Corps and their staffs, accompanied by 100 men of the 2d Cavalry, proceeded to the square of the city hall, where, amid a great concourse of people from the city and the Spanish army, Santiago was formally turned over to the United States government. At the stroke of twelve, the Spanish flag floating over the municipal building was replaced by that of the United States.

After the surrender of Santiago, occurred another of those unfortunate controversies of which the war was so fruitful.

As has been shown, all of the negotiations were carried on by the officers of the army; the province and city, in fact, being yielded up to the authority of the same. The navy was thus ignored, doubtless unintentionally, which caused Admiral Sampson to feel so aggrieved that he sent a vigorous protest both to General Shafter and to Washington. He conceived that the navy had been affronted, and demanded as the navy's share in the operations around Santiago the ships and naval material included in the articles of capitulation. These were ultimately turned over to the navy, but not as prizes of war, the United States Supreme Court deciding that ships taken by joint operations of army and navy were not subject to prize laws.*

By the terms of the capitulation the United States became possessed

* The division of prize money among the crews of war-ships-a vestige of the old custom of spoils of war - was definitely abrogated in the United States navy by the passage of the Naval Reorganization Act of 1899.

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by military occupation of the entire portion of Cuba under the jurisdiction of General Linares, which extended from Aserraderos on the southern coast, to the extreme eastern point; and on the northeastern coast from thence to Tanamo, and contained forces approximating 25,000 men. This was known as the Eastern District of Santiago de Cuba, and possessed, in addition to the city of Santiago, the important towns of Guantanamo, Baracoa, and Tanamo. The garrisons of the latter places surrendered gladly when they were informed that the terms of surrender included their trans-shipment to Spain. As the result, therefore, of the campaign, a large territory was gained from which future operations on the island could be initiated.

With this highly important object attained, it was needful now to look after the well-being of the soldiers who had so heroically accomplished an extraordinary task. The wise course demanded the immediate withdrawal of these men, and the substitution of fresh troops not yet infected with tropical diseases. For various reasons, however, this was delayed, despite the urgent recommendations of General Shafter. It is not strange, hence, that the reports of the surgeons for August 1 state that there were 4,255 cases of fever in the army, many of them undoubtedly yellow fever. These were being cared-for as well as conditions would permit by the medical corps, and the women of the Red Cross, who had volunteered to do this

noble work under the direction of Miss Clara Barton. Nevertheless the situation was fast getting beyond control. In view of the seriousness of the situation General Shafter Shafter called for an expression on the part of his commanders, who sent to him a statement, signed by all, which stated as strongly as words could express it, the fearful condition of the American forces. In it occurs the following passage: "This army must be moved at once or it will perish. As an army it can be safely moved now. Persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of thousands of lives."

This document, which became known as the Round Robin, got into the press in some way, and its publication not only threw the administration into a panic, but was also the cause of great distress to people in the United States. who had relatives or friends in the army. It had, however, the effect of opening the eyes of the Secretary of War and others to the gravity of the situation, and immediate orders were issued August 4 providing for the withdrawal of the 5th Army Corps from Santiago to an encampment at Montauk Point, New York.

During its occupation by the military forces of the United States, the province of Santiago de Cuba was organized as a department of the United States, General Lawton being assigned command of the same. Generals Ewers and Wood were designated as his subordinates, the latter

having the city placed under his particular jurisdiction.

The capitulation of Santiago to General Shafter was the cause of a further widening of the breach between General Garcia and himself. The Cuban general thought that he should be allowed to participate in the results of the campaign, and, with reason, in view of the policy made public at the beginning of the war. There is little doubt but that the Cubans were treated with no excess of tact by General Shafter and others, and the result was Garcia's withdrawal from Santiago at the time of the capitulation. He sent in his resignation to the Cuban government, and addressed to General Shafter a communication in which he expressed his disappointment in terms both dignified and patriotic:

"I have done my best, sir, to fulfill the wishes of my Government, and I have been until now one of your most faithful subordinates, honoring myself in carrying out your orders and instructions as far as my powers have allowed me to do it. The city of Santiago surrendered to the American army, and news of that important event was given to me by persons entirely foreign to your staff. I was neither honored, sir, with a kind word from you inviting myself or any officer of my staff to represent the Cuban army that occasion. You have left in

on

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power at Santiago the same Spanish authorities that for three years I have fought as enemies of the independence of Cuba. A rumor, too absurd to be believed, General, ascribes the reason of your measures and of the orders forbidding my army to enter Santiago to fear of massacres and revenge against the Spaniards. Allow me, sir, to protest against even the shadow of such an idea. We are not savages ignoring the rules of civilized warfare. We are a poor, ragged army, as ragged and as poor as was the army of your forefathers in their noble war for independ

ence, but, as did the heroes of Saratoga and Yorktown, we respect too deeply our cause to disgrace it with barbarism and cowardice."

There is much pathos in the position of this old hero of years of struggle for Cuban freedom, who when he thought that his long deferred dream of an independent Cuba was at last to be realized, should have that hope apparently snatched away by those who claimed to come as saviors.

Nor did he ever realize it on this earth, for long before America made good her pledge to Cuba, Calixto Garcia was in his grave.

