Quesnay, Adam Smith, Delacourt, Montesquieu, and Sismondi, &c., &c., to bring Society to its better social proprieties.

Carelessness as to the mode of collection and the use of the revenue, after its collection, yea the eagerness for getting it expended, had some sense, when it was done, as against kings, churches, or lords, who had feudal incomes by right of conquest; for then it was a restoration of means taken unfairly from the people, and every cent, rescued from being used for mere personal ends, was a gain to the public. But the same negligence, as to how public moneys are gotten, as well as the haste for their outlay on the favorite projects of some special people, has no sense in it in republics like ours; it is, on the contrary, a most dangerous public propensity. When the Queen of England makes a donation or assists in some public works, it diminishes, to that extent, the means that she would otherwise spend for herself or family, or save and accumulate. When a republican government expends means on special schemes, it takes moneys, gathered for general public purposes, for private, local, or semipublic ends, and it is a false distribution of wealth. With a queen it means a restraint on herself; with a republic it means overleaping a barrier. The praises of history of the munificence of potentates in erecting public buildings, &c., have their just reasons for using means, legally and technically their own, for public objects. They gave back to all, what they had an ostensible right to keep or spend as they pleased.

When in later times governments became the agents of the public for special public purposes, and the parliaments voted taxes for the same, either by assessments or general tax, then it was necessary to create special funds, and to guard them against being taken by the kings, &c. At that time the clause arose which is in nearly every American Constitution, viz: "Every law imposing a tax shall state, distinctly, the object of the same, to which only it shall be applied." But in a republic, which should defray nothing from the general treasury, except what has a general object-that is to say: one for which the special beneficiary cannot be found-this clause is not only nonsensical, but actually mischievous. For such governments the rule should read: No taxes shall be levied except for strictly public purposes, and for these alone shall the proceeds be used. No public money shall be expended, except for objects, for which the personal beneficiary cannot be ascertained, and then only for objects recognized by pre-existing law. Appropriations are not laws, they cannot authorize an expenditure not already recognized as legal by previous enactment. When the cost of any semi-public or private work is ascertained, it shall be assessed on those benefited by them,

and only the amount, not so ascertainable, shall be paid from the treasury. These assessments should be the only special funds.

The framers of the Constitution of 1787 could not free themselves entirely from political reasonings, that had their roots in British historic conditions; but, rather than blame them for any lack of logical discernment of the different government they were dealing with, as compared with that of England, let us praise them for emancipating themselves as much as they did. Had the body of the people been at all equal to them, and the manifold propositions that were fortunately defeated, and the many measures that were unfortunately successful, by which the United States treasury and property was misused, would never have happened. They-the people-could not rise to the height of their free position; but would keep treating the federal government and its money, lands, and credit, as if it were a royal government, that had revenues outside of taxation, and that to deplete it was a process of redistribution of moneys collected as a badge of conquest. We can hear even now, every day, men saying: "Oh! never mind the principle, let us get the money into circulation again!" If they fully understood: that, in a republican government, taxes should be levied by general contribution; that the people cause their levy, that they should only be levied for general objects; and that special things should be assessed on the beneficiaries, what a change it would have made in the public will!

But it is time to close this chapter, already much more extended than we had intended. We can only add the general conclusion that there are not yet any systems of taxation in force in any of the governments of the United States, that rest on justice, as worked out by science or by a gradual perfection in their details. If popular will alone could make good tax laws, we should have the best in the world; for our legislation on this subject, embodies not only implicit obediences of public opinion, but zealous anticipations of them. The public men of the United States know, that peoples' minds are much more occupied with desires to escape taxation, and yet to enjoy its benefits, than they are with the reasonings necessary to have none, but just tax laws. And they understand, furthermore, that some well-sounding phrase or plausibility, that passes for a principle and is promulgated by the press, is the next easiest method to secure public favor. But political economy teaches, that the execution of even a good tax law is the more important point, and as our governments are all weak in their administrations, because we have no schooled officers, it, with the false distribution already explained, explains to us, why

America got in time not only the most exorbitant, but the worst executed tax laws in the world. That our people do not see this fact, does not change its truth; it only proves, that a people may be bled most severely, provided you hide the lancets.

