what would be the intentions of the Government."

From day to day he was ordered to make haste and on the 9th was informed that the enemy was massing forces in front of Pope and Burnside with the intention of crushing them and marching on to the Potomac: "You must send reinforcements instantly to Aquia Creek. Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory." Next day General-in-Chief Halleck telegraphed that "the enemy is fighting Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your movements. That which has already occurred was entirely unexpected and must be satisfactorily explained."

At the very moment these numerous and urgent orders from Washington were being disobeyed, one of McClellan's own generals and partisans was asking permission to strike the blow so desperately demanded by Stanton-the blow which would have saved Pope and turned the tide of the war. It was sent through McClellan's father-in-law (General Marcy) by General Alfred Pleasanton:

General R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-Staff,

Haxall's Landing, August 11, 1862.

General: Your note of this date received. There are moments when the most decided action is necessary to save us from great disasters. I think such a moment has arrived.

The enemy before us is weak. A crushing blow by this army at this time would be invaluable to disconcert the troops of the enemy to the north of us. That blow can be made in forty-eight hours. Two corps would do it, and be in position to go wherever else they may be ordered by that time.

From all I can learn there are not 36,000 men between this and Richmond, nor do I believe that they can get more before we can whip them. I have guides ready, and know the roads sufficiently well to accomplish anything the General wants.

I write this as a friend. I shall willingly carry out the General's orders, be they what they may; but I think he has an opportunity at this time few men ever attain.

Destroy this, and whatever I have said shall not be repeated by me

Very truly yours,

A. Pleasanton.

The foregoing, not used by the historians but, through an error, left on file in the War Department, clearly establishes McClellan's persistent and disastrous insubordination, as well as what his own friends thought of it at that moment.

On the 21st he was advised: "Pope and Burnside are hard pushed and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself

as soon as you can." On the 24th he arrived at Aquia Creek, with orders to proceed to Alexandria and “take entire charge of sending out troops," and reached that city by boat on the evening of the 26th.

On the following morning Herman Haupt, Stanton's director of Military Railways, went in a rowboat to search for McClellan among the fleet of transports. On finding him, surrounded by his staff and writing materials, Haupt lost no time in disclosing that Pope was out of forage and rations, Lee tearing at his rear, communication cut off, and relief imperatively demanded. He then rowed McClellan ashore and explained how, if protection were granted for the trains, relief could be promptly sent, but was told in reply that the undertaking was "too risky"-as if war could be prosecuted without risk! Refusing to provide protection, approve Haupt's plan, or make any suggestion of his own, McClellan called for a drink of brandy, mounted a horse and rode away!

At that moment there were thirty thousand veteran troops in camp near Alexandria, within sixteen miles of the spot where Pope's handful of weary men was being slaughtered; but, as his "Own Story" (page 529) shows, McClellan was so busy preparing a journal and writing to his wife that he could not cooperate with Haupt to save Pope from annihilation and the capital from peril. He began writing in the early "A. M.," and at 10:30 A. M., after Haupt had ceased begging him for help, complained to his wife. that he had "been again interrupted by telegrams requiring replies."

That a general of the army was not permitted to devote his mornings, noons, and evenings to writing copiously to his wife. without being "interrupted by telegrams requiring replies," and that he was not allowed to make military history with a pen instead of a sword without "interruption" at 10:30 in the morning, is unquestionably the blackest shame in American history!

Haupt, exasperated at the unmistakable disposition to let Pope perish, determined to send succor at any hazard. Having prepared a relief train, he asked McClellan, who had been rediscovered, for a convoy of two hundred sharp-shooters. At 1 o'clock in the morning of the 28th, the request being ungranted, Haupt secured a lantern and walked four miles to General Hancock's camp and, routing that superb officer out of bed, promptly secured the

required escort and at 4 o'clock that morning began despatching the relief trains that were so sorely needed.

Pope's army, after the pluckiest resistance human creatures could offer, was overwhelmed, though not until the supply of green apples and crackers and of ammunition was exhausted and the shattered band worn out. The first part of McClellan's prophecy to his wife that "Pope will be badly thrashed within ten days and then they will be glad to turn over the redemption of affairs to me," thanks to his own recalcitrant conduct, came very near being fulfilled, but the desperate fighting of, Pope's men held Lee's fiery army in check and saved Washington.

Yet if Lee had known the real situation-that McClellan was inactive and rejoicing at Alexandria and that Pope had neither bread, bullets, nor reinforcements-he would have swept on to Washington and set up the Confederate government in the Federal capital!