TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD. WASHINGTON, D. C., October 4, 1863. II A.M. MAJOR-GENERAL SCHOFIELD, St. Louis, Mo.: I think you will not have just cause to complain of my action. A. LINCOLN. TELEGRAM TO GENERAL W. S. ROSECRANS. WAR DEPARTMENT, October 4. 1863. 11.30 A.M. MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANS, Chattanooga, Tenn.: Yours of yesterday received. If we can hold Chattanooga and East Tennessee, I think the rebellion must dwindle and die. I think you and Burnside can do this, and hence doing so is your main object. Of course to greatly damage or destroy the enemy in your front would be a greater object, because it would include the former and more, but it is not so certainly within your power. I understand the main body of the enemy is very near you, so near that you could "board at home," so to speak, and menace or attack him any day. Would not the doing of this be your best mode of counteracting his raid on your communications? But this is not an order. I intend doing something like what you suggest whenever the case shall appear ripe enough to have it accepted in the true understanding rather than as a confession of weakness and fear. A. LINCOLN. TO C. D. DRAKE AND OTHERS. EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, HON. CHARLES D. DRAKE AND OTHERS, Committee. GENTLEMEN:-Your original address, presented on the 30th ult., and the four supplementary ones presented on the 3d inst., have been carefully considered. I hope you will regard the other duties claiming my attention, together with the great length and importance of these documents, as constituting a sufficient apology for not having responded sooner. These papers, framed for a common object, consist of the things demanded and the reasons for demanding them. The things demanded are First. That General Schofield shall be relieved, and General Butler be appointed as Commander of the Military Department of Missouri. Second. That the system of enrolled militia in Missouri may be broken up, and national forces be substituted for it; and Third. That at elections persons may not be allowed to vote who are not entitled by law to do so. Among the reasons given, enough of suffering and wrong to Union men is certainly, and I suppose truly, stated. Yet the whole case, as presented, fails to convince me that General Schofield, or the enrolled militia, is responsible for that suffering and wrong. The whole can be explained on a more charitable, and, as I think, a more rational hypothesis. We are in a civil war. In such cases there always is a main question, but in this case that question is a perplexing compound-Union and slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of at least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, saying nothing of those who are against it. Thus, those who are for the Union with, but not without slavery; those for it without, but not with; those for it with or without, but prefer it with; and those for it with or without, but prefer it without. Among these, again, is a subdivision of those who are for gradual, but not for immediate, and those who are for immediate, but not for gradual extinction of slavery. It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet, all being for the Union, by reason of these differences each will prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once, sincerity is questioned, and motives are assailed. Actual war coming, blood grows hot and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception breeds and thrives. Confidence dies, and universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbor, lest he be killed by him. Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be among honest men only. But this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad, and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strong measures deemed indispensable, but harsh at best, such men make worse by maladministration. Murders for old grudges, and murders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that will best serve for the occasion. These causes amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, without ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general. The newspaper files, those chroniclers of current events, will show that the evils now complained of were quite as prevalent under Frémont, Hunter, Halleck, and Curtis, as under Schofield. If the former had greater force opposed to them, they also had greater force with which to meet it. When the organized rebel army left the State, the main Federal force had to go also, leaving the department commander at home relatively no stronger than before. Without disparaging any, I affirm with confidence that no commander of that department has, in proportion to his means, done better than General Schofield. The first specific charge against General Schofield is, that the enrolled militia was placed under his command, whereas it had not been placed under the command of General Curtis. The fact is, I believe, true; but you do not point out, nor can I conceive, how that did, or could, injure loyal men or the Union cause. You charge that, General Curtis being superseded by General Schofield, Franklin A. Dick was superseded by James O. Broadhead as Provost-MarshalGeneral. No very specific showing is made as to how this did or could injure the Union cause. It recalls, however, the condition of things, as presented to me, which led to a change of commander of that department. To restrain contraband intelligence and trade, a system of searches, seizures, permits, and passes, had been introduced, I think, by General Frémont. When General Halleck came, he found and continued the system, and added an order, applicable to some parts of the State, to levy and collect contributions from noted rebels, to compensate losses and relieve destitution caused by the rebellion. The action of General Frémont and General Halleck as stated, constituted a sort of system which General Curtis found in full operation when he took command of the department. That there was a necessit for something of the sort was clear; but that could only be justified by stern necessity, and that it was liable to great abuse in administration equally clear. Agents to execute it, co the great prayer, were led into temptation might, while others would not, resist that te It was not possible to hold any to a accountability; and those yielding t to the would sell permits and passes to the pay most and most readily for them property and collect levies in the their own pockets. Money bein man having money, whether lo be a victim. This practice some extent, and it was, a osely |