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a power can by registration have conferred on him an “estate in fee simple” or“ possession of” land for a leasehold“ estate.” In another place (p. 90) he says, 'Put in the most general words the registered estate is a group of statutory rights which are new in the sense that they do not exactly correspond in their judicial theory with rights in property as known to the ordinary law, though designed to preserve and confer the same or analogous rights in their practical result.' At p. 97 the author says, “The possession of the legal estate is really only the technical expression used to denote ownership in English law-it may be called the criterion of ownership; and the scheme of the Land Transfer Acts may be said to aim at substituting for the legal estate another criterion of ownership, i.e. entry on the register or the registered estate.' We consider this to be an accurate statement of the aim of the Acts; unluckily they do not always carry it into effect. The discussion at p. 101 as to the cases where the owner of a legal estate outstanding at the time of first registration can obtain rectification of the register, leaves little to be desired.
At pp. 102 and 114 et seq., the author discusses the nature and effect of a registered charge; the conclusion at which he arrives is that the proprietor of a registered charge seems to be entitled to rely on the entries on the register as conferring on him a title similar in degree, as far as possible, to that conferred on a proprietor of land. At p. 120 he discusses the rights of the registered charges against leaseholders.
The fourth chapter contains transactions inter vivos, and is divided into three sections: (1) conveyances on sale in compulsory districts before first registration; (2) transactions on the register; and (3) transactions off the register. The first section is excellent. We doubt, however, the statement at p. 160, that where a mortgage of registered land is made off the register supported by a statutory charge, it is unnecessary to take the precaution of entering a restriction on the register against the registered proprietor of the land transferring it without the consent of the proprietor of the charge, or of handing the land certificate to the proprietor of the charge, for it will be observed that if neither of these precautions is taken the registered proprietor of the land will be able by means of a registered transfer to destroy the legal estate in the land conferred by the unregistered mortgage.
At p. 163 the author discusses the difficult question whether a mortgagee selling by virtue of a mortgage prior to first registration is bound either to be registered or to procure a transfer from the registered proprietor; he adopts the view commonly held by the profession that this case falls within rule 151
L. T. R., and that it is a case for rectification of the register. At p. 220 will be found a form of strict settlement of registered land. The common practice (see 2 Prid. 282, Brick. & S. 128) is to make the settlement in the same form as if the land were not registered, with a recital that the land is registered, and to support it by proper entries on the register.
At p. 230 transactions with registered land off the registry are considered. The questions discussed are of the greatest difficulty, and are hardly covered by authority. The author states several propositions which we consider doubtful. At p. 231 he says, “that for practical purposes and regarded as enforceable rights of property, estates and interests off the register created under s. 49 are on the level of equitable interests only in registered land.' He raises the question whether a conveyance by the registered proprietor of freehold land in the ordinary form 'unto A in fee simple to the use of B for life, with remainder to the use of C,' might not confer an equitable fee on C notwithstanding the absence of words of limitation. Again, he says that the conveyance or creation of a freehold estate for life differs altogether in a practical way from a conveyance of the fee, since the grantee would not bave the right to be placed on the register. Surely in this case the land becomes settled, and the life-tenant has a right to be registered as proprietor. Notwithstanding the objections that we have raised, we consider that the discussion of these questions will be found very useful.
Chapter v treats of Registered dispositions in invitum '; and chapter vi treats of Succession on death of Registered proprietor.' The most important question discussed in the latter chapter is, What becomes of the fee of registered land during the interval that elapses between the death of the registered proprietor and the registration of his successor ? The author submits that the fee is in abeyance.
The necessary limits of space by which this review is bound prevent us from stating the very interesting questions discussed in chapter vii, viz. (1) Rectification of the register, (2) Indemnity for loss, and (3) other remedies.
Lastly, the book contains the Land Transfer Acts and Rules, printed in a consolidated form, that is in a form approximating with respect to the collation of the sections and rules to that in which they would appear if consolidated and re-enacted as a single code or statute.
The final conclusion at which we arrive is that while we do not always agree with the author, the book will be very useful, especially to those practitioners who have to advise on questions relating to registration which are not yet covered by authority.
The Law and Practice relating to Letters Patent for Inventions. By
Thomas TERRELL, K.C. Fourth Edition. By COURTNEY TERRELL.
627 pp. and index 60 pp. (308.) The first edition of this well-known work was produced early in 1884 when the Patents Act of 1883 came into force. The second edition appeared in 1889, and now, ten years from the third edition, a fourth has been produced by the son of the learned author.
