VAN BUREN AND TAYLOR ON CUBA. of the United States duties and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline." In the same spirit, his instructions to Messrs. Anderson and Sergeant " contained the following passage: "It is required by the frank and friendly relations which we most earnestly desire ever to cherish with the new Republics, that you should, without reserve, explicitly state that the United States have too much at stake in the fortunes of Cuba, to allow them to see with indifference a war of invasion prosecuted in a desolating manner, or to see employed, in the purposes of such a war, one race of the inhabitants combating against another, upon principles and with motives that must inevitably lead, if not to the extermination of one party or the other, to the most shocking excesses. The humanity of the United States in respect to the weaker, and which, in such a terrible struggle, would probably be the suffering, portion, and the duty to defend themselves against the contagion of such near and dangerous examples, would constrain them, even at the hazard of losing the friendship of Mexico and Colombia, to employ all the means necessary to their security." 269 and, while refusing, so early as 1825, to guarantee the possession of that island to Spain, and informally giving notice that we would never consent to its transfer to any more formidable power, seemed entirely satisfied with, and anxious for, its retention by Spain as her most precious and valued dependency- The Queen of the Antilles.' But, at length, having reännexed Texas, the Slave Power fixed covetous eyes on this fertile, prolific island. In 1848, our Minister, under instructions from President Polk, made an offer of $100,000,000 for it, which was peremptorily, conclusively rejected. Presi Directly thereafter, the South became agitated by 'fillibustering' plots for the invasion and conquest of that island, wherein real or pretended Cubans by nativity were prominent as leaders. dent Taylor was hardly warm in the Several years later, Mr. Van Bu- White House before he was made ren, writing as Gen. Jackson's pre-aware that these schemes were on mier to Mr. C. P. Van Ness, our then Minister at Madrid, urges upon Spain, through him, the acknowledgment of South American independence, on this among other grounds: "Considerations connected with a certain class of our population make it the interest of the Southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island [Cuba] to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence; the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, whose result could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States." Thus, so long as any revolution in Cuba, or displacement of the Spanish authority there, seemed likely to affect the stability or perpetuity of Slavery, our Government steadily, officiously opposed such revolution; May 8, 1826. 11 the point of realization, and compelled to issue his proclamation" against them in these words: "There is reason to believe that an armed expedition is about to be fitted out in the United States with an intention to invade the island of Cuba, or some of the provinces of Mexico. The best information which the Executive has been able to obtain points to the island of Cuba as the object of this expedition. It is the duty of this Government to observe the faith of treaties, and to prevent any aggression by our citizens upon the territories of friendly nations. I have, therefore, thought it necessary and proper to issue this Proclamation, to warn all citizens of the United States, who shall connect themselves with any enterprise so grossly in violation of our laws and our treaty obligations, that they will thereby subject themselves to the heavy penalties denounced will forfeit their claim to the protection of against them by our acts of Congress, and their country. No such persons must ex 12 August 11, 1849. pect the interference of this Government, in any form, on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their conduct. An enterprise to invade the territories of a friendly nation, set on foot and prosecuted within the limits of the United States, is, in the highest degree, criminal, as tending to endanger the peace, and compromit the honor, of this nation; and, therefore, I exhort all good citizens, as they regard our national reputation, as they respect their own laws and the Law of Nations, as they value the blessings of peace and the welfare of their country, to discountenance and prevent, by all lawful means, any such enterprise; and I call upon every officer of this Government, civil or military, to use all efforts in his power to arrest, for trial and punishment, every such offender against the laws providing for the performance of our sacred obligations to foreign powers." This emphatic warning probably embarrassed and delayed the execution of the plot, but did not defeat it. Early in August, 1851-or soon after Gen. Taylor's death-an expedition under Lopez, a Cuban adventurer, sailed in a steamer from New Orleans-always the hotbed of the projects of the Slavery propagandists. About five hundred men embarked in this desperate enterprise, by which a landing was effected on the island of Cuba. All its expectations, however, of a rising in its behalf, or of any manifestation of sympathy on the part of the Cubans, were utterly disappointed. The invaders were easily defeated and made prisoners, when their leader was promptly garroted at Havana," and a few of his comrades shot; but the greater number were sentenced to penal servitude in a distant Spanish possession, 13 August 16th. 14 The body of the Convention proposed to us, on the part of Great Britain and France, was in the following words: "The high contracting parties hereby severally and collectively disclaim, both now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba; and they respectively whence they were ultimately liber ated by pardon. The discipline proved effective. There was much talk of further expeditions against Cuba from one or another Southern city. A secret cabal, known as the "Order of the Lone Star," recruited adventurers and tried to raise funds through all the seaboard cities of the Union, and it was understood that Gen. John A. Quitman, of Mississippi, one of the ablest and strongest of Mr. Calhoun's disciples, had consented to lead the next expedition against Cuba; but none ever sailed. The "Order of the Lone Star" proved useful to Gen. Pierce in swelling his vote for President in 1852, and soon after subsided into nothingness. As our Government had long expressed satisfaction with the possession of Cuba by Spain, while proclaiming hostility to its transfer to any other power, Great Britain and France determined to put our sincerity to the test; and, accordingly, in 1852, proposed to unite with us in a treaty mutually guaranteeing that island to Spain. But Mr. Edward Everett, as Secretary of State to Mr. Fillmore, rejected the overture in an exceedingly smart dispatch. 