A brighter phase of the end of the Santiago campaign resulted from the treatment of the Spanish prisoners of war by the American soldiers. Both armies had learned in their struggle to respect the prowess of the other. The wonderful defense of El Caney and San Juan and the equally heroic attack taught a lesson to each that could not be learned in any other way. The Spanish, also, learned that the American was far from being the "pig" and money-grubber that the foreign prints had portrayed, and

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when they found that they were cared for and fed and clothed as well as the American soldier himself, their gratitude was unbounded. The treatment, indeed, was so different from what they had been led to expect that the Spanish soldiers addressed a letter extraordinary later to the soldiers of the American army, the spirit of which is expressed in the following

sentences:

"We would not be fulfilling our duty as well. born men, in whose breasts there lives gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending to you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor, with all our strength, endeavor. ing to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or hate toward the American nation. You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of the world, have given honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished, have cured their wounded with great humanity, have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort, and lastly, to us whose condition was terrible, you have given us freely of food, of your stock of medicines, and you have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony.

From 11,000 Spanish soldiers.

PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO,
Soldier of Infantry."

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From the very beginning of the war with Spain, Major-General Miles desired the first aggressive movements of the American army to be directed against the enemy in Porto Rico, for he considered this island the key to Spanish power in the West Indies. The climate was more healthful than that of Cuba, and dangers to be encountered from fevers and malaria during a summer campaign were vastly less than in Cuba. The fact that more than twice as many men died of fevers as from Spanish bullets during the Santiago campaign is alone proof enough that it would have been a wise precaution to have considered the relative climates of the two islands in planning operations; and when the vast improvement this century has made in sanitation and medicine over a hundred years ago is considered, it is impossible not to marvel that out of an equal force of men, we lost by disease as inany as the British army lost during their operations on the Island of Cuba in 1762. Aside from the humane consideration of the welfare of the soldiers, General

An

Miles offered other important reasons for selecting Porto Rico for the scene of the first activities. This island was Spain's supply station in the West Indies. With Porto Rico occupied, a strategical position of first importance would be gained, and the line of communication with Spain severed. interesting letter to Senator Morgan of Alabama, written by Admiral Ammen from Washington, February 3, prior to the opening of the war, shows not only remarkable insight into the Spanish situation, but outlines a plan of operations which if carried out might have proved successful:

"If Spain chooses to make war, we should at once take Puerto Rico, which will leave her without a point except the island of Cuba. Then I would say we should knock all their defences down except those of Havana, for the comfort and in aid of the insurgents, but not land a man on the island, as we should do on Puerto Rico, which we should occupy with a considerable force. As for Havana, we might try our hand as between her guns and ours afloat. As for the Spanish Navy, I have the idea that it is in a very bad condition, and it would be a question of relative forces whether we should engage it."

About a month after Lieutenant Rowan performed his famous feat of

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carrying "A message to Garcia." Lieutenant Henry Whitney sailed for Porto Rico on a similar errand, and under disguise managed to explore a great deal of the southern portion of the island, gathering information which proved of inestimable value later on, and, as did Rowan, daily risking his life in the undertaking. In his interesting account of General Miles' campaign in Porto Rico, Lieutenant Whitney does not mention that it was he who performed this valuable service, yet it is interesting to note that he had since been raised to the rank of not only captain but assistant adjutant-general, nor is it difficult to infer why.

It was General Miles' policy to do nothing by halves. From the minutest to the most important detail he was scrupulously exact. It is characteristic, then, that after receiving permission from Washington to proceed against Porto Rico, he delayed preparations until he had looked after the health of the fever-stricken men of the 5th Corps in Santiago. His last telegram, sent on shipboard before sailing, was one of caution and directions regarding the sanitation of the camps, and the prevention of the spread of the disease.

Now that fever was rife among Shafter's men, it would have been folly to have taken even those not yet infected from among them, and he therefore found himself obliged to fall back almost entirely upon the forces he had personally conducted thither to aid Shafter. From Wash

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ington he was promised immediate reinforcements as well as necessary implements for disembarkation, and with these promises and the 3,314 men he had already, he set sail on July 21. A weary altercation with Admiral Sampson regarding the convoy of battleships had added to the delay, and as two of the ships accompanying bore troops, and could therefore be classed as part of the transports, it may be said the convoy consisted of only the battleship Massachusetts, the converted yachts Gloucester and Dixie. The cruisers Columbia and Yale were the two others of the convoy which bore troops. Of transports proper, there were the Lampasas, Neuces, City of Macon, Comanche, Unionist, Specialist, Rita and Stillwater.

It had been planned to land at Fajardo, on the northeast coast, but this intention had somehow been communicated to the world at large by the ever-vigilant and incautious American press, and when General Miles realized that his landing place had become known to the Spanish he decided to modify his plans without notice. Besides this, he was influenced by learning that troops were being concentrated at Fajardo. The water there was shallow, and as a result would probably make it difficult to get the troops ashore. In striking contrast to the undesirable Fajardo, Guanica, on the southern coast of the island, offered him every advantage, and more. It was of 42 fathoms of water; it had within its harbor sugar