Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in EthicsThis is a revised edition of Walker's well-known book in feminist ethics first published in 1997. Walker's book proposes a view of morality and an approach to ethical theory which uses the critical insights of feminism and race theory to rethink the epistemological and moral position of the ethical theorist, and how moral theory is inescapably shaped by culture and history. The main gist of her book is that morality is embodied in "practices of responsibility" that express our identities, values, and connections to others in socially patterned ways. Thus ethical theory needs to be empirically informed and politically critical to avoid reiterating forms of socially entrenched bias. Responsible ethical theory should reveal and question the moral significance of social differences. The book engages with, and challenges, the work of contemporary analytic philosophers in ethics. Moral Understandings has been influential in reaching a global audience in ethics and feminist philosophy, as well as in tangential fields like nursing ethics; research ethics; disability ethics; environmental ethics, and social and political theory. This revised edition contains a new preface, a substantive postscript to Chapter 1 about "the subject of moral philosophy"; the addition of a new chapter on the importance of emotion in practices of responsibility; and the addition of an afterword, which responds to critics of the book. |
From inside the book
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Page viii
... standing lower in a racial hierarchy that still haunts our culture and politics, locally and globally. Because this is a fact, the questioning of how that fact has shaped our canonical representations of moral life is surely in order ...
... standing lower in a racial hierarchy that still haunts our culture and politics, locally and globally. Because this is a fact, the questioning of how that fact has shaped our canonical representations of moral life is surely in order ...
Page 4
... standing to enter claims about the nature of morality, to represent it within and to a particular society? Are moral philosophers, in being this and in being trained for it, in a particularly good position to represent what morality is ...
... standing to enter claims about the nature of morality, to represent it within and to a particular society? Are moral philosophers, in being this and in being trained for it, in a particularly good position to represent what morality is ...
Page 12
... standing to give or to demand accounts. It has also to do with the candor of the parties to these understandings with each other and with themselves. Critical reflection looks for relations of earned trust that allow understandings to ...
... standing to give or to demand accounts. It has also to do with the candor of the parties to these understandings with each other and with themselves. Critical reflection looks for relations of earned trust that allow understandings to ...
Page 14
... standing for. So I conclude in chapter 10 with some discussion of moral criticism and objectivity, within and across moral cultures. It will be obvious now that I am maintaining that moral philosophy bears a far greater descriptive and ...
... standing for. So I conclude in chapter 10 with some discussion of moral criticism and objectivity, within and across moral cultures. It will be obvious now that I am maintaining that moral philosophy bears a far greater descriptive and ...
Page 16
... standing to judge and blame us. In the ways we assign, accept, or deflect responsibilities, we express our understandings of our own and others' identities, relationships, and values. At the same time, as we do so, we reproduce or ...
... standing to judge and blame us. In the ways we assign, accept, or deflect responsibilities, we express our understandings of our own and others' identities, relationships, and values. At the same time, as we do so, we reproduce or ...
Contents
Clearer Views An ExpressiveCollaborative Model | 53 |
Self and Other Portraits Who Are We and How Do We Know? | 107 |
Testing Sight Lines | 209 |
Some Questions about Moral Understandings | 259 |
Notes | 269 |
Bibliography | 281 |
Index | 299 |
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Common terms and phrases
actions actual applied arrangements assumptions authority believe body certain chapter claims commitments conception continue critical cultural demands dependent discussion effects epistemic ethics example expectations experience express fact familiar females feminist force forms gender give given Greeks human idea ideal identities important individuals integrity interests involve judgments justification kind knowledge least less lives look matter means Methods moral philosophy moral theory moral understandings mutual narrative nature necessary normative objectivity one’s particular perhaps person philosophers picture political positions possible practices problems projects provides question reason recognize reflective relations relationships represent requires responsibility roles seems sense shared Sidgwick simply situations slaves social society sometimes speak specific standards standing stories structure tell theory things tion truth University values victims violence vulnerable women wrong