Apparently a strong incentive for its production was the experience gained in the working of the Patents Act of 1902, section 1 of which, at the instance of the Board of Trade, was put into operation in January of last year. Shortly expressed, this section empowered the Comptroller of Patents, in his discretion, to add to a complete specification, by way of notice to the public, the identifying numbers of certain older specifications in which the invention during the preceding fifty years had been wholly or in part described or claimed. Section 2, which came into force immediately on the passing of the statute, sought to remedy defects which had shown themselves in connexion with the compulsory grants of licences to use inventions. So far as we are aware, no case under this section has been reported, even if it has been put into operation, which is doubtful. Consequently, in the present book, little is said concerning compulsory licensing as it is usually termed.
The present edition, already the recipient of judicial commendation (Cooper Patent Anchor, &c. v. London County Council, 23 R. P. C. p. 295), comprises 391 pages of case-law and comment, and an appendix of 234 pages of statutes, rules, forms, precedents, &c. It may be considered
one of the best, if there can be more than one best, of the bulky volumes to which we have now become so accustomed as almost to be compelled to suppose that a book of any less size must necessarily be incomplete. The author appears to be well on the road towards a realization of that ideal textbook which we are still awaiting; a work, which exhibiting patent law as a homogeneous and systematized whole, shall set out clearly and concisely those principles to which judges are continually deferring, principles easily won from the rich mine of case-law. Indeed, so ample is case-law, that a code of principles could be compiled with less than the usual difficulty that surrounds similar attempts in other directions. As regards structure, we perceive signs of an endeavour to cast off trammels self-imposed by former generations of textbook writers who, fearful of a wrong generalization or of an incorrect deduction, have not hesitated to cram their pages with solid blocks of judicial dicta, often to the bewilderment of their readers. · The result of the decided cases' (p. 279) as to what has been held to constitute infringement when either master-patents or patents for improvements were in question, is well stated, and is an instance of what we mean, and affords an example of the generalizations to be met with in the book. The style in which the various propositions are presented is fluent, and effects an easy transition from one subject to another. The introduction of marginal notes materially assists the searcher, as also the Table of Cases, where points in the judgments, e. g. revocation, evidence, amendment, and so on, are placed against the name of each case. The chapter that deals with the practice of the Patent Office under the Act of 1902 is likely to be of value to that increasing number of practitioners who come into contact with the officials. In short, owing to lucidity in exposition, conciseness in expression, and general accuracy in the statement of principles, careful selection of examples, ample treatment of court procedure, and lastly, a matter not to be despised, the general get-up of the book, we may regard this production by Mr. Terrell as entitled to high position among its fellows.
We are glad that the author has not followed in the train of the many who merely set out results of the judicial construction of specifications, and then state the findings of the court when acting as a jury. Usually this is wholly unnecessary, since, when once construction has been determined, no doubt, apart from the consideration of 'subject-matter,' has remained upon the question of fact.
In the ideal textbook, of which we have spoken, one of the main divisions, in our opinion, ought wholly to be concerned with the construction of the specification ; for, with construction safely in hand, the majority of the problems that present themselves could be readily solved. The difficulties incidental to infringement, sufficiency of subject-matter in the invention, novelty, adequacy of description, disconformity, relation of master and servant, and so on, are minimized when construction has determined the metes and bounds of the invention. We should then, instead of, or in addition to, finding the question What is the invention' cropping up in divers situations, as in the present work, have a dissertation once and for all upon the extreme importance of the answer to this question and of the means for securing it. This chapter on Construction' would, in our opinion, take into account the state of affairs in view of which the question arose; for construction in the abstract is practically unknown. The end to be served must be—and is, in practice, although not expressly so stated—continually kept in sight. Construc
tion for one purpose may for other purposes be totally inadequate or irrevelant. If the subject of construction were properly set out in full, there would be no need to distinguish, as is customary, between the invention and its 'pith or marrow' or 'essence. The want for such a chapter and for the invention to be defined sufficiently to meet the case in hand, may be gathered, if need be, from the author's summary on page 375 of the Questions for Court and Jury. In common with other textbooks, construction is scattered through the pages of the present work, although it is but fair to point out that a great portion of it appears in the chapter on the Complete Specification.'
In a book of the present dimensions there must necessarily be an abundance of matter upon which divergent opinions may be expressed. It is also a pity that the many inaccuracies which it contains have not been corrected before publication. The book as a whole is so successful that to indicate differences of opinion and to point out what we conceive to be defects might be deemed captious, and have the effect of unduly magnifying slight blemishes. However this may be, we will allude to some points, if only to suggest their reconsideration in a future edition. Fewer instances might have been allowed to remain of an unqualified affirmative proposition immediately followed by an adversative, and attended, may be, by a secus, a cf., or its equivalent, in a footnote, a method of transmitting information so dear to our forebears but puzzling both to the legal scientist and practitioner. We look in vain for an elucidation of difficulties that the various statutes have raised, but concerning which no authoritative pronouncement has appeared, for th main the book confines itself only to such points as have actually received judicial or official attention.
