proving that he is irresponsible is upon the accused person, except as otherwise prescribed in this Code.

Responsible for natural consequences. Peo. v. Adams, 16 Hun, 549. Sanity is presumed. Walter v. Peo., 32 N. Y., 147; O'Brien v. Peo., 48 Barb., 274. Insanity must be affirmatively established. Sellick's case, 1 C. H. Rec., 185; Peo. v. Robinson, 1 Park., 646; 2 iù., 235.

§ 18. Child under seven years.-A child under the age of seven years is not capable of committing crime.

§ 19. Child of seven years or more. A child of the age of seven years, and under the age of twelve years, is presumed to be incapable of crime, but the presumption may be removed by proof that he had sufficient capacity to understand the act or neglect charged against him, and to know its wrongfulness. Whenever in any legal proceeding it becomes necessary to determine the age of a child, the child may be produced for personal inspection, to enable the magistrate, court or jury to determine the age thereby; and the court or magistrate may direct an examination by one or more physicians, whose opinion shall also be competent evidence upon the question of age. [Am'd ch. 46 of 1884.]

See § 279, post. Walker's case, 5 C. H. Rec., 137. See Stage's case, ib., 177; Peo. v. Davis, 1 Wh. C. C., 230.

§ 20. Irresponsibility of idiot, lunatic, etc.-An act done by a person who is an idiot, imbecile, lunatic, or insane, is not a crime. A person cannot be tried, sentenced to any punishment, or punished for a crime, while he is in a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity, so as to be incapable of understanding the proceeding or making his defense.

If reasonable doubt of sanity, must acquit. Peo. v. McCann, 16 N. Y., 58; Wagner v. Peo., 2 Keyes, 681; Cole's case, 7 Abb. Pr. N. S., 321. See Peo. v. Schryver, 42 N. Y., 1; Brotherton v. Peo., 75 N. Y., 159; State v. Crawford, 11 Kan., 32; Polk v. State, 19 Ind., 170; Dove v. State, 3 Heisk., 318; Boswell v. Com., 20 Gratt. 860; State v. Marler, 2 Ala., 43; State v. Felter, 32 Ia., 49. See Peo. v. Coffman, 24 Cal., 230; Peo. v. Best., 39 ib., 690. Lunatic, responsible during lucidity. Claile's case, 1 C. H. Rec., 176. Sanity at trial, no bearing on condition at time of offense. Freeman v. Peo., 4 Den, 9. Delirium from fever. Peo. v. Beno Ville, 3 Abb. N. C., 125. Epileptic. Staudeman's case, ib., 187. Jenisch's case, ib., 200. Weakness of intellect no defense. Patterson v. Peo., 46 Barb., 625. Partial insanity. State v. Huting, 21 Mo., 464; Bovard v. State, 30 Miss., 600. Moral insanity not recognized. Chorci v. State, 31 Ga., 424; Humphreys v. State, 45 ib., 190. See Scott v. Com., 4 Metc. Ky., 227. Feo. v. Pine, 2 Barb., 566; Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 id., 467; Peo. v. Lake, 2 Park., 215. See O'Connell v. Peo., 62 How, P. R., 436, 89 N. Y., 377; Moett v. Peo., 85 N. Y., 373; Walker v. Peo., 88; id., 81; Peo. v. Coleman, 1 N. Y. Cr., 1; Peo. v. Carnel, 2 Edm., S. C., 200. Hereditary insanity. Walsh v. Peo., 88 N. Y., 458. Plea of not guilty raises question. Ostrander v. Peo., 28 Hun, 38. Momentary insanity. Peo. v. Ross, 2 Edm., S. C., 413

§ 21. Idiots, lunatics, etc., when excused from criminal liability.-A person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic, or insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, as either

1. Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or

2. Not to know that the act was wrong.

Where prisoner knows act unlawful, he is responsible. Willis v. Peo., 32 N. Y., 715; Flanagan v. Peo., 52 N. Y., 467; Wagner v. Peo., 4 Abb. Dec.. 509; Peo. v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr., N. S., 207; Peo. v. Moett, 23 Hun, 60; Smith v. Com, 1 Duvall, Ky., 224; Kriel v. Com., 5 Bush, Ky., 362; Peo. v. McDonnell, 47 Cal., 134; Hopps v. Peo., 31 Ill., 385; Spain v. State, 47 Ga., 553; Brown v. Com., 78 Penn., St., 122; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn., 136. Knowledge must be accompanied with reason to apply it. Macfarland's trial, 8 Abb., Pr. N. S., 57. Influence of spirits no defence, when knowledge of right and wrong. Peo. v. Waltz, 50 How. Pr., 204. Feigned insanity. Waltz's case, 3 Abb. (N. C.), 209. Insane impulse Peo. v. Sprague, 2 Park., 43. Phrensy, without derangement, no defense. Pierson's case, 3 C. H. Rec., 123; Sanchez v. Peo., 4 Park., 535; 22 N. Y., 147. Monomania. Stevens v. State, 31 Ind., 485. See Peo. v. Kline, Edm. S. C., 13; Peo. v. Divine, ib., 594; Peo. v. Pine, 2 Barb., 566. Opinion of non-expert as to rational character of act, competent. Peo. v.

§ 22. Intoxicated persons, intent.-No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication, shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act.

