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just what Mr. V. was adjudged guilty of; hat is, 1st for saying that Lincoln and his nions (meaning the president and those acng under him in the character of spies, &c.) d prevented Union by rejecting certain proptions for peace, &c. (This was stricken out, ther than expose WooD's testimony) 2d, the ttering the belief that those in power were attempting to establish a Despotism. (Did not this very trial furnish the proof of this?) If this be treason, then traitors may be counted by the millions. The writer hereof, it is but proper to remark, has ever opposed Mr. V's peculiar peace views, as both premature and seless, yet, he believes the means used to put down that gentleman, while CONWAY and hundreds of other republicans, who have directly advocated dissolution, and committed well-de fined acts of treason, without so much as a genile rebuke from official quarters, is not only a gross outrage, but is intensifying the sting of despotism by an unmistakable display of political partiality.

We have not the patience to comment on such a trial, and the punishment inflicted on such charges, and such proofs, to say nothing of the spy system, through the criminal farce as inaugurated.

Suspect that's a Spie's office !-Byron
"Rather confide, and be deceived,

A thousand times, by treacherous foes,
Than once accuse the innocent,

Or, let suspicion mar repose."-Mrs. Osgood.

It would puzzle the most astute and patriotic man that ever lived, to pick out a sentence uttered by Mr. V., on the occasion, and distort it to mean anything like treason against the Government—or anything the half so disloyal as the hundreds of extracts from republican speeches, in the preceding pages of this work. One of the main charges against Mr. V. it seems, was the repetition of a phrase used by Mr. Lincoln in his proclamation of July, '62. To punish citizens for repeating expressions used by him who applies the punishment, in the language of Edward Livingston, in 1798, is "a refinement on despotism."

As we have given our opinion that Order 38 was issued expressly to reach VALLANDIGHAM, So we record our belief that he was virtually sentenced before he was tried. This Would not be without a precedent, for the bloody annals of La Force and other Bastiles during the Reigr of Terror in France, teach us that the following order was often observed :

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Use of the coffin and the grave.

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The forms of trial, &c., over, the next thing was to sentence and punish Mr. V. BURNSIDE was graciously pleased to sentence the victim to confinement, which the President, in the plenitude and magnanimity of His Majesty's power, commuted, by substituting banishment -a punishment unknown before, on this free continent-a punishment so long the disgrace to British Statutes, but no longer known to the English criminal code.

The arrest and deportation of Mr. V. aroused the most intense excitement throughout the north. The people saw in it a rapidly germinating despotism, and public meetings were. held in numerous places-calm, yet firm and decided resolves were adopted, protesting to the President against the usurpation of power, and the striking down at one blow, the last barrier between despotism and civil liberty. The following resolves and "correspondence with the President, are self-explanatory.

THE ALBANY RESOLUTIONS AND THE PRESI-
DENT'S REPLY.

Letter of the Committee and Resolutions.
ALBANY, May 19, 1863.

To His Excellency the President of the United States: The undersigned, officers of a public meeting held at the city of Albany on the 16th day of May instant, herewith transmit to your Excellency a copy of the resolutions adopted at earnest consideration of them. They deem it proper on their personal responsibility to state that the meeting was one of the most respectable as to numbers and character, and one of the most earnest in the support of the Union ever held in the city.

Yours, with great regard,
ERASTUS CORNING, President.
ELI PERRY, Vice President.

PETER GRANSEVOORT, Vice President.
PETER MONTEATH, Vice President.
SAMUEL W. GIBBS, Vice President.
JOHN NIBLACK, Vice President.

H. W. MCCLELLAN, Vice President.
LEMUEL W. ROGERS, Vice President.
WM. SEYMOUR, Vice President.
JEREMIAH OSBORN, Vice President.
WM. S. PADDOCK, Vice President.
J. B. SANDERS, Vice President.
EDWARD MULCAHY, Vice President.
D. V. N. RADCLIFFE, Vice President.
WM. A. RICE, Secretary.

