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prominent part. In her legislative halls, the question, "whether the Union ought to be continued or dissolved by a total separation of the States, was freely discussed, and either side of it was maintained, not only without reproach, but with uncompromising fearlessness of consequences. Here Mr. Marshall, side by side with Madison, stood forth on all occasions an inflexible and enlightened advocate for union. It was here that he learned and practised those profound doctrines of rational, limited, constitutional liberty, from which he never shrunk, and to which he resolutely adhered to the end of his life. * It was here that he learned to love the Union with a supreme, unconquerable love—a love which was never cooled by neglect, or alienated by disappointment: a love which survived the trials of adversity, and the still more dangerous trials of prosperity: a love which faltered not, fainted not, wearied not on this side the grave."

* *

In 1788, Mr. Marshall was a member of the Virginia Convention, assembled for the ratification of the Federal Constitution. In the debates of that body he took an active part. His speeches on the power of taxation, the powers of the judiciary, and that on the power over the militia, evince many of those sagacious and statesmanlike views which characterized his subsequent life. After the adoption of the constitution, he was elected to the State legislature, where he remained until 1792, when he once more returned to the practice of his profession, and soon became engaged in many of the leading causes in the State and national tribunals. Again in 1795, he was returned to the State legislature, where he greatly distinguished himself by his ability and power in the discussions relating to the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay.

During the winter of 1796, he visited Philadelphia, to argue an important case before the United States Supreme Court. It was during this sojourn that he became acquainted with many of the most celebrated men of the northern States, who were then in Congress. "I then became acquainted," said he, "with Mr. Cabot, Mr. Ames, Mr. Dexter, and Mr. Sedgwick, of Massachusetts, Mr. Wadsworth, of Connecticut, and Mr. King, of New York. I was delighted with these gentlemen. The particular subject, the British Treaty, which introduced me to their notice, was at that time so interesting, and a Virginian who supported, with any sort of reputation, the measures of the government, was such a rara avis, that I was received by them all with a degree of kindness which I had not anticipated." About this time he was invited by Washington to accept the office of Attorney General of the United States, but he declined, on account of its interference with the practice of his profession. He was offered the position of Minister to France, on the recall of Mr. Monroe. This he also declined. "I then thought," said he, "my determination to remain at the bar unalterable. My situation at the bar appeared to me to be more independent, and not less honorable than any other; my preference for it was decided."

General Pinckney, of South Carolina, who was subsequently appointed to succeed Mr. Monroe, being refused an audience at the Court of France, Mr. Adams, (who was then President,) desirous of an amicable and honorable adjustment of the differences between that nation and his own country, in 1797, appointed Mr. Marshall, Mr. Gerry, and General Pinckney, envoys extraordinary to France; but the envoys were not accredited, and in the summer of 1798, Mr. Marshall returned to the United States. The next year, yielding to the wishes of General Washington, he consented to become a candidate, and after a spirited political contest, was elected to Congress. His services in the memorable session of the winter of 1799 and 1800, were zealous and untiring. His masterly speech in the case of Thomas Nash alias Jongthan Robbins, delivered during this session, will be found in the subsequent pages of this volume.

In May, 1800, he was appointed by President Adams to the office of Secretary of War, but before he entered upon the duties of that station, he was transferred to the head of the department of State. On the resignation of Chief Justice Ellsworth, in 1801, Mr. Marshall was appointed as his successor, and continued on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, "with increasing reputation and unsullied dignity," until his death, on the sixth day of July, 1835.