Voluntary intoxication, furnishes no excuse; Peo. v. Rogers, 18 N. Y., 9, Peo. v. Smith, 2 Park. Cr., 223; Peo. v Robinson, ib., 235; 1 ib., 649; Kenny v. Peo., 27 How. Pr., 202; S. C., 31 N. Y., 330; Lanergan v. Peo., 6 Park., 209; Friery v. Peo., 54 Barb., 319; Peo. v. Porter, 2 Park., 14; Peo. v. Fuller, ib., 36; Peo. v. Wiley, ib., 19; Peo. v. Hammill, ib., 223; Peo. v. Batting, 49 How. Pr., 392; Peo. v. Eastwood, 3 Park. 25; 14 N. Y., 562; State v. Harlow, 21 Mo., 446; Shanahan v. Com., 8 Bush., 463; Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463; Rafferty v. Peo., 66 Ill., 118; Chorci v. State, 31 Ga., 424; Humphreys v. State, 45 ib., 190. See Peo. v. Lewis, 36 Cal., 531; Hale v. State, 11 Humph., 154; Pirtle v. State, 9 ib., 663; Cluck v. State, 40 Ind., 263. Evidence of intoxication to explain motive and conduct. Lanergan v. Peo., sup.; Peo. v Hammill, sup.; Eastwood v. Peo., sup. State v. Gut, 13 Minn., 341; Kelly v. State, 3 Smed. & Marsh, 518; Golden v. State, 25 Ga., 527; Jones v. State, 29 ib., 594; Jones v. Com., 75 Penn. St. 403; Golliher v. Com., 2 Duvall, Ky., 163; Smith v. Com., 11 ib., 224; Curry v. Com., 2 Bush, Ky., 7; Kriel v. Com., 5 ib., 362; Blimm v. Com, 7 ib., 320; Shanahan v. Com., 8 ib., 463; State v. Horne, 9 Kan., 119; Nichols v. State, 8 Ohio,. N. S., 435; State v. Schingen, 20 Wis., 74; State v. Garvey, 11 Minn., 154. Where intoxication produces insanity. Lanergan v. Peo., supra; O'Brien v. Peo., 48 Barb., 274; Peo. v. Williams, 43 Cal., 344; Cromwell v. State, 1 Mart. & Yerg., 147; U. S. v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28; State v. McGonigal, 5 Harring, 510. Delirium tremens. O'Brien v. Peo., supra; Real v. Peo., 55 Barb., 551; S. C., 42 N. Y., 270; Maconnekey v. State, 5 Ohio, N. S., 77; Willis v. Com. (Va.) 22 Alb. L. J., 176; Peo. v. Cavanagh, 62 How. Pr., 187; Peo. v. Pearce, 2 Edm., S. C., 76; Peo. v. Jones, ib., 86; Flanigan v. Peo., 86 N. Y., 554; Peo. v. O'Connell, 89 N. Y., 377. See Peo. v. Cassiano, 17 W. Dig., 499.

§ 23. Morbid criminal propensity, no defense.-A morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts, existing in the mind of a person who is not shown to have been incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, forms no defense to a prosecution therefor.

See Huntington's Trial and authorities cited.

§ 24. Defense of duress, by married woman.-It is not a defense, to a married woman charged with crime,

that the alleged criminal act was committed by her in the presence of her husband.

Keeping disorderly house. Boyd's case, 3 C. H. Rec., 134. Goldstien et al. v. Peo., 10 W. Dig., 506; 82 N. Y., 231; Seiler v. Peo., 77 N. Y., 411; Peo. v. Ryland, 28 Hun, 568, aff'd 2 N. Y. Cr., 438.

§ 25. Duress, how constituted. Where a crime is committed or participated in by two or more persons, and is committed, aided, or participated in by any one of them, only because, during the time of its commission, he is compelled to do, or to aid or participate in the act, by threats of another person engaged in the act or omission, and reasonable apprehension on his part of instant death or grievous bodly harm, in case he refuses, the threats and apprehension constitute duress, and excuse him. Goldstein v. Peo., 82 N. Y., 231.

§ 26. Act done in defense of self or another.—An act, otherwise criminal, is justifiable when it is done to protect the person committing it, or another whom he is bound to protect, from inevitable and irreparable personal injury, and the injury could only be prevented by the act, nothing more being done than is necessary to prevent the injury.

See post, §§ 203, 204, 205, 223. Code Cr. Proc. §§ 79, 80, 81. Statutory offenses indictable, though penalty also. Peo. v. Stevens, 13 Wend., 341, Peo. v. Brown, 16 Wend., 561. A person attacked if justified in reasonably apprehending great bodily harm and the danger iminent, may kill his assailant. Shorter v. Peo., 2 N. Y., 193; Patterson v Peo., 46 Barb. 625. See Peo. v. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Peo. v. Austin, 1 Park., 154; Peo. v. Cole, 4 Park., 35; Pfomer v. Peo., ib., 558; Uhl v. Peo., 5 ib., 410. Party as sailed must avoid attack if possible to justify resistance. Peo. v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y., 396; Peo. v. Cole, supra; Peo. v. Harper, Edm. S. C., 180; Shorter v Peo., supra. Resistance to prevent felony. Ruloff. v Peo., 45 N. Y., 213; Peo. v. Hand, 4 Alb. L. J., 91. Need not first invoke protection against anticipated assault. Evers v. Peo., 3 Hun, 716, 63 N. Y., 625. Defense of possession of real property. Corey v. Peo., 45 Barb., 262; Wood v. Phillips, 43 N Y, 152; Peo. v. Gulick, Lalor, 229; Harrington v. Peo., 6 Barb., 607. Defense of personal property. Gyre v. Culver, 47 Barb., 592; Morgan v. Durfee, 21 Alb. L. J., 215.

§ 27. Exemption of public ministers.-Ambassadors and other public ministers from foreign governments, accredited to the president or government of the United