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EDWARD NEWCOMB, Secretary.
R. W. PECKHAM, JR., Secretary.
M. A. NOLAN, Secretary.
JOHN R. NESSEL, Secretary.
C. W. WEEKS, Secretary.

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FIVE HUNDRED POLITICAL TEXTS.

Resolutions Adopted at the Meeting held in Meeting held in Albany, N. Y., on the 16th of May, 1863.

Resolved, That the Democrats of New York point to their uniform course of action during the two years of civil war through which we have passed, to the alacrity which they have evinced in filling the ranks of the army, to their contributions and sacrifices as the evidence of their patriotism and devotion to the cause of our imperiled country. Never in the history of civil wars has a government been sustained with such ample resources of means and men as the people have voluntarily placed in the hands of the administration.

Resolved, That as Democrats we are determined to maintain this patriotic attitude, and, despite of adverse and disheartening circumstances, to devote all our energies to maintain the cause of the Union, to secure peace through victory, and to bring back the restoration of all the states under the safeguard of the Constitution.

Resolved, That while we will not consent to be misapprehended on these points, we are determined not to be We misunderstood in regard to others not less essential. demand that the administration shall be true to the constitution; shall recognize and maintain the rights of the states and the liberties of the citizen; shall everywhere, outside of the lines of necessary military occupation and the scenes of insurrection, exert all its powers to sustain the supremacy of the civil over military law.

Resolved, That in view of these principles we denounce the recent assumption of a military commander to seize and try a citizen of Ohio, Clement L. Vallandigham, for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting, in criticism of the course of the administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of that General.

Resolved, That this assumption of power by a military tribunal, if successfully asserted, not only abrogates the right of the people to assemble and discuss the affairs of

government, the liberty of speech and of the press, the right of trial by jury, the law of evidence, and the privilege of habeas corpus, but it strikes a fatal blow at the supremacy of law and the authority of State and Federal constitutions.

Resolved, That the constitution of the United States... the supreme law of the land...has defined the crime of treason against the United States to consist "only in levying war against them, or adhearing to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort;" and has provided that "no person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." And it farther provides that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on the presentment or an indictment by a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land and naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger ;" and farther, that, "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right of a speedy and public trial by an impartial juny of the State and district wherein the crime was committed.

Resolved, That these safeguards of the rights of the

ample of a manly, independent and constitutional defence

of them."

Resolved, That in the election of Gov. Seymour, people of this State, by an emphatic majority, declarel their condemnation of the system of arbitrary arrests, and their determination to stand by the constitution. That the revival of this lawless system can have but one re sult: to divide and distract the North, and to destroy it confidence in the purposes of the administration. That we deprecate it as an element of confusion at home, of weakness to our armies in the field, and as calculated to lower the estimate of American character and magnify the apparent peril of our cause abroad. And that, regarding the blow struck at a citizen of Ohio as aimed at the rights of every citizen of the North, we denounce it as against the spirit of our laws and constitution, and most earnestly call upon the President of the United States to reverse the action of the military tribunal which has passed a "cruel and unusual punishment" upon the party arrested, prohibited in terms by the constitution, and to restore him to the liberty of which he has been deprived.

Resolved, That the President, Vice-Presidents, and Secretary of this meeting be requested to transmit a copy of these resolutions to his Excellency the President of the United States, with the assurance of this meeting of their hearty and earnest desire to support the government in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the existing rebellion.

Mr. Lincoln's Reply.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, June 12, 1863.

Hon. Erastus Corning and others:

GENTLEMEN-Your letter of may 19, inclosing the resolutions of a public meeting held at Albany, New York, on the 10th of the same month, was received several days ago.

