3. BERT E. BROWN. ANSWER Great Britain for 330,000l., African Republic, which has by such acts ceased to exist, Great Britain is bound to pay the debts of the defunct Republic, and especially so when such debts are in the nature of judgment debts. Furthermore, Great Britain is bound to meet and discharge the legal obligations of said defunct Republic, particularly when they arise out of and are connected with the tortious taking or deprivation of real estate or interests therein, and when the illegal possession resulting from such tortious taking or deprivation has been confirmed by and protected under the sovereign authority of Great Britain." The Brown claim is stated on p. 1 of the Memorial to be a claim arising out of a denial of justice suffered by the late Robert E. Brown in the Courts of the late South African Republic, and the wording of the above paragraph from p. 11 seems singularly inapplicable to a claim for compensation arising out of a denial of justice in the Courts. Brown's right to compensation was certainly not a debt of the South African Republic, still less was it a judgment debt. The second sentence of the paragraph seems to be even more irrelevant, for if the legal obligation of the South African Republic flowed from the denial of justice in the Courts it cannot have been a "tortious taking or deprivation of real estate or interests therein.' It will be shown in Part II of this Answer that the judgment of the High Court of the Transvaal in Brown's action gave him no title to real estate. By Rule 11 of the Rules of Procedure for this arbitration, a Memorial is to be filed containing a succinct statement of the facts out of which the claim arises, of the grounds upon which it is put forward, and of the relief claimed," and His Majesty's Government consider they have strong cause for complaint in the failure of the United States Memorial to comply with this rule. The grounds of Brown's claim, even as against the Government of the late Republic, are left extremely vague and ill defined, but no attempt whatever is made to substantiate the proposition that the liability of the South ROBERT E. BROWN. ANSWER. THIS is a claim against Great Britain for 330,000l., with interest from the 19th July, 1895. The basis of the claim is a denial of justice in the Courts of the South African Republic. Throughout the duration of the litigation between Brown and the Transvaal officials, in which this denial of justice is said to have taken place, the South African Republic was a free and independent State, and it is therefore incumbent upon the Government of the United States not merely to establish the obligation of the South African Republic to pay compensation in respect of the injury suffered by Brown, but also to show that that liability has passed to His Majesty's Government. In the absence of such proof the claim must necessarily fall to the ground, whether or not it was valid against the South African Republic. Before passing to a consideration of the merits of the claim, the Answer of His Majesty's Government will therefore deal with the question of State succession, i.e., whether Great Britain has succeeded by reason of the annexation of the Transvaal to any such liability of the South African Republic. Part I of this Answer deals with the question of State succession. Part II deals with Brown's claim on its merits. PART I.-State Succession. The only passage in the Memorial of the United States which deals with this question of the transfer of liability from the South African Republic to Great Britain is the penultimate paragraph on p. 11, which is as follows: "Inasmuch as Great Britain has acquired the entire and complete territory of the South African Republic by conquest and has succeeded to and holds the full and entire sovereignty thereof, thereby replacing and substituting itself for the South. African Republic, which has by such acts ceased to exist, Great Britain is bound to pay the debts of the defunct Republic, and especially so when such debts are in the nature of judgment debts. Furthermore, Great Britain is bound to meet and discharge the legal obligations of said defunct Republic, particularly when they arise out of and are connected with the tortious taking or deprivation of real estate or interests therein, and when the illegal possession resulting from such tortious taking or deprivation has been confirmed by and protected under the sovereign authority of Great Britain." The Brown claim is stated on p. 1 of the Memorial to be a claim arising out of a denial of justice suffered by the late Robert E. Brown in the Courts of the late South African Republic, and the wording of the above paragraph from p. 11 seems singularly inapplicable to a claim for compensation arising out of a denial of justice in the Courts. Brown's right to compensation was certainly not a debt of the South African Republic, still less was it a judgment debt. The second sentence of the paragraph seems to be eveu more irrelevant, for if the legal obligation of the South African Republic flowed from the denial of justice in the Courts it cannot have been a "tortious taking or deprivation of real estate or interests therein." It will be shown in Part II of this Answer that the judgment of the High Court of the Transvaal in Brown's action gave him no title to real estate. By Rule 11 of the Rules of Procedure for this arbitration, a Memorial is to be filed containing "a succinct statement of the facts out of which the claim arises, of the grounds upon which it is put forward, and of the relief claimed," and His Majesty's Government consider they have strong cause for complaint in the failure of the United States. Memorial to comply with this rule. The grounds of Brown's clain, even as against the Government of the late Republic, are left extremely vague and ill defined, but no attempt whatever is made to substantiate the proposition that the liability of the South African Republic has now passed to Great Britain. The paragraph quoted above is the only reference to the matter from beginning to end of the 236 pages of the Memorial. No precedents are quoted to show that a conqueror is bound by the rules of international law to undertake such obligations of a conquered state, and His Majesty's Government are left exposed to the risk and inconvenience of a sudden change of ground on the part of the United States after an answer has been prepared to meet what appear to be the contentions of the Memorial. The denial of justice which is alleged to be the ground of Brown's claim must be the order made by the High Court of the Transvaal on the 2nd March, 1898, on Brown's motion for the assessment of damages.* That this is so will be seen from a consideration of the litigation which Brown carried on. It will be remembered that on the 22nd July, 1895, Brown instituted an action against the State Secretary and another official of the South African Republic because prospecting licences for 1,200 claims on Witfontein had been refused to him on the 19th July, 1895. In his action he claimed a declaration that he was entitled to such a licence and an order directing its issuet or in the alternative, damages. Judgment was given in his favour on the 22nd January, 1897, and the responsible clerk at Doornkop was ordered to issue the licence claimed. § The licence issued is alleged to have been void in law because it bore an endorsement upon it that the claims could not be renewed. It is also alleged that Brown endeavoured to obtain a renewal of the licence, but failed. He subsequently applied to the Court to assess the damages. If the Court had acceded to his request and assessed the damages as desired, it is obvious that Brown would have had nothing to complain of. * Memorial, p. 76. † Memorial, p. 51. Ibid., p. 57. § Ibid., 74. |