All except the Secretary of War answered in the affirmative. He answered as follows:

Under the limitations and qualifications expressed in my general view of the acts of Congress under consideration just read to the President and cabinet, and which is made a part of my answer, I answer in the affirmative. Q. 2. Has the President a supervision over the military commanders, and are they bound to perform their duties in conformity with his instructions?

All except the Secretary of War answered in the affirmative, and that the President has the same supervision and right of instruction as he has of any other acts of Congress. The Secretary of War answered as follows: The President has as commander-in-chief a supervision over the military commanders to see that there is no wilful neglect or wanton abuse of authority by the generals commanding. But in my opinion the duties assigned to the military commanders in the act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States and its supplement are specifically intrusted to them, and they are not bound to perform these duties in conformity to his (the President's) instructions unless they are in accordance with the acts of Congress.

Q. 3. If any one of the military commanders assumes and exercises powers not conferred by these acts, or any other acts of Congress, and the error is injurious to the execution of these laws or the public welfare, is it the duty of the President (if he deem it proper and expedient) to cause the error to be corrected?

All answered in the affirmative except the Secretary of War, who answered as follows:

I answer that if the supposed wrongful act of the commanding general be a wilful neglect of duty or a wanton abuse of authority that would obstruct or prevent the execution of the acts of Congress under consideration, it would in my opinion be the duty of the President to correct it.

Q. 4. Is an unlimited power conferred on the military commanders to abolish, modify, control, or supersede the laws of the State?

All answered in the negative, that Congress had not conferred such unlimited power, except the Secretary of War, who answered as follows:

I answer that Congress in the preamble of the act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States has declared among other things, that no legal State governments exist in said States, and has made them subject to military authority, and given command in each district to the military commander assigned by the President, and has also provided that any civil government which may exist therein shall be deemed to be provisional only; I am therefore of the opinion that the military authority is paramount, and if the general commanding shall find any State law obstructing, impeding, or inconsistent with the due execution of the acts of Congress under consideration, he has unlimited power to abolish, modify, control, or supersede the State law.

Q. 5. Has a military commander the power to order the established courts of the States or of the United States exercising criminal jurisdiction, to sentence a criminal to a different mode or degree of punishment than is provided by the law of the State or by the Federal law?

All answered in the negative except the Secretary of War, who answered as follows:

I answer that I have no knowledge of any interference or authority having been assumed by any district commander over the action of the Federal courts; nor have I knowledge of any such cause in respect to a State court, as is assumed by the question. But inasmuch as the State is subject to military authority, I am of opinion that a district commander may prohibit the execution of corporal punishment by the sentence of a State court. I am not aware of any case in which he has authority to command a judge to impose any particular sentence, although he may remove the judge for good cause.

The foregoing questions were planned to unite the cabinet formally in favor of using the so-called "State governments" in the South to annul and overturn the acts of Congress-to reestablish State sovereignty where the victory of the Union army had so recently demolished it.

Stanton's opposition in writing, notwithstanding the unanimous support of the President's covert scheme by the other members of the cabinet, prevented that course from being taken. They felt the overwhelming force of his reasoning and dared not go against it as intended. The instructions prepared by Stanton were reluctantly issued.

There is on record no more conspicuous instance of one resolute patriot thwarting, off-hand, the plans of the President and his entire administration. All of Stanton's contentions have been amply confirmed by time, Congresses, and courts; those of Johnson and his cabinet have been condemned and rejected as unlawful by the same great tribunals-yet how unspeakably unpleasant was the patriot's task, and how miserable his compensation!

CHAPTER LVII.

A PATRIOTIC CONSPIRACY-GRANT.

The exasperated President was now narrowed down to the alternative of subsiding or attempting to seize the army and use it to subvert the will of Congress and nullify the reconstruction acts of March 2 and March 25, 1867. His nature was such that he could not subside, and, as Stanton stood resolutely athwart his path, he was unable to gain practical control of the army.