We notice, in passing, that`P. 0. R.' is adopted when alluding to the * Reports of Patent, Design, Trade Mark and other Cases (published under Section 40 (1) of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883).' Presumably the abbreviation •P. O. R.’ is the shortened form of Patent Office Reports. If this is so, we must demur to it, for the Reports should not in our opinion be styled 'Patent Office Reports’; they are reports, as the title-page clearly shows, edited by eminent King's Counsel. The issue of Mr. Cutler's Reports is the form which action under section 40 of the Act has taken. So many pages are occupied with statutes, rules, forms, &c., as already mentioned, that attention seems compulsorily to be directed to the Appendix to which they are properly relegated. In this Appendix we find not only all the repealed sections of the Act of 1883 that relate to trade-marks printed in full, but also the Trade Marks Act of 1905, and this in a book upon Letters Patent for Inventions. There are also present the · Instructions to Applicants for Patents' occupying some seventeen closely printed pages. Since these Instructions, in pamphlet form, are distributed gratuitously by the Patent Office, it is not clear why a book, already big, should thus further be enlarged. Indeed, on the general question, it is always a matter of opinion how far a textbook should reprint acts, rules, &c., which are purchasable for a few pence in other forms. The busy practitioner for whom, for instance, this work is intended would have the official publications ready to hand. He should not again be compelled to purchase them probably at an enhanced price. This reprinting appears to be the more unnecessary when, in addition, all relevant sections and rules verbatim accompany the text. As regards the principles wbich are set out in the book, the salutary practice of looking up the authorities quoted might, here and there, causc
the reader to qualify the views with which he is met. On the question of ‘novelty,' the author says, “It is evident, that, if the alleged new manufacture can be shown to have been in possession of the public before the application for the grant of letters patent, there is no consideration for the grant' (p. 77); and, “Therefore, the question of whether the invention is new or not is one of fact and depends on the circumstances in every case' (p. 80), a reference being made to Pickard v. Prescott ( 9 R. P. C. p. 200). We cannot altogether agree with the author. Whether novelty is present is a question of mixed law and fact, using those words in their usual sense. It is, we think, a question of law as to what constitutes being in possession of an invention. We would refer to Harris v. Rothwell ( 4 R. P. C. 225), in which the Court of Appeal was divided on the question of what constituted' being in pos. session of the public.' The solution still awaits the House of Lords. In the case of Pickard v. Prescott the Lord Chancellor was anxious for his remarks upon the publication of an invention to be taken only in reference to the circumstances of the case before him. We are referred to a case of 1843 for the statement, which for many years has not held good, that 'the title of the specification must disclose the object of the invention'(p. 110). Several decisions before 1852, and bearing upon the results of inconsistency of title and specification, are given ; yet, four pages later, we are informed that the question of variance between the title and the specification is one upon which the decided cases can have but little bearing. Of course, as appears on a subsequent page, their value depends upon the fact that for the “Title' before 1852 we ought now to read
Provisional Specification, and utilize this information where disconformity between the provisional specification and the complete specification is alleged. The statement (p. 103) that · Utility ... does not depend at all upon the amount of commercial success that may result,' reads strangely against ‘Commercial success is strong and almost conclusive evidence of utility, though as pointed out above, (p. 103] its absence is no proof of want of utility' (p. 107). Possibly the qualification that was evidently intended on p. 103 has been inadvertently omitted. The statement (p. 33) that Section 85 ‘does not abolish trusts, but merely prohibits the registration of trusts,' does not state adequately the result of Stewart v. Casey, which is alluded to on p. 224.
On p. 194 we are told that under Section 18 • there is power neither to amend the title ...'; yet in the case of Arnold's Patent (Grif. Ad. Pat. Ca. 5) the Attorney-General, under this section, was prepared to allow an amendment of the title after the patent had been sealed.
We, ourselves, consider the use of quotation marks demands a faithful adherence to the words of the passages quoted. Apart from the introduction of italics into quotations where none appear in the originals-a practice of doubtful propriety- there are instances here where the revision must have been more or less perfunctory. For example, on p. 118, we find these words-short note or minute of that which was ultimately disclosed in the full specification’-put in quotation marks. The report, to which we are referred, says, “the identity of the invention which is disclosed by the full specification, with that of which a short note or minute was made in the provisional specification.' Dates, too, given to the cases are curious. Sometimes an appended date means the date of the first proceedings in the case, sometimes when the quoted dictum was delivered, and sometimes, if we mistake not, the date of the report, with nothing to inform the reader which is which. On p. 34 an Act is improperly