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tion there were at Manila 470 officers and 10,464 men. Opposed to these was a military force of Spaniards of approximately twice the strength of the American army. On the arrival of the transports the men were established at Cavite and along the beach controlled by the fleet after the battle. General Merritt had not only the enemy to contend with but also Aguinaldo and his Filipino insurgents, whose relations with Admiral Dewey and the American generals had already become strained. By diplomacy, however, they were controlled and the way was cleared for unhampered action on the part of the American forces.

The task that General Merritt had to accomplish was not an easy one. Manila, a city of nearly 200,000 inhabitants, strongly protected by outer defenses and an inner wall, offered an almost insuperable problem to a body of men as small as that of the American army. The Filipino allies could not be trusted, and Admiral Dewey was disinclined to attack the city until the monitor Monterey arrived, fearing that the powerful guns of the shore batteries might send one of his light armored cruisers to the bottom.

The plan of General Merritt was to advance his men from the position they occupied, south of Manila, and by a combined frontal and flanking attack, to endeavor to drive the Spaniards back to the inner defences of the city. Entrenchments were dug from the coast paralleling the Spanish lines of defence, but no collision between

the two forces occurred until July 31, a month after the arrival of General Anderson's command. Anderson's command. The Spanish were stationed in front of Malate, a suburban village on the coast south of Manila. When they saw that the American soldiers were advancing their trenches towards their position, they made a sudden night attack on the men of the 10th Pennsylvania, during one of the heavy storms common to the islands at that season. The men were already tired out with their labors in digging the trenches, and suffering from the effects of remaining in them for hours when they were half-filled with water and mud; nevertheless they showed their mettle and replied to the firing as best they could, not yielding an inch, and keeping up the firing until reinforced by a detachment of the 3d U. S. Artillery, the 1st California and the 1st Colorado. In moving forward to the aid of the Pennsylvania regiment these came within the zone of firing, suffering severe losses before they reached the front. Soon after the arrival of these reinforcements, the Spanish ceased firing and withdrew, taking their wounded and dead with them. The Americans lost 15 killed and 53 wounded during this affair in the night, a punishment almost as severe as that received by the regiments in front of Guasimas and El Caney.

From July 31 to August 7 the troops of General MacArthur's brigade were unable to land owing to the heavy surf produced by the storms, and thus could not participate in




the skirmishes that were occurring nightly along the lines. The strain of these constant alarms, and the exposure of the men in the trenches, were beginning to tell on the health and spirits of the army, so General Merritt felt that the time had come to make a determined effort to put an end to what was developing into a very embarrassing situation. This was rendered easier by the arrival of the powerful armored monitor Monterey on August 4, and by the successful though hazardous landing of MacArthur's expedition. The great ten and twelve inch guns of the Monterey were more than a match for the shore batteries of the enemy, so Admiral Dewey was now willing to coöperate with General Merritt in a general attack on Manilla. The story of the succeeding operations is graphically told in his report to the Adjutant-General, dated August 31 and written when he was at sea on his way to Paris where he was summoned to aid the United States peace commissioners:

"Upon the assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's, I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed that the time had come for final action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his ships to open fire on the right of the Spanish line of entrenchments, believing that such action would stop the night firing and loss of life, but the Admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for which he was not ready. Now, however, the brigade of General MacArthur was in position and the Monterey had arrived, and under date of August 6 Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to the Captain


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same date stated that the council of defense had declared that the demand could not be granted; but the Captain-General offered to consult his Government if we would allow him the time strictly necessary for the communications by way of Hong Kong.

"This was declined on our part for the reason that it could, in the opinion of the Admiral and myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy to give up the town, in order to relieve our troops from the trenches and from the great exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a bivouac during the rainy season. The sea-coast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated that it is impossible for ships to engage with them without firing into the town, and as the bombardment of a city, filled with women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large amount of neutral property, could only be justified as a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish line of entrenchments in front of the positions at the time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy.

"It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the enemy should hold it in strong force, until after the navy had made practicable breaches in the works and had shaken the troops holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. This is indicated fully. It was believed, however, as most desirable, and in accordance with the principles of civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy

out of his entrenchments before resorting to bombardment of the city.

"By orders issued some time previously, MacArthur's and Greene's brigades were organized as the Second Division of the 8th Army Corps, Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson commanding; and in anticipation of the attack General Anderson moved his headquarters from Cavite to the brigade camps and assumed direct command in the field. Copies of the written and verbal instructions were given to the division and brigade commanders on the 12th, and all the troops were in position on the 13th at an early hour in the morning.

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"About 9 A. M. on that day our fleet steamed forward from Cavite and before 10 A. M. opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapidfire projectiles on the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments at the powder magazine fort, and at the same time the Utah batteries, in position in our trenches near the Calle Real,' began firing with great accuracy. At 10:25 on a prearranged signal from our trenches that it was believed our troops could advance, the navy ceased firing, and immediately a light line of skirmishers from the Colorado regiment of Greene's brigade passed over our trenches and deployed rapidly forward, another line from the same regiment from the left flank of our earthworks advancing swiftly up the beach in open order. Both these lines found the powder-magazine fort and the trenches flanking it deserted, but as they passed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among others the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own (Private Phoenix, Co. I, 1st Colorado)

"The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined advance of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his brigade rapidily through Malate and over the bridges to occupy Binondo and San Miguel, as contemplated in his instructions. In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, advancing simultaneously on the Pasay road, encountered a very sharp fire, coming from the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the roads and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. With much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the brigade commander and the troops engaged, these difficulties were overcome with a minimum loss * and Gen

eral MacArthur advanced and held the bridges and the town of Malate, as was contemplated in his instruction.

"The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the walled town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into Malate a white flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon, Lieut.-Col. C. A. Whittier, U. S. V., of my staff, and Lieut. Brumby, U. S. Navy, representing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate with the Captain-General. I soon personally followed these officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the Governor-General, and there, after a conversation with the Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of capitulation was signed by the Captain-General and myself. This agreement was subsequently incorporated into the formal terms of capitulation, as arranged by the officers representing the two forces.


'Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors on the sea front were hauled down and the American flag displayed and saluted by the guns of the Navy. The 2d Oregon Regiment, which had proceeded by sea from Cavite, was disembarked and entered the walled town as a provost guard, and the colonel was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in places of security. The town was filled with the troops of the enemy driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed and standing in line in the streets, but the work of disarming proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred.

"In leaving the subject of the operations of the 13th, I desire here to record my appreciation of the admirable manner in which the orders for attack and the plan for occupation of the city were carried out by the troops exactly as contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter under fire a town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly disarm an army of Spaniards more than equal in numbers to the American troops, and finally by all this to prevent entirely all rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete possession of a city of 300,000 people filled with natives hostile to the European interests, and stirred up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate resolute American soldier, well and skillfully handled by his regimental and brigade commanders, could accomplish

"The amount of public funds and the numbers of prisoners of war have been reported in detail by cable.* It will be observed that the trophies of

* "About 7,000 prisoners of war taken. The squadron has no casualties; no vessel injured Dewey." (Cablegram, August 13, 1898.)

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