The resolutions, as I understand them, are resolved into two propositions-first, the expression of a purpose to sustain the cause of the Union, to secure peace through victory, and to support the administration in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion; and, secondly, a declaration of censure upon the administration for supposed unconstitutional action, such as the making of military arrests. And from the two proposi tions a third is deduced, which is, that the gentlemen composing the meeting are resolved on doing their part to maintain our coramon government and country, despite the folly or wickedness, as they may conceive, of any administration. This position is eminently pat

citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary power were intended more especially for his protection in times of civil commotion. They were secured substantially to the Eng-riotic, and, as such, I thank the meeting and lish people after years of protracted civil war, and were adopted into our constitution at the close of the revolu

tion. They have stood the test of seventy-six years of trial, under our republican system, under circumstances which show that while they constitute the foundation of all free government, they are the elements of the enduring stability of the Republic.

Resolved, That, in adopting the language of Daniel Webster, we declare, "It is the ancient and undoubted prerogative of this people to canvass public measures and the merits of public men. It is a "home-bred right," a fire-side privilege. It has been enjoyed in every house, cottage and cabin in the nation. It is as undoubted as the right of breathing the air or walking on the earth. Belonging to private life as a right it belongs to public life as a duty, and is the last duty which those representatives we are shall find us to abandon, Aiming at all times to be courteous and temperate in its use, except when the

right itself is questioned, we shall place ourselves on the

extreme bounds of our own right and bid defiance to any arm that would move us from our ground. "This high

congratulate the nation for it. My own purpose is the same; so that the meeting and myself have a common object and can have no differ ence, except in the choice of means or measures for effecting that object.

And here I ought to close this paper, and would close it, if there were no apprehensions that more injurious consequences than any merely personal to myself might follow the censures systematically cast upon me for doing what, in my view of duty, I could not forbear. The resolutions promise to support me in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress ployed, nor shall knowingly employ, any other. the rebellion, and I have not knowingly em But the meeting, by their resolutions, assert that certain military arrests, and proceedings following them, for which I am ultimately responsible, are unconstitutional. I think they

constitutional privilege we shall defend and exercise in all
places-in time of peace, in time of war, and at all times.
Living, we shall assert it; and should we leave no other
inheritance to our children, by the blessing of God we will
leave them the inheritance of free principles and the ex- are not.

"That these safeguards of the rights of the citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary power were Intended more especially for his protection in times of civil commotion."

And, apparently to demonstrate the proposition, the resolutions proceed:

"They were secured substantially to the English people after years of protracted civil war, and were adopted into our constitution at the close of the revolution."

Would not the demonstration have been better if it could have been truly said that these safeguards had been adopted and announced during the civil wars and during our revolution, instead of after the one and at the close of the other? I, too, am devotedly for them after civil war, and before civil war, and at all times, "except when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require" their suspension. The resolutions proceed to tell us that these safeguards

"Have stood the test of seventy-seven years of trial, under our republican system, under circumstances which show that while they constitute the foundation of all free governments they are the elements of the enduring stability of the Republic."

The re

The resolutions quote from the constitution | fore I was inaugurated, and, of course, before the definition of treason, and also the limiting I had done any official act whatever. safeguards and guarantees therein provided bellion thus began, soon ran into the present for the citizen on trials for treason, and on his civil war; and, in certain respects, it began on being held to answer for capital or other infa- very unequal terms between the parties. The mous crimes, and, in criminal prosecutions, insurgents had been preparing for it more than his right to a speedy and public trial by an im- thirty years, while the government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had carepartial jury. The proceed to resolve fully considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It undoubtedly was a well-pondered reliance with them that in their unrestricted efforts to destroy Union, constitution and law, all together, the government would, in a great degree be restrained by the same constitution and law from arresting their progress. Their sympathizers pervaded all departments of the government and nearly all communities of the people. From this material, under cover of "liberty of speech," liberty of the press," and "habeas corpus" they hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew that, in times such as they were inaugurating, by the constitution itself, the "habeas corpus" might be suspended; but they also knew they had friends who would make a question as to who was to suspend it; meanwhile their spies and others might remain at large to help on their cause. Or if, as has happened, the Executive should suspend the writ, without ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such cases, and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this which might be at least of some service to the insurgent cause. It needed no very keen perception to discover this part of the enemy's programme so soon as, by open hostilities, their machinery was fairly put in motion. Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the constitution and as indispensible to the public safety. Nothing is better known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incompetent to such cases. Civil courts are organized chiefly for trials of individuals, or, at most, a few individuals acting in concert; and this in quiet times, and on charges of crimes well defined in the law. Even in times of peace, bands of horse thieves and robbers frequently grow too numerous and powerful for the ordinary courts of justice. But what comparison in numbers have such bands ever borne to the insurgent sympathizers even in many of the loyal States? Again, a jury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor. And yet, again, he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion or inducement may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.

