cultivate its own notions and to exclude those of its neighbors.1

Such was the structural condition of the colonies during the colonial epoch. It was emphatically a condition of separateness, and one which was favored by the policy of disjunction maintained by the sovereign. One cannot but feel, that a condition existing so long without any significant disturbance, must have had its foundation in the nature itself of the people. No artificial structure, and no mere administrative policy, can account for the tenacity with which the colonies maintained their individuality. Natural causes alone account for a characteristic, which, in its political relations, is to be described as an absorbing love of local self-government. Those who see in the separateness of the colonies the effects of a mere divide et impera

1 In treating of the separateness of the colonies, their points of dissimilarity have been indirectly revealed. It may be well to give the points in which all the colonies were alike, as they are set forth by one so accomplished in political analysis as Bluntschli:

...

"(a) English law, without either landlords or feudal tenure: free property in the soil was the basis of the economic system. (b) Essential equality of position and rights, and the absence of any aristocracy like that which still held power in England. This equality was, however, broken by marked differences of race [such as those of the Indians and the negroes]. (c) The constant habit of self-reliance in contrast to State-aid. (d) The general education of the people by means of national schools. . . . (e) A free constitution of the villages, and independent administration of the colonies. (f) The small number of officials. . . . (g) Hardly any standing troops, their place being taken by the militia. (h) The existence of a House of Representatives, elected in each colony by the free men, which acted with the Senate in making laws, but by itself granted taxes and controlled the administration. (i) The custom of short tenure of offices, so as to provide for frequent changes. (k) Lastly, the gradual development of a free press and freedom of combination." Allgemeine Statslehre, or The Theory of the State, b. vi, chap. xxii (Engl. ed., 1885).

LAISSEZ-FAIRE.

63

policy, attribute to colonial docility more than belongs to it; and much more than the other members of the anglican family have shown, even when under conditions more favorable to its exercise than those which surrounded the American colonies. And those who attribute to provincial self-importance a characteristic so general, and which appears so natural on the face of things, fall short of the true explanation, which, as has been observed, is to be found in the race-nature of the colonist. Thanks to the conditions of colonial existence which permitted these colonies to develop themselves, they came to be natural and complete exponents of the most powerful forces of their being; of inherent, spontaneous, irresistible individuality in government, and of abiding love of the soil. Without these traits they would have become mere factories of British commerce, but, with these, they became autonomies, each of which was as rich in institutions and in personal liberty, as England herself was.

A comparison of the British colonies with those of France or of Spain, which bordered them, will show them to be creatures of growth and development, and that this growth and development is to be attributed to their self-government. So well was this understood at Whitehall, that the fixed and wise maxim of administration concerning them was, Let them alone: a maxim recognized by George II., when he said: "I do not understand the colonies; I wish their prosperity. They appear to be happy at present, and I will not consent to any innovations, the consequences of which I cannot foresee." 1

1 "Solomon in all his glory," said John Adams, "could not have said a wiser thing." Life and Works, x, 347.

CHAPTER IV.

SEPARATENESS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES

CONTINUED.

Separateness during the Stamp Act period; during the Congressional period - Congresses of 1774 and 1775- The Declaration of Independence - Local self-government.

How dominating and persistent this principle of local self-government was, is shown by its manifestations during the Revolutionary period, which extended from the agitation of the Stamp Act to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. This period may be divided into three subdivisions, as follows: the time intervening between the beginning of the Stamp Act agitation and the Congress of 1774; that between the meeting of such Congress and the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, and that which ensued until terminated by the adoption of the Constitution.

It needs little more than to recall the expressions of public feeling during the Stamp Act period the speech of Otis concerning the writs of assistance, the addresses of the committees of correspondence and congresses, and the like to see that the underlying principle maintained by the colonies, was the integrity and independence of their local legislatures and the sanctity of their personal freedom. Resistance to encroachment by the British Parliament was the cry,

UNION NOT YET A FORCE.

65

and for the reason, that, not being represented therein, such parliament was not their own, and, therefore, had no right to legislate for them. They had their own parliaments, and, to the minds of the colonists, their local self-government being menaced, to prevent its violation they united in taking up arms.

As affairs neared the vortex of actual hostilities, one might suppose that the gravity of the situation would compel a union of all the governmental forces possessed by the colonies. Surely, in the face of the overawing danger without and of the perilous distraction within, the instinct of self-preservation should prompt a complete and harmonious union. Nothing of the sort occurred; it was still mere combination, and one which was restricted, incomplete, and inharmonious. This condition can be accounted for - the sentiment of union, which had been growing for ten years past, had been too lately awakened to become presently an active and willing force; its character was not yet well enough understood, it was not altogether above suspicion; it exacted too much of those who never had been called upon to share their liberties with their neighbors, and, in a word, it was still a sentiment, strong enough to effect a combination of arms, it is true, but was not strong enough to act the part of a binding, cohesive force. It could induce a combination which promised immediate and visible results, but when it came to exacting the surrender of liberties to a power yet to be created, and for results that could not be forecast, it was impotent. A colonist of Rhode Island, for example, knew nothing of colonial relations, except those existing between Rhode Island and the crown; to him there were none else, and all the

opinion that he could entertain upon the present troubles was, that his own colony and its fellows were in a bad plight together, and that, as the conditions were similar, common counsel and common effort were better than individual action. Further than this he did not go; as for a common colonial parliament with governmental powers, his mind had never suggested, much less entertained, such a notion, and, had it been broached, he would have rejected it, if on no other ground than that it would be turning over to a new and untried creation in America powers which he was then denying to an ancient and venerated institution in England; he would be yielding to equals the very thing he denied to those who asserted that they were his superiors, and who he half-believed were his superiors. Accordingly, the Congress in which he consented to appear, was a body that met merely for counsel and not for government.

But, even had this sentiment been strong enough to sustain union, the capacity to effect it was wanting; for, so long as the colonies remained dependencies, they were confined within the limitations of dependencies; and such organizations, as we have seen, had no power to unite. Union of governmental forces in the face of administrative prohibition, would be rebellion, and they abhorred and repudiated the thought of rebellion. No man can serve two masters, and, so long as they held to their allegiance to the king, they could serve no one else; any other position would be a contradiction of their assertion that they would suffer interference in their affairs from none except their natural lord, the king. They might counsel together, but they could not act as one power; and that this