That event created the deepest regret in the public mind throughout the country. Eulogies upon his character and judicial services were pronounced by the most eminent members of the

they not do it?

in the old system; to little purpose, indeed, did | vite them by our weakness to attac she propose improvements; and to no purpose If we add debilit is this plan constructed for the promotion of present situation, a partition of Ame our happiness, if we refuse it now, because it take place. is possible that it may be abused. The con- It is, then, necessary to give the go federation has nominal powers, but no means that power, in time of peace, which t to carry them into effect. If a system of gov- sity of war will render indispensabl ernment were devised by more than human in- we shall be attacked unprepared. Th telligence, it would not be effectual if the means ence of the world, a knowledge of h were not adequate to the power. All delegated ture, and our own particular experie powers are liable to be abused. Arguments confirm this truth. When danger sh drawn from this source go in direct opposition upon us, may we not do what we wer to the government, and in recommendation of point of doing once already—that is, anarchy. The friends of the constitution are dictator? Were those who are now as tenacious of liberty as its enemies. They this constitution less active in the d wish to give no power that will endanger it. liberty, on that trying occasion, than t They wish to give the government powers to oppose it? When foreign dangers co secure and protect it. Our inquiry here must not the fear of immediate destru be, whether the power of taxation be necessary foreign enemies, impel us take a most o to perform the objects of the constitution, and step? Where, then, will be our safe whether it be safe, and as well guarded as hu- may now regulate and frame a plan man wisdom can do it. What are the objects | enable us to repel attacks, and render of the national government? To protect the rence to dangerous expedients unneces United States, and to promote the general wel- we be prepared to defend ourselves, t fare. Protection, in time of war, is one of its be little inducement to attack us. principal objects. Until mankind shall cease defer giving the necessary power to th to have ambition and avarice, wars will arise. government till the moment of dange The prosperity and happiness of the people we shall give it then, and with an depend on the performance of these great and hand. America, like other natics, m important duties of the general government. posed to war. The propriety of gi Can these duties be performed by one State? power will be proved by the histor Can one State protect us, and promote our hap- world, and particularly of modern piness? The honorable gentleman who has I defy you to produce a single instan gone before me, Governor Randolph, has shown requisitions on several individual Sta that Virginia cannot do these things. How, posing a confederacy, have been hone then, can they be done? By the national gov-plied with. Did gentlemen expect to ernment only. Shall we refuse to give it power punctuality complied with in Amer to do them? We are answered, that the they did, our own experience shows powers may be abused; that, though the Con- trary. gress may promote our happiness, yet they may prostitute their powers to destroy our liberties. This goes to the destruction of all confidence in agents. Would you believe that men who had merited your highest confidence would deceive you? Would you trust them again after one deception? Why then hesitate to trust the general government? The object of our inquiry is, Is the power necessary, and is it guarded? There must be men and money to protect us. How are armies to be raised? Must we not have money for that purpose? But the honorable gentleman says that we need not be afraid of war. Look at history, which has been so often quoted. Look at the great volume of human nature. They will foretell you that a defenceless country cannot be secure. The nature of man forbids us to conclude that we are in no danger from war. The passions of men stimulate them to avail themselves of the weakness of others. The powers of Europe are jealous of us. It is our interest to watch their conduct, and guard against them. They must be pleased with our disunion. If we in

See the speech of Governor Randolph, at page 165 of

the first volume of this work.

We are told that the confederation us through the war. Had not the en of liberty inspired us with unanimity, tem would never have carried us th It would have been much sooner te had that government been possessed o ergy. The inability of Congress, and ure of States to comply with the const requisitions, rendered our resistance cient than it might have been. The of that government caused troops to b us which ought to have been on our prevented all resources of the commu being called at once into action. The readiness of the people to make thei exertions to ward off solely the pressing supplied the place of requisitions. W came solely to be depended on, their was fully discovered. A bare sense of a regard to propriety, is too feeble t men to comply with obligations. We ourselves if we expect any efficacy fro If requisitions will not avail, the gov must have the sinews of war some ot Requisitions cannot be effectual. The productive of delay, and will ultimate efficient. By direct taxation, the n

