therefore, no reason for a different course of procedure for the assessment of damages in the two cases.

But however unfair to the memorialist the second judgment may be in the aspect just considered, it is completely overshadowed by the injustice inflicted on him by its effect upon the original judgment. By the law of the South African Republic, the issuance of the new summons authorizes the reopening of the judgment upon its merits. No reason has been offered by the reconstituted court or by the defendants' counsel for such reopening. The injuries resulting to the memorialist through this nullification of his original judgment are many. They include (1) the expenditure of time, labor, and money made necessary by the second judgment, in addition to that incurred in procuring the original judgment and endeavouring to obtain the execution thereof; (2) the subjection to the possibility of being unable to produce the evidence introduced by him at the former trial; and (3) the opportunity offered to the defendents, after being made fully aware of the memorialist's case, to produce new and material evidence, which may have been known to them at the time of the former trial and which they failed to produce, in direct contravention of the universally recognized rule of res adjudicata.

These conclusions are, therefore, irresistible: (1) If the second judgment authorizing the reopening of the original judgment, by the issuance of a new summons, be in violation of the law of the South African Republic, then, under the first principle of international law above stated, the memorialist, being injuriously affected thereby, is entitled to diplomatic intervention by the United States in his behalf; (2) even if the said second judgment be in accordance with the law of the South African Republic, it constitutes such a denial of natural justice, according to the laws of the civilized world, as, under the second principle of international law above stated, entitles the injured memorialist to diplomatic intervention by the United States in his behalf.

There remains only to consider the relation to the present case of the third principle of international law above stated, to wit: "Whenever it is apparent that it would be useless for a citizen of a foreign State to attempt to pursue the means of redress afforded by the law of a country, diplomatic intervention by such foreign State is justifiable without such an attempt.' A recurrence to the memorial establishes the futility of further efforts to obtain

That document exhibits that the executive and legislative departments have always been united to deprive the memorialist of his rights, and that since the reconstitution of the court, prior to the rendition of the second judgment, they have been joined therein by the judiciary. The memorialist's suit had its birth in an unjust and illegal attempt on the part of the executive and legislative departments to deprive him of his vested rights; the executive by revoking the proclamation which declared a portion of Witfontein a public digging, after this ground had by law become such, and after the memorialist had legally acquired rights therein, and the legislative by confirming the said revocation and prohibiting redress to those injured thereby. This unlawful purpose was further manifested by the attempt of President Kruger to influence the court to render a judgment against the memorialist by seeking to extort from Chief Justice Kotze a promise that he would determine the confirmatory resolutions of the Volksraad to be decisive of the present case. This hostile spirit was again evidenced when, after the court had withstood the coercive pressure of the executive and had rendered judgment in favor of the memorialist, the execution of its clear mandate was not only completely disregarded, but, on the contrary, was sought to be evaded by the issuance of a palpably defective and illegal license. And, finally, the inimical temper of the executive and legislative branches of the Government resulted in the complete subjugation of the high court, which had hitherto been the sole defender of of the memorialist against their aggression.

The unlawful deposal of Chief Justice Kotze and the enforced resignation of Justice Ameshoff gave the desired opportunity for the appointment of men pledged to the policy of the oppression of the memorialist, and by the appointments so made, and by the retention of Mr. Justice Jorissen, the court was made a pliable instrument in the hands of the other departments of the Government for the accomplishment of their designs. When, therefore, the second judgment in this case was pronounced it represented neither the unbiased opinion of an independent tribunal nor the views of an impartial court seeking to maintain its former judgment and to adhere to its established precedents, but, on the contrary, it was the utterance of the mere mouthpiece of an autocratic President and an unjust Volksraad.

It is, accordingly, evident that the memorialist can obtain no redress of his grievances from the executive or

legislative departments of the Government of the South African Republic, while to proceed further before the judicial branch thereof would be utterly useless, resulting merely in the further expenditure of time, labor, and money. Hence, there is no prerequisite wanting to justify the diplomatic intervention by the United States to secure satisfaction for the flagrant injustice suffered by R. E. Brown at the hands of the South African Republic.

Sir:

Mr. Thomas J. Meagher to Mr. Hay.

Philadelphia, Pa., December 24, 1900. We send herewith an appendix to the memorial of R. E. Brown, relative to his claim against the South African Republic. The appendix contains a request for intervention with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. We would thank you to cause its receipt to be acknowledged.

Yours truly,

THOMAS JAMES MEAGHER.

Hon. John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States of America:

Whereas your memorialist is informed and believes, and therefore, represents, that it is claimed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland that the South African Republic has been overthrown by the said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, that the territory thereof has been annexed to the said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and that the said South African Republic is no longer in existence; and

Whereas your memorialist is informed and believes, and therefore represents, that the said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is now in occupation of the capital and the principal part of the said territory of the South African Republic; and

Whereas, by reason of the premises, the relations of your memorialist as a claimant against the said South African Republic are affected:

Now, therefore, your memorialist respectfully requests

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to protect and preserve the rights of your memorialist set forth in his memorial heretofore filed.

R. E. BROWN. State of New York, City and County of New York, ss:

R. E. Brown, the above-named memorialist, domiciled and residing in the State of Idaho, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that the facts above set forth

are true.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 18th day of December, A.D. 1900.

(Seal.)

GEO. C. BURBANK,

Notary Public, 173, New York County

Hoffman House, New York, N. Y.

ANNEX 24.

In the matter of R. E. Brown, Plaintiff, versus W. J. Leyds,
N. O. and A. A. J. C. Dieperink, Defendants.

Translation of Notes by Judge Ameshoff and
Judge Morice.

C. v. LEENHOF, Acting Registrar of
the Supreme Court of South Africa
(Transvaal Provincial Division).

Notes of Judge Ameshoff, 15th November, 1895.
Coram Chief Justice.
Ameshoff J.

Morice J.

R. E. Brown versus Dr. W. J. Leyds, N.O.

Wessels-Curlewis for Plaintiff.

Cloete, State Attorney and Hummel for Defendant.

Pleadings read.

15th November, 1895.

Robert Edgar Brown (duly sworn):

Am Plaintiff. Know Witfontein. Know of Proclamation on 19 July, 1895. On morning of the 19th there were many people on the area. Half-past eight the Responsible Clerk came before the office at Doornkop. Spoke in Dutch. Edward Melville, my interpreter, told me that he said no licences would be issued before 10 o'clock. I then went to my office. I then wrote a letter to the Responsible Clerk. This is letter A1 protesting and making application for licences. Went with letter to see Dieperink. He read it and put it in his pocket. I had three witnesses with me and tendered £300. This was 8.52. About 9.15 Dieperink came back again with certain telegrams and read these out to public. I was told that this was to defer the proclamation. I went into office and asked written acknowledgement of the Responsible Clerk's refusal to give me licences. First he refused. Then he said he would endorse on my protest. He did this but did not fulfil his promise to write me later. I have paid my per