14 The formal proposition for a joint agreement of perpetual renunciation, on the part of Great Britain, France, and the United States, respectively, of any covetous designs on Cuba, bind themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatever. "The high contracting parties declare, severally and collectively, that they will not obtain or maintain, for themselves, or for any one of themselves, any exclusive control over the said island, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over the same." MR. EVERETT TO FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 271 was presented, on the 23d of April, | of Texas; as to which, Mr. Everettto Mr. Webster, then our Secretary overdoing his part, as is natural in a of State, and by him courteously Federalist turned fillibuster-volunacknowledged, six days later, in a teers the wholly gratuitous assertion note which, though not without that "there never was an extension demur, expressed the acquiescence of territory more naturally or justifiof our Government in the general ably made." Ignoring the fact that views expressed by France and Eng- Great Britain has still possessions in land with reference to Cuba, and this hemisphere nearly, if not quite, gave assurances that, "The Presi- equal in extent to those of our own dent will take M. de Sartiges' com- country, and that her important munication into consideration, and island of Jamaica is quite as near give it his best reflections." to Cuba as is any portion of our Southern coast, Mr. Everett says: "The President does not covet the acquisition of Cuba for the United States;,at the same time, he considers the acquisition of Cuba as mainly an American question. The proposed convention proceeds on a different principle. It assumes that the United States have no other or greater interest in the question than France or England; whereas, it is necessary only to cast one's eye on the map to see how remote are the relations of Europe, and how intimate those of the United States, with this island." Mr. Webster being dead" and Mr. Everett duly installed as his successor, the latter answered" a note of M. de Sartiges, recalling Mr. Webster's attention to this subject, under date of July 8th. In this answer, In this answer, our Government peremptorily declines, for various and elaborately stated reasons, any such convention or compact as that proposed to it by France and England. While still disclaiming, pro forma, any desire If three strong men were traversor intention on our part of acquiring a desert in company with a ing Cuba, this document affords the fourth rich, but weak, companion, strongest evidence of a contrary dis- and two of them should propose to position. It assumes that the Sen- the other a mutual stipulation not to ate would inevitably refuse its as- rob or otherwise abuse their weak sent to the treaty proposed, and brother, it could hardly fail to astonadds: "its certain rejection by that ish them to hear their proposition body would leave the question of declined, as contemplating an Cuba in a more unsettled position tangling alliance"-a perplexing and than it is now." It doubts the con- troublesome undertaking, whereof stitutional power "to impose a per- no one could fully calculate the scope manent disability on the American and ultimate consequences. Yet Mr. Government for all coming time." Everett sees fit to say that It parades, with significant emphasis, the repeated and important acquisitions of territory by our Government, through the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, and of Florida in 1819, as also through the annexation 15 Oct. 24th, 1852. en "There is another strong objection to est traditions of the Federal Government is the proposed agreement. Among the oldan aversion to political alliances with European powers. In his memorable Farewell Address, President Washington says: The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our com 16 December 1, 1852. mercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop." President Jefferson, in his Inaugural Address in 1801, warned the country against 'entangling alliances.' This expression, now become verbial, was unquestionably used by Mr. Jefferson in reference to the alliance with ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked them to assume." pro Mr. Everett, having thus, in effect, apprised the civilized world that the acquisition of Cuba is essential to our independence, and that we shall proceed in our own time to appropriate it, turns to give our slaveholders a meaning hint that they must not be overreach themselves. too eager in the pursuit, or they will He says: France of 1778-an alliance, at the time, of incalculable benefit to the United States; but which, in less than twenty years, came near involving us in the wars of the French Revolution, and laid the foundation of heavy claims upon Congress, not extinguished to the present day. It is a sig nificant coincidence, that the particular provision of the alliance which occasioned these evils was that under which France called upon us to aid her in defending her West Indian possessions against England. Nothing less than the unbounded influence of Washington rescued the Union from the perils of that crisis, and preserved our neutrality." Mr. Everett proceeds: "But the President has a graver objection to entering into the proposed convention. He has no wish to disguise the feeling that the compact, although equal in its terms, would be very unequal in substance. France and England, by entering into it, would disable themselves from obtaining possession of an island remote from their seats of government, belonging to another European power, whose natural right to possess it must always be as good as their own-a distant island in another