of the government will be supplied in a peacea- | cles of domestic property. Can you believe ble manner, without irritating the minds of the that ten mer, selected from all parts of the people. But requisitions cannot be rendered State, chosen because they know the situation efficient without a civil war-without great ex- of the people, will be unable to determine so as pense of money, and the blood of our citizens. to make the tax equal on, and convenient for, Are there any other means? Yes, that Con- the people at large? Does any man believe gress shall apportion the respective quotas pre- that they would lay the tax without the aid viously, and if not complied with by the States, of other information besides their own knowthat then this dreaded power shall be exercised. ledge, when they know that the very object The operation of this has been described by the for which they are elected is to lay the taxes in gentleman who opened the debate. He can- a judicious and convenient manner? If they not be answered. This great objection to that wish to retain the affections of the people at system remains unanswered. Is there no other large, will they not inform themselves of every argument which ought to have weight with us circumstance that can throw light on the subon this subject? Delay is a strong and pointed ject? Have they but one source of informaobjection to it. tion? Besides their own experience-their knowledge of what will suit their constituents

We are told by the gentleman who spoke last, that direct taxation is unnecessary, because we are not involved in war. This admits the propriety of recurring to direct taxation if we were engaged in war. It has not been proved that we have no dangers to apprehend on this point. What will be the consequence of the system proposed by the worthy gentleman? Suppose the States should refuse?

The worthy gentleman who is so pointedly opposed to the constitution, proposes remonstrances. Is it a time for Congress to remonstrate or compel a compliance with requisitions, when the whole wisdom of the Union, and the power of Congress are opposed to a foreign enemy? Another alternative is, that, if the States shall appropriate certain funds for the use of Congress, Congress shall not lay direct taxes. Suppose the funds appropriated by the States, for the use of Congress, should be inadequate; it will not be determined whether they be insufficient till after the time at which the quota ought to have been paid; and then, after so long a delay, the means of procuring money, which ought to have been employed in the first instance, must be recurred to. May they not be amused by such ineffectual and temporizing alternatives from year to year, until America shall be enslaved? The failure in one State will authorize a failure in another. The calculation in some States that others will fail, will produce general failures. This will, also, be attended with all the expenses which we are anxious to avoid. What are the advantages to induce us to embrace this system? If they mean that requisitions should be complied with, it will be the same as if Congress had the power of direct taxation. The same amount will be paid by the people.

It is objected, that Congress will not know how to lay taxes, so as to be easy and convenient for the people at large. Let us pay strict attention to this objection. If it appears to be totally without foundation, the necessity of levying direct taxes will obviate what the gentleman says; nor will there be any color for refusing to grant the power.

The objects of direct taxes are well understood: they are but few; what are they? Lands, slaves, stock of all kinds, and a few other arti

they will have the benefit of the knowledge and experience of the State legislature. They will see in what manner the legislature of Virginia collects its taxes. Will they be unable to follow their example? The gentlemen who shall be delegated to Congress will have every source of information that the legislatures of the States can have, and can lay the taxes as equally on the people, and with as little oppression as they can. If, then, it be admitted that they can understand how to lay them equally and conveniently, are we to admit that they will not do it, but that in violation of every principle that ought to govern men, they will lay them so as to oppress us? What benefit will they have by it? Will it be promotive of their re-election? Will it be by wantonly imposing hardships and difficulties on the people at large, that they will promote their own interest, and secure their re-election? To me it appears incontrovertible that they will settle them in such a manner as to be easy for the people. Is the system so organized as to make taxation dangerous? I shall not go to the various checks of the government, but examine whether the immediate representation of the people be well constructed. I conceive its organization to be sufficiently satisfactory to the warinest friend of freedom. No tax can be laid without the consent of the House of Representatives. If there be no impropriety in the mode of electing the representatives, can any danger be apprehended? They are elected by those who can elect representatives in the State legislature. How can the votes of the electors be influenced? By nothing but the character and conduct of the man they vote for. What object can influence them when about choosing him? They have nothing to direct them in the choice but their own good. Have you not as pointed and strong a security as you can possibly have? It is a mode that seems an impossibility of being corrupted. If they are to be chosen for their wisdom, virtue, integrity, what inducement have they to infringe on our freedom? We are told that they may abuse their power. Are there strong motives to prompt them to abuse it? Will not such abuse militate against

their own interest? Will not they and their friends feel the effects of iniquitous measures? Does the representative remain in office for life? Does he transmit his title of representative to his son? Is he secured from the burden imposed on the community?

