CHAPTER LX.

BESIEGED BY THE PRESIDENT.

While Grant was sincere in his secret cooperation with Stanton to thwart Johnson, he was piqued at the unceremonious way in which Stanton resumed possession of the War Department. He did not at the moment realize that Stanton must secure actual physical possession in advance of any agent of the President, or be placed at a decided disadvantage.

Johnson, too, was exasperated-excessively enraged-for he had been defeated by Grant's failure to keep his promise to hold the War Department at all hazards. He consulted J. S. Black and other lawyers as to whether he could use the army to forcibly remove Stanton, and asked several army officers whether they would obey direct orders from the President to that effect. General W. H. Emory (commanding the Department at Washington), General Grant, and General Sherman replied that they would obey no such orders. He then conceived the idea of creating the military "Department of the Atlantic," with headquarters in the War Office, and appointing General Sherman to be its commander and also secretary of war. He believed that Sherman's personal hostility to Stanton for reversing the deplorable Sherman-Johnston-Davis terms of surrender was great enough to lead him to use force, if necessary, to gain and hold possession of the War Office. On this point Major A. E. H. Johnson makes some interesting disclosures:

General W. T. Sherman now appeared and joined with his brother John Sherman, General Grant, Judge J. S. Black, the Blairs, and a band of copperheads encamped about the White House in the efforts to oust Stanton.

Grant and Sherman, after consulting the President, agreed to go together and ask Stanton to resign. The date of their going and the purpose were advertised-probably by the President himself. Sherman did not summon courage to keep his promise, but Grant called, though he did not find a way to suggest resignation. Stanton expected and was ready for such a suggestion and knew precisely how to meet it. Through Walter L. Dunn, a soldier detailed there who carefully noted all callers and conversations,. he knew all that was transpiring at the White House.

Stanton appreciated the fact that Grant was destroying his strength and usefulness, encouraging the South to renew efforts for supremacy, and tending inevitably toward national unrest and turmoil. Grant, too, knew how the country, North and South, interpreted his partnership with Johnson, for he read it everywhere, and it was told to him repeatedly by the foremost men of the nation. He also knew of Johnson's determination to resist Congress, to seize the army and use force to dispossess Stanton, and Stanton knew that he knew it.

History no longer questions the character of Johnson's designs. That he intended, if he could secure the cooperation of an adequate tool, to forcibly eject Stanton in spite of the law and the adverse vote of the Senate, is established by Grant himself as well as by General Sherman's "confidential" letter to the President, in which he says, subsequently declining to enter upon the desperate scheme:

"Your personal preferences, as expressed, were to remove Mr. Stanton from his office as secretary of war and have me discharge the duty. To effect this removal two modes were indicated: to simply cause him to quit the War Office building and not to respect him as secretary of war; or to remove him and submit my name to the Senate for confirmation."

Grant and Sherman were both too much afraid of the law and of Congress to go to violent extremes, and suddenly disconnected themselves from Johnson's revolutionary plans.

Thus checkmated, Johnson, partially in writing and fully by parol, forbade Grant to obey orders emanating from Stanton, but the Treasury Department continued to honor the Secretary's requisitions and the military establishment to obey his orders.

Johnson then assailed Grant in a series of letters of great strength, said to have been composed by his attorney, J. S. Black. One of them is given a place here because it confirms the statement made previously that Stanton did not leave the Department in August, 1867, until Grant had given a pledge that the office should not, under any circumstances, be turned over to Johnson or his tools prior to the meeting of Congress:

I deem it proper, before concluding this letter, to notice some of the statements contained in your letter. You [Grant] say that performance of the promises alleged to have been made by you to the President "would have involved a resistance to law and an inconsistency with the whole history of your connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton." You then state that you had fears that the President would, on the removal of Mr. Stanton, appoint some one in his place who would embarrass the army in carrying out the reconstruction acts and add: "It was to prevent such an appointment that I accepted the office of secretary of war ad interim and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stanton by my withholding it from

him in opposition to the law, or surrendering it to one who would do so, as the statements and assumption in your communication plainly indicate was sought."