hemisphere, and one which, by no ordinary or peaceful course of things, could ever belong to either of them. *** The United States, on the other hand, would, by the proposed convention, disable themselves from making an acquisition which might take place without any disturbance of existing foreign relations, and in the natural order of things. The island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our States. It bars the entrance of that great river which drains half the North American continent, and with its tributaries forms the largest system of in ternal water communication in the world. It keeps watch at the doorway of our intercourse with California by the Isthmus route. If an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames and the Seine, and the United States should propose a convention like this to France and England, those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by "The opinions of American statesmen, at different times, and under varying circumstances, have differed as to the desirableness of the acquisition of Cuba by the United States. Territorially and commercially, it would, in our hands, be, an extremely valuable possession. Under certain contingencies, it might be almost essential to our safety. Still, for domestic reasons, on which, in a communication of this kind, it might not be proper to dwell, the President thinks that the incorporation of the island into the Union at the present time, although effected with the consent of Spain, would be a hazardous measure; and he would consider its acquisition by force, except in a just war deprecated take place), as a disgrace to the with Spain (should an event so greatly to be civilization of the age." In another place, he gives them another intimation of the solicitude with which our Government watches and wards against any subversion of Slavery in Cuba; saying: "Even now, the President cannot doubt that both France and England would prefer any change in the condition of Cuba to that which is most to be apprehended, viz.: an internal convulsion which should renew the horrors and the fate of San Domingo THE OSTEND MEETING AND island.' The President is convinced that the conclusion of such a treaty, instead of putting a stop to these lawless proceedings, would give a new and powerful impetus to them. It would strike a death-blow to the conservative policy hitherto pursued in this country toward Cuba. No administration of this Government, however strong in the public confidence in other respects, could stand a day under the odium of having stipulated with the Great Powers of Europe, that, in no future time, under no change of circumstances, by no amicable arrangement with Spain, by no act of lawful war (should that calamity unfortunately occur), by no consent of the inhabitants, should they, like the possessions of Spain on the American continent, succeed in rendering themselves independent; in fine, by no overruling _necessity of self-preservation, should the United States ever make the acquisition of Cuba." After all this, and much more of the same purport, a smile must have irradiated the countenance of even the most impassive European diplomatist on reading the concluding paragraph of Mr. Everett's dispatch, viz.: "For these reasons, which the President has thought advisable, considering the importance of the subject, to direct me to unfold at some length, he feels constrained to decline respectfully the invitation of France and England to become parties to the proposed convention. He is persuaded that these friendly powers will not attribute this refusal to any insensibility on his part to the advantages of the utmost harmony between the great maritime States on a subject of such importance. As little will Spain draw any unfavorable inference from this refusal; the rather, as the emphatic disclaimer of any designs against Cuba on the part of this Government, contained in the present note, affords all the assurance which the President can constitutionally, or to any useful purpose, give, of a practical concurrence with France and England in the wish not to disturb the possession of that island by Spain." Soon after the passage of the Nebraska bill, President Pierce, through a dispatch from Gov. Marcy as Secretary of State," directed Messrs. 17 Dated Washington, August 16, 1854. James Buchanan, John Y. Mason, and Pierre Soulé, our Embassadors at London, Paris, and Madrid respectively, to convene in some European city, there to confer with regard to the best means of getting possession of Cuba. They met accordingly at Ostend," and sat three days; adjourning thence to Aix-la-Chapelle, where they held sweet council together for several days more, and the result of their deliberations was transmitted to our Government in a dispatch known as the 'Ostend Manifesto.' In that dispatch, they say: "We firmly believe that, in the course of human events, the time has arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale, as those of the United States in the purchase, of the island, and that the transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations. "Under these circumstances, we cannot anticipate a failure, unless, possibly, through the malign influence of foreign powers, who possess no right whatever to interfere in the matter. "We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to this conclusion; and, for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under two distinct heads: "1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba with as little delay as possible. "2. The probability is great that the Government and Cortes of Spain will prove willing to sell it; because this would essentially promote the highest and best interests of the Spanish people. "Then, 1. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the peculiarity of its geographical position, and the considerations attendant on it, Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic as any of its present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great family of States of which the Union is the providential nursery. "From its locality, it commands the mouth of the Mississippi, and the immense and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to the ocean. "On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of some thirty thousand miles, which disembogue themselves through this magnificent river 18 October 9, 1854. |