will be sufficiently energetic and oper small territory, will be feeble when over a wide-extended country. The g tells us there are no checks in this pla has become of his enthusiastic eulogiu American spirit? We should find a c control, when oppressed from that so this country, there is no exclusive stock of interest. The interest of the

To procure their re-election, it will be necessary for them to confer with the people at large, and convince them, that the taxes laid are for their good. If I am able to judge on the sub-nity is blended and inseparably conne ject, the power of taxation now before us is wisely conceded, and the representatives are wisely elected.

that of the individual. When he pro own, he promotes that of the co When we consult the common good.

When he desires such these, he will find them abundan They are the best checks. What ha of his eulogium on the Virginia cons Do the checks in this plan appear less than those of the constitution of Virg the checks in the constitution be con the checks in the Virginia constitution find the best security in the former.

The temple of liberty was complete when the people of England said to th that he was their servant. What a learn from this? Shall we embrac system as that? Is not liberty secure where the people hold all powers in t hands, and delegate them cautiously, periods, to their servants, who are acc for the smallest mal-administration ? the nation that can boast greater secu we do? We want only a system like t before you, to strengthen and perpet security.

The honorable gentleman said that a govern-sult our own. ment should ever depend on the affections of the people. It must be so. It is the best support it can have. This government merits the confidence of the people, and, I make no doubt, will have it. Then he informed us again of the disposition of Spain with respect to the Mississippi, and the conduct of the government with regard to it. To the debility of the confederation alone may justly be imputed every cause of complaint on this subject. Whenever gentlemen will bring forward their objections, I trust we can prove that no danger to the navigation of that river can arise from the adoption of this constitution. I beg those gentlemen that may be affected by it, to suspend their judgment till they hear it discussed. Will, says he, the adoption of this constitution pay our debts? It will compel the States to pay their quotas. Without this, Virginia will be unable to pay. Unless all the States pay, she cannot. Though the States will not coin money, (as we are told,) yet this government will bring The honorable gentleman has asked forth and proportion all the strength of the be any safety or freedom, when we g Union. That economy and industry are essen- the sword and the purse. Shall the tial to our happiness, will be denied by no man. large hold the sword and the purse wit But the present government will not add to our interposition of their representatives? industry. It takes away the incitements to in- whole aggregate community act pe dustry, by rendering property insecure and un-I apprehend that every gentleman wil protected. It is the paper on your table that will promote and encourage industry. New Hampshire and Rhode Island have rejected it, he tells us. New Hampshire, if my information be right, will certainly adopt it. The report spread in this country, of which I have heard, is, that the representatives of that State having, on meeting, found they were instructed to vote against it, returned to their constituents without determining the question, to convince them of their being mistaken, and of the propriety of adopting it.

impossibility of this. Must they, then, them to others? To whom are they them, but to their representatives, wh countable for their conduct? He r secrecy as unnecessary, and produces th government as a proof of its inutility. no secrecy there? When deliberatin propriety of declaring war, or on mi rangements, do they deliberate in 1 fields? No, sir. The British govern fords secrecy when necessary, and every government. In this plan, s The extent of the country is urged as another only used when it would be fatal and p objection, as being too great for a republican to publish the schemes of governme government. This objection has been handed are threatened with the loss of our lib from author to author, and has been certainly the possible abuse of power, notwith misunderstood and misapplied. To what does the maxim, that those who give may ta it owe its source? To observations and criti- | It is the people that give power, and cisms on governments, where representation it back. What shall restrain them? did not exist. As to the legislative power, was the masters who give it, and of wh it ever supposed inadequate to any extent? servants hold it. Extent of country may render it difficult to execute the laws, but not to legislate. Extent of country does not extend the power. What