No one denies that they have so stood the test up to the beginning of the present rebellion if we accept a certain occurrence at New Orleans; nor does any one question that they will stand the same test much longer after the rebellion closes. But these provisions of the constitution have no application to the present case we have in hand, because the arrests complained of were not made for treason—that is, not for the treason defined in the constitution, and upon the conviction of which the punishment is death-nor yet were they made to hold persons to answer for any capital or otherwise infamous crimes; nor were the proceedings following, in any constitutional or legal sense, "criminae Prosecutions." [In this connection we call the readers attention to the speech of Edward Livingston, on a subsequent page.] The arrests were made on totally different grounds, and the proceeding following accorded with the grounds of the arrest. Let us consider the real case with which we are dealing, and apply to it the parts of the constitution plainly made for such cases.

Prior to my installation here, it had been inculcated that any state had a lawful right to secede from the national Union, and, that it would be expedient to exercise the right whenever the devotees of the doctrine should fail to elect a President to their own liking. I was elected contrary to their liking; and accordingly, so far as it was legally possible, they had taken seven states out of the Union, had seized many of the United States forts, and had fired upon the United States flag, all be

Ours is a case of rebellion-so called by the resolutions before me-in fact, a clear, flagrant

and gigantic case of rebellion; and the provision of the constitution that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," [But the writ had not then been suspended;] is the provision which specially applies to our present case. This provision plainly attests the understanding of those who made the constitution, that ordinary courts of justice are inadequate to cases of rebellion"-attests their purpose that, in such cases, men may be held in custody whom the courts, acting on ordinary rules, would discharge. Habeas corpus does not discharge men who are proved to be guilty of defined crime; and its suspension is allowed by the constitution on purpose that men may be arrested and held who cannot be proved to be guilty of defined crime, "When, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public saety may require it." This is precisely our present case-a case of rebellion, wherein the public safety does require the suspension. Indeed, arrests by process of courts, and arrests in cases of rebellion, do not proceed together altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed at the small percentage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime, while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against the government, which at most will succeed or fail in no great length of time. In the latter case, arrests are made, not so much for what has been done, as for what probably would be done. [0. Moses, what a rule.] The latter is more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former. In such cases the purposes of men are much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his government is discussed cannot be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; [so that Vallandigham was ar rested for what he might do!] much more if he talks ambiguously-talks for his country with "buts," and "ifs," and "ands." Of how little value the constitutionai provisions I have quoted will be rendered, if arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall have been committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples. General John C. Breckinridge, General Robert E. Lee, General Joseph E. Johnston, General John B. Magruder, General William B. Preston, General Simon B. Buckner and Commodore Franklin Burohanan, now occupying the very highest places in the rebel war service, were all within the power of the government since the rebellion began, and were nearly as well known to be traitors then as now. Unquestionably, if we had seized and held them the insurgent cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then committed any crime defined in the law. Every one of them, if arrested, would have been discharged on habeas corpus were the writ allowed to operate. In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not likely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.