First of all you here admit, that from the very beginning of "the whole history" of your conduct in connection with Mr. Stanton's suspension, you intended to circumvent the President. It was to carry out that intent that you accepted the appointment. This was in your mind at the time of acceptance. It was not, then, in obedience to the order of your superior, as had heretofore been supposed, that you assumed the duties of the office. You knew it was the President's purpose to prevent Mr. Stanton from resuming the office of secretary of war; and you intended to defeat that purpose. You accepted the office, not in the interest of the President but of Mr. Stanton! You not only concealed your design from the President, but induced him to suppose that you would carry out his purpose to keep Mr. Stanton out of office by retaining it yourself after an attempted restoration by the Senate, so as to require Mr. Stanton to establish his right by judicial decision.

The above is essentially a true statement of the case. Grant promised Stanton that he would not permit the War Office to fall into the hands of Johnson, and he kept the promise, although obliged to deceive the President and his cabinet to do so. He did it for the benefit of his country, North and South.

Undaunted in his purpose, Johnson now adopted a more startling course. Having worked General Lorenzo Thomas up to the point of promising "to obey orders," he restored him to duty as adjutant-general on February 13, and on the 21st issued this order to Stanton:

You are hereby removed from the office as Secretary of the Department of War, and your functions as such will terminate upon the reception of this communication. You will transfer to Brevet-Major-General Lorenzo Thomas, adjutant-general of the army, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as secretary of war ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other property now in your charge.

Within an hour Stanton communicated the foregoing to the Senate and House and "commanded" Thomas "to abstain from issuing any orders other than in your capacity as adjutant of the army." Immediately thereafter Stanton dictated to A. S. Worthington, who copied and delivered at army headquarters, the following to General Grant:

As secretary of war I command you to arrest and confine General Lorenzo Thomas, adjutant-general, for disobedience to superior authority in refusing to obey my orders as secretary of war.

"A few moments later," says Colonel Worthington, "General Grant and his aides clattered into the hall. Holding the order of arrest in his hand, Grant entered the Secretary's room and a private conference of perhaps half an hour followed. The nature of it can only be surmised, but the arrest was not put on file and Grant never after that was friendly to the President,"* and never thereafter, Stanton excepted, spoke to a member of the cabinet.

That evening, after receiving the President's order to "go ahead and take possession of the War Office-find the necessary means"Thomas attended a masquerade ball, announcing as he waltzed about that he should take possession on the following morning, "battering down the doors" if he found them locked and meeting "force with force" if Stanton should resist. He invited his friends to "come and see the performance"; he was "going to kick Stanton out." Washington was in high excitement. Thomas expressly stated that he was "acting on the advice of the President, who had good attorneys," and could call on Grant, who would have no discretion but to "obey an order from his superior officer," for sufficient force to dislodge Stanton, and that "success was certain."

Johnson was advised at this moment, says Henry Wilson, that his performance might result in impeachment. "Impeach and be d—d," he roared in a terrific rage. "I'll put Stanton out if I have to be tried and shot for it!"

Stanton, learning these threats, sent this note to Senator Edmunds by a special messenger:

I am informed that Adjutant-General Thomas is boasting that he intends to take possession of the War Office at 9 to-morrow morning. If the Senate does not declare its opinion of the law, how am I to hold possession?

The Senate, acting on the note to Senator Edmunds, by unanimous party vote refused to confirm Thomas and also "Resolved, that under the constitution of the United States the President has no power to remove the Secretary of War and designate any other officer to perform the duties of that office ad interim."

If this had not been done, Stanton would have left his office the next day, feeling that Congress did not care to save itself.

*After Grant had been elected president he refused to ride to the inauguration in the carriage with Johnson.

At 10 o'clock that evening (February 21) copies of the resolution were transmitted to Stanton, Johnson, and Thomas. Thereupon threats to employ the army to "kick Stanton out"-Johnson's exact words-became more emphatic, and leading Republicans gathered in the War Department, where the Secretary had already fortified himself, to aid in resisting whatever siege might be laid.

After full discussion among those present, Stanton advised the arrest of Thomas on civil process and the impeachment of Johnson. The complaint against the former was signed by Stanton at 2 o'clock next morning (the 22nd), Judge David K. Cartter issuing a warrant thereon which was promptly served. At 9 o'clock Thomas was not in the Secretary's office but before the court to answer for his conduct.

Being released on his own recognizance,* he returned to the President, who again ordered him to "go ahead and take possession. of the War Department," which order he attempted to execute notwithstanding the fact that he was under arrest.

The effort was ineffective. He could not secure sufficient help to overcome the large number of distinguished citizens and officials by whom Stanton was surrounded.

*Thomas was discharged on Stanton's motion after articles of impeachment had been brought in against his superior, the President, for practically the same offense.