He then argues against the system, l does not resemble the British govern this-that the same power that declare

prominent part. In her legislative halls, the question, "whether the Union ought to be continued or dissolved by a total separation of the States, was freely discussed, and either side of it was maintained, not only without reproach, but with uncompromising fearlessness of consequences. Here Mr. Marshall, side by side with Madison, stood forth on all occasions an inflexible and enlightened advocate for union. It was here that he learned and practised those profound doctrines of rational, limited, constitutional liberty, from which he never shrunk, and to which he resolutely adhered to the end of his life. * * * It was here that he learned to love the Union with a supreme, unconquerable love—a love which was never cooled by neglect, or alienated by disappointment: a love which survived the trials of adversity, and the still more dangerous trials of prosperity: a love which faltered not, fainted not, wearied not on this side the grave."

In 1788, Mr. Marshall was a member of the Virginia Convention, assembled for the ratification of the Federal Constitution. In the debates of that body he took an active part. His speeches on the power of taxation, the powers of the judiciary, and that on the power over the militia, evince many of those sagacious and statesmanlike views which characterized his subsequent life. After the adoption of the constitution, he was elected to the State legislature, where he remained until 1792, when he once more returned to the practice of his profession, and soon became engaged in many of the leading causes in the State and national tribunals. Again in 1795, he was returned to the State legislature, where he greatly distinguished himself by his ability and power in the discussions relating to the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay.

During the winter of 1796, he visited Philadelphia, to argue an important case before the United States Supreme Court. It was during this sojourn that he became acquainted with many of the most celebrated men of the northern States, who were then in Congress. "I then became acquainted," said he, "with Mr. Cabot, Mr. Ames, Mr. Dexter, and Mr. Sedgwick, of Massachusetts, Mr. Wadsworth, of Connecticut, and Mr. King, of New York. I was delighted with these gentlemen. The particular subject, the British Treaty, which introduced me to their notice, was at that time so interesting, and a Virginian who supported, with any sort of reputation, the measures of the government, was such a rara avis, that I was received by them all with a degree of kindness which I had not anticipated." About this time he was invited by Washington to accept the office of Attorney General of the United States, but he declined, on account of its interference with the practice of his profession. He was offered the position of Minister to France, on the recall of Mr. Monroe. This he also declined. "I then thought," said he, "my determination to remain at the bar unalterable. My situation at the bar appeared to me to be more independent, and not less honorable than any other; my preference for it was decided."

General Pinckney, of South Carolina, who was subsequently appointed to succeed Mr. Monroe, being refused an audience at the Court of France, Mr. Adams, (who was then President,) desirous of an amicable and honorable adjustment of the differences between that nation and his own country, in 1797, appointed Mr. Marshall, Mr. Gerry, and General Pinckney, envoys extraordinary to France; but the envoys were not accredited, and in the summer of 1798, Mr. Marshall returned to the United States. The next year, yielding to the wishes of General Washington, he consented to become a candidate, and after a spirited political contest, was elected to Congress. His services in the memorable session of the winter of 1799 and 1800, were zealous and untiring. His masterly speech in the case of Thomas Nash alias Jongthan Robbins, delivered during this session, will be found in the subsequent pages of this volume.

In May, 1800, he was appointed by President Adams to the office of Secretary of War, but before he entered upon the duties of that station, he was transferred to the head of the department of State. On the resignation of Chief Justice Ellsworth, in 1801, Mr. Marshall was appointed as his successor, and continued on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, "with increasing reputation and unsullied dignity," until his death, on the sixth day of July, 1835.

That event created the deepest regret in the public mind throughout the country. Eulogies upon his character and judicial services were pronounced by the most eminent members of the

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