CHAPTER XLIV.

HAMPTON ROADS PEACE CONFERENCE.

On December 28, 1864, Lincoln gave to F. P. Blair a pass through the lines for a journey to see Jefferson Davis. On January 18, Blair returned with a letter from Davis which said he would "not stand on forms" in an effort to restore "peace to the Two countries." Lincoln, very much pleased, instructed Blair to revisit Richmond and learn what steps Davis proposed to take in behalf of peace. On second thought he consulted Stanton, who exclaimed:

There are not Two countries, Mr. President, and there never will be Two countries. Tell Davis that if you treat for peace, it will be for this ONE Country; negotiations on any other basis are impossible.

Lincoln instantly adopted this view and sent a reply to Davis by Blair agreeing to receive agents to treat for peace for our “one common country."

Thereupon Davis appointed R. M. T. Hunter, Alexander H. Stephens, and John A. Campbell to proceed to Washington to meet the President, and asked Grant for safe conduct. Stanton peremptorily forbade issuing passes to insurgent agents to visit Washington. Next morning, however, he telegraphed that a messenger would meet the gentlemen. where they were-at City Point, near Richmond-and sent Major Thomas T. Eckert, who bore a letter from Lincoln saying simply that if the proposed commissioners would come to the terms of his letter to Davis-to treat for peace in "one common country"-they would be met.

Grant had represented that the commissioners were sincere, but Major Eckert, who was sent by Stanton to prevent Lincoln from being snared into agreeing to destructive terms of peace, thought he did not find them so, and turned them back. Grant, seeing his representations going for naught, telegraphed at length to Stanton that the insurgent commissioners were in earnest and that Lincoln himself ought to meet them, and then gave the safe conduct which Eckert, under Stanton's instructions, had refused. Stanton declined to

have anything to do with the affair. He believed that it was decidedly beneath the dignity of the President and his cabinet, and also that it must prove a failure or a disaster because, he said, Lincoln "had no right to do anything except demand unconditional surrender," and he had learned (which fact Eckert had confirmed at City Point) that the commissioners were empowered to come to no terms that did not recognize the Confederacy as a separate State. He so informed Lincoln and begged him to be cautious.

"You observe, Mr. President," he said, "that Davis himself does not propose to meet you; he sends underlings who have no discretion beyond their instructions and whose acts can be repudiated, if necessary. But go, if you think the proposition is not a trap, and I will remain here and push our plans for crushing the enemy, which is the only thing that will save the Union."

Lincoln, offering no reply, proceeded to Fortress Monroe and, with Secretary Seward, had a conference of four hours with the insurgents, which resulted, as Stanton had predicted, in nothing, though many writers of "history" allege that the President offered to pay the insurgents four hundred million dollars for their slaves if the war should be closed at once. This assertion is probably entirely unfounded, as Stanton had explained before Lincoln departed that already all the slaves of rebellious masters had been confiscated under the laws of war, and therefore could not be subjects of compensation. He also pointed out that Congress had passed the Trumbull (XIIIth) Amendment of the constitution, which forever wiped out slavery both as a thing and as a right, so there were no slaves in existence to be paid for. However, the historian can only imagine what would have happened if Stanton had not interposed a masterful hand.

*“Mr. Stanton did not want the President to grant that conference," says Major A. E. H. Johnson. "He believed from the beginning that the coming of the Confederate commissioners was a trap laid for Mr. Lincoln. He did not want to accompany the President and suggested sending General Eckert in advance with specific instructions to test the sincerity of the commissioners, and privately told Eckert to 'keep close to Mr. Lincoln.' When General Eckert returned he raised his hands above his head and exclaimed: 'You are head and shoulders above them all, Mr. Secretary!' He then related all that had transpired. He never made a written report, but I know that Mr. Stanton enjoined him to watch closely the proceedings and I know also that he obeyed the injunction and reported thereon orally.'

CITY POINT, VA.- PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S PRIVATE CAR IN FRONT.

CHAPTER XLV.

THE SURRENDER-A RESCUING HAND.

Lincoln and the several members of his cabinet gathered in a room at the Capitol on the evening of March 3, 1865, to dispose of the last bills of the expiring thirty-eighth Congress. While thus engaged a telegram from Grant advised that Lee sought an interview for the purpose of arranging terms of peace. Lincoln, rejoicing at the prospect of terminating the war and overflowing with kindly feelings, proposed to allow Grant to extend to the vanquished insurgents almost any terms they might ask if they would cease fighting.

"Stanton listened in silence," says Carpenter's "Six Months in the White House," "restraining his emotion; but at length the tide burst forth. 'Mr. President,' said he, 'to-morrow is inauguration day. If you are not to be president; if any authority is for one moment to be recognized or any terms made that do not signify that you are the supreme head of the nation; if generals in the field are to negotiate peace, or any other chief magistrate is to be acknowledged on this continent, you are not needed and you had better not take the oath of office.""

The President's tone changed. "I think the Secretary is right," he said with an air of thoughtfulness and, taking a pen, wrote the following, which, being satisfactory, was dated and signed by Stanton and sent from the Capitol:

Lieutenant-General Grant:

Washington, March 3, 1865, 12 P. M.

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it is for the capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He further directs me to say to you that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political question. Such questions the President holds in his own hands and will submit them to no military conference or convention. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

Edwin M. Stanton,

Secretary of War.