Stanton knew that the military criminals of the war period were being pardoned and appointed to office by scores; that Johnson had asked to be supplied with a secret telegraph cipher code of his own; that female pardon-brokers were obtaining pardons by the thousands for influential secessionists at prices varying from twentyfive dollars to six thousand, five hundred dollars each; that the President was acting under the direct guidance of Jeremiah S. Black, Reverdy Johnson, Montgomery Blair, Edgar Cowan, and others who pretended to hold that reconstruction and military occupancy were unconstitutional; that former leaders of the Rebellion were confidential advisers at the White House; and that all executive effort was directed entirely toward reversing the fruits of the war in spite of laws, courts, and Congress. He therefore felt convinced that to leave his post at such a moment, no matter how distasteful the task of remaining, would betray the loyal masses of the nation. and encourage the operations of those who were obstructing and defying the Federal authorities.

Seeing that Stanton would not resign, and that, sustained by Congress, he could effectually control the situation so long as he was able to hold possession of the War Office, Johnson, on August 5, 1867, in sheer desperation, sent a note to the Secretary, declaring: "Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation will be accepted." Within five minutes Stanton replied by messenger:

Sir:

Your note of this day has been received stating that public considerations of a high character constrain you to say that my resignation will. be accepted.

In reply I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this Department, constrain me not to resign the office of secretary of war before. the next meeting of Congress.

On the 12th Johnson sent a letter of suspension to Stanton and appointed Grant secretary of war ad interim. Before he could reply to the letter of suspension, Stanton received a note from Grant, after which he sent the following to the President:

Sir:

Your note has been received informing me that by virtue of the powers and authority invested in you as president by the constitution and laws of the United States, I am suspended from office as secretary of war, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same; and also directing me to at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as secretary of war ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in my custody and charge.

Under my sense of public duty I am compelled to deny your right, under the constitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate and without legal cause, to suspend me from the office of secretary of war, or the exercise of any and all functions, or to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in my custody as secretary.

But, inasmuch as the general commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed ad interim, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit to superior force.

Of course Stanton was not compelled "to submit to superior force," except theoretically. When Johnson first proposed to make him secretary of war ad interim, Grant went direct from the White House to Stanton and disclosed the executive program, explaining that if he should conclude to accept, it would be for no purpose whatever beyond that of preventing the War Department from falling into the hands of one of Johnson's tools who would use it for the subversion of Congress.

At first Grant opposed the removal of Stanton, arguing against it before the entire cabinet-a fact, however, that was unknown to the Secretary. He advised the President and the cabinet repeat

edly that the loyal portion of the country would not submit to such an ill-advised manœuvre. He also thrice protested in writing, his letter of August 1, 1867, to the President, being as follows:

I take the liberty of addressing you privately on the subject of the conversation we had this morning, feeling as I do the great danger to the welfare of the country should you carry out the designs then expressed.

First, on the displacement of the Secretary of War: His removal cannot be effected against his will without the consent of the Senate. It is but a short time since the United States Senate was in session, and why not then have asked his removal, if it was so desired?

It certainly was the intention of the legislative branch of the Government to place cabinet ministers beyond the power of executive removal; and it is pretty well understood that as far as cabinet ministers are affected by the tenure-of-office bill, it was intended specially to protect the Secretary of War, whom the country felt much confidence in.

The meaning may be explained by an astute lawyer [J. S. Black] but common sense and the views of the people will give it the effect intended by its framers.

In conclusion, allow me to say as a friend desiring peace and quietthe welfare of the whole country North and South-that it is, in my opinion, more than the loyal people of this country (I mean those who supported the Government during the great Rebellion) will quietly submit to, to see the man of all others whom they have expressed confidence in, removed.

Notwithstanding this protest, Grant accepted. In fact, when the notice of his appointment was handed to him by Colonel W. G. Moore, Johnson's secretary, he said: "This is an order [it was in reality not an "order" but only an appointment] from the President; I do not see how I can disobey."

However, before the appointment was made and delivered as stated, Grant met the President with his cabinet and agreed, or in some way gave them to understand (five of them, in addition to Johnson himself, so stating in writing) that he would keep Stanton out of the War Department in case the Senate should refuse to confirm his own appointment as secretary ad interim, and thus compel the deposed Secretary either to submit or to resort to the courts for reinstatement.

Stanton was silent and manifestly displeased when Grant informed him that if he should accept it would be simply to tie the President's hands so he could not get possession of the War Office. He did not want Grant to accept. He was fearful of the outcome. He knew that Grant could not take his own place before and had no influence with Congress, and he could not see how anything was