By the third resolution the meeting indicate their opinion that military arrests may be constitutional in localities where rebellion actually exists, but that such arrests are unconstitutional in localities where rebellion or insurrection does not actually exist. They insist that such arrests shall not be made "outside of the lines of necessary military occupation and the scenes of insurrection." Inasmuch, however, as the constitution itself makes no such distinction, I am unable to believe that there is any such constitutional distinction. I consider that the class of arrests complained of can be constitutional only when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require them; and I insist that in such cases they are constitutional wherever the public safety does require them, as well in places to which they may prevent the rebellion extending as in those places where it may be already prevailing, as well where they may restrain mischievous interference with the raising and supplying armies to suppress the rebellion, as where the rebellion may actually be; as well where they may restrain the enticing men out of the army, as where they could prevent mutiny in the army; equally constitutional at all places where they will conduce to the public safety, as against the danger of rebellion or invasion. Take the particular case mentioned by the meeting. It is asserted, in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried "for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting, in criticism of the course of the administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of the General." Now, if there be no mistake about this; if this assertion is the truth and the whole truth; if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But the arrest, I understand, was made for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. [Nothing of this kind appears in evidence against him.] He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the Administration or the personal interest of the Commanding General, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory evidence. [General BURNSIDE himself furnished the President the best evidence on this point, when he said that the army would "tear to pieces' any man who should talk as Vallandigham did. The fact and corolary do not lay together.-ED.]

I understand the meeting, whose resolutions I am considering, to be in favor of suppressing

He on

the rebellion by military force-by armies. | dices of the past and the selfish hopes of the Long experience has shown that armies cannot future, we are sure to extend much of be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a willy agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there work upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a case to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy.

If I be wrong on the question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in the absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them. In other words, that the constitution is not in its application in all respects the same in case of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace and public security. The constitution itself makes the distinction; and I can no more be persuaded that the government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man because it can be shown that it is not good for a well man. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting that the American people will. by means of military arrests during the rebellion. lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, law of evidence, trial by jury and habeas corpus throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life.

In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you request me, I cannot overlook the fact that the meeting speak as "democrats." Nor can I, with full respect to their known intelligence, and the fairly presumed deliberation with which they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by accident, or in any other way than that they preferred to designate themselves "democrats" rather than American citizens." In this time of national peril I would have proferred to meet you upon a level one step higher than any party platform, because I am sure that, from such more elevated position, we could do better battle for the country we all love than we possibly can from those lower ones where, from the force of habit, the preju

our ingenuity and strength in finding fault with and aiming blows at each other. But since you have denied me this, I will yet be thankful, for the country's sake, that not all Democrats have done so. whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me; and the Judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham on habeas corpus, is a Democrat of better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the battlefield, I have learned that many approve the course taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard a single one condemning it. I cannot assert that there are none such. And the name of President Jackson recalls an instance of pertinent history. After the battle of New Orleans, and while the fact that the treaty of peace had been concluded was well known in the city, but before official knowledge of it had arrived, General Jackson still maintained martial or military law. Now, that it could be said that the war was over, the clamor against martial law, which had existed from the first, grew more furious. Among other things a Mr. Louailler published a denunciatory newspaper article. General Jackson arrested him. A lawyer by the name of Morel procured the United States Judge Hall to order a writ of habeas corpus to relieve Mr. Louaillier. Gen. Jackson arrested both the lawyer and the Judge. A Mr. Hollander ventured to say of some part of the matter that "it was a dirty trick. Gen. Jackson arrested him. When the officer attempted to serve the writ of habeas corpus, Gen. Jackson took it from him, and sent him away with a copy. Holding the Judge in custody a few days, the General sent him beyond the limits of his encampment, and set him at liberty, with an order to remain until the ratification of peace should be regularly announced, or until the British should have left the southern coast. A day or two more elapsed, the ratification of the treaty of peace was regularly announced, and the Judge and others were fully liberated. A few days more, and the Judge called Gen. Jackson into court and fined him a thousand dollars for having arrested him and the others named. The General paid the fine, and there the matter rested for nearly thirty years, when Congress refunded principal and interest. The late Senator Douglas, then in the House of Representatives, took a leading part in the debates, in which the constitutional question was much discussed. I am not prepared to say whom the journals would show to have voted for the measure.

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It may be remarked, first, that we had the same constitution then as now; secondly, that we then had a case of invasion, that the permanent right of the people to public discussion,

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