The heads of the chief men in public life in America were ever too much preoccupied with their partisan and personal idealities to allow them to see clearly the country's political realities. They had taken grounds that prevented an objective consideration of the subject. No system would have been adopted by them, that did not fit into their respective statesrights or other false extremisms. They had, themselves, some metropolitan spirit, but were afraid of the narrow provincial politicians whom they had themselves indoctrinated with the respective special ideas of government. These became more and more narrow prejudices in their uncultivated minds. And both feared this public opinion, that had, as explained, in part arisen from historic events, but had also been specially cultivated and intensified here. It saw aristocratic spooks in every public institution, that had (as could not be otherwise) a look, as if modelled after British or European patterns. The name tax, bank, &c., had nearly as bad a sound in the public ear as that of Kings, Lords, Chancellors, and High Priests or Popes. The absurdity of such public aversions is the more transparent, when we consider, how many things, both in public and private life, were necessarily more or less imitations-often, too, improvements-of European examples. As we transferred the British system of "clerks," as a general designation of subordinate civil officers; used "coaches" for the name of the vehicles that carried the mails; spoke of "cabinets" for our presidents, &c.; why should the name "bank" or "tax" or assessment" scare us away from doing the sensible thing on any subject? We should adopt and avoid things for good reasons, not for mere names.

CHAPTER XVII.

STATE AND MUNICIPAL TAXATION.

'Liberty produces excessive taxes, but the effect of excessive taxes is slavery and slavery produces a diminution of the means, from which taxes are paid." -Montesquieu

THIS protest of the author of "The Spirit of Laws" against the liberty-worship of the eighteenth century, reads like prophecy, when we think of the taxation of the municipal governments of the United States. We have the "liberty that produces excessive taxes," and their effect is slavery over the thrifty part of our society to an extent that discourages production and prevents saving. But the extract not only reads like prophecy, it is prophecy, and of the best kind, to wit: that it announces a law, and the results certain to follow its violation, as lessons of historic research. And why have we infringed on this law, though known to us; and brought upon us the penalties, though predicted for us? Because we thought, that our liberty was exempt from the faults of that of the Athenian democracies, of the Roman republic, and the governments of the so-called free cities and principalities of Italy and Germany. And we are now waked up by the most fierce abuses of the taxing power, which the world ever saw. We slept, because we presumed, that ours would be, not merely the lowest taxation in amount (that, however, would prove nothing), but the wisest expended public revenue. If our object had been to prevent the formation of capital, we could not have devised measures more certain to accomplish it. In any other society the deleterious effects would have shown themselves within the first five years, while here, owing to peculiar extraneous circumstances (emigration and a large landed area), it has taken near fifty years to come to the surface. The truth is: that instead of being less careful in our finances and fiscal administrations, we should have been more so; and instead of our believing that our voters need not be put under as severe restraints as Kings, Hierarchs, and Nobles, we should have known, that a multitude requires both more numerous as well as more definite restrictions.

The arrogant doctrine of there being unlimited powers of taxation in any government, first advanced by monarchs, then denied by the great jurists and economists of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, and under their advice. placed under restraints, is now reasserted in America under the plea of popular sovereignty. And other plausibilities, that wear the mask of liberty, followed of course. It was therefore proper to remind the reader of the ground taken by one of these great minds, who lived and wrote over a century ago, as to the effect of liberty on taxation. His sense of right told him, that the right to tax is no larger in a republic, than in a monarchy or an aristocracy; and that it is no safer in a People's hands, than in a King's; nor likely to be more justly exercised. No government can, as he holds, take more than a fair portion of a subject's earnings, and it only "because it secures the agreeable enjoyment of the rest." Furthermore (he says): “it is the duty of a government to measure honestly, how much a taxpayer ought to pay, and not merely to guess how much he can pay." It amazes us to find contrary doctrines advanced in America, and that they are so popular. Hence we deem it a fair inquiry, how it was possible, that states, who revolted against the tax sovereignty of a king and parliament, should miss entirely the true principles announced by writers, like Montesquieu, on this subject; and reassert in their constitutions and laws, impliedly at least, the old arbitrary unlimited powers of government over the means of their subjects. Under the regime of popular sovereignty we have not only asserted the omnipotence of government, but adopted also the other error, viz: that popular governments are under no obligations, except those, which they self-impose by constitutional law. Yea more, that protection is not due to the very wealth, which keeps up government. A person, once popularly supposed to be rich, has, according to these ideas, no rights, unless they are conferred, but he is presumed to be under the duty to bear taxation because he is rich. With the supposed poor, it is the reverse; they have rights by nature, and owe nothing to the state except what they vote upon themselves.

We admit that these objects and results of our public rules have not been expressed in so many words; but we contend, that they are the reality, that stands behind our systems of taxation and our action towards private wealth. All that thrifty men can do among us, is to save their means and enter with them into a sort of legalized bastard condition; for if they want to have any legitimacy in the republic, they must either be unthrifty and have no visible layings-up for evil days; or