Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in EthicsThis is a revised edition of Walker's well-known book in feminist ethics first published in 1997. Walker's book proposes a view of morality and an approach to ethical theory which uses the critical insights of feminism and race theory to rethink the epistemological and moral position of the ethical theorist, and how moral theory is inescapably shaped by culture and history. The main gist of her book is that morality is embodied in "practices of responsibility" that express our identities, values, and connections to others in socially patterned ways. Thus ethical theory needs to be empirically informed and politically critical to avoid reiterating forms of socially entrenched bias. Responsible ethical theory should reveal and question the moral significance of social differences. The book engages with, and challenges, the work of contemporary analytic philosophers in ethics. Moral Understandings has been influential in reaching a global audience in ethics and feminist philosophy, as well as in tangential fields like nursing ethics; research ethics; disability ethics; environmental ethics, and social and political theory. This revised edition contains a new preface, a substantive postscript to Chapter 1 about "the subject of moral philosophy"; the addition of a new chapter on the importance of emotion in practices of responsibility; and the addition of an afterword, which responds to critics of the book. |
Contents
Clearer Views An ExpressiveCollaborative Model | 53 |
Self and Other Portraits Who Are We and How Do We Know? | 107 |
Testing Sight Lines | 209 |
Some Questions about Moral Understandings | 259 |
Notes | 269 |
Bibliography | 281 |
Index | 299 |
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Common terms and phrases
actions actual applied arrangements assumptions authority believe body certain chapter claims commitments conception continue critical cultural demands dependent discussion effects epistemic ethics example expectations experience express fact familiar females feminist force forms gender give given Greeks human idea ideal identities important individuals integrity interests involve judgments justification kind knowledge least less lives look matter means Methods moral philosophy moral theory moral understandings mutual narrative nature necessary normative objectivity one’s particular perhaps person philosophers picture political positions possible practices problems projects provides question reason recognize reflective relations relationships represent requires responsibility roles seems sense shared Sidgwick simply situations slaves social society sometimes speak specific standards standing stories structure tell theory things tion truth University values victims violence vulnerable women wrong