myself against General McClellan, it is utterly false, for reasons needless to mention. Fire and water would as soon combine. Each does his duty as he deems right.

In respect to the imputation of selfish or ambitious motives, denial is useless. Those who make it do so in ignorance of my principles of action, or with prejudiced feeling, and like all other public men, I must expect and patiently bear misconstruction and false report.

Turning neither to the right hand nor to the left, serving no man and at enmity with none, I shall strive to perform my whole duty to this great work, before us. Mistakes and faults I no doubt may commit, but the purpose of my action shall be single to the public good.

In his "Own Story" McClellan says that his removal created such a "deep feeling in the army" that "many were in favor of his refusing to obey the order and marching upon Washington and taking possession of the Government"-just what Jefferson Davis tried for four years to do, at a cost, on both sides, of over five hundred thousands of lives and several billions of treasure.

In discussing McClellan's unfortunate contest with Stanton and humiliating retirement, General M. C. Meigs, who knew him intimately, says:

When McClellan was promoted, I went to him, for I was his friendhis close friend-and said: "General, you are now in the way to occupy the place occupied by Washington. You are to be commander of all the armies and finally president. It is the greatest opportunity in the world at this time-one of the greatest of any time."

But, poor fellow, he swelled up, outgrew advice, became pompous, and wanted to be surrounded by courtiers, aides, and retinues. He seemed to have forgotten all about fighting in his overweening determination to remain at Washington and direct in grandeur. He commanded from the rear instead of the front, and so, of course, failed-fell into irretrievable disaster. Grant would have failed too, if he had adopted the same tacticsfailed ignominiously.

When McClellan did leave Washington it was because Stanton literally kicked him out of town. This weakness for vain display and hanging around Washington to dine and be petted by society, is the beginning of the conduct which led to his suspension from the position of general-in-chief and finally from any command in the army.

Besides the weakness mentioned, he was always afraid that if he should actually get into a fight some of his men, if not himself, might get hurt. Grant had absolutely no fear of death for himself or his men. He hesitated to do nothing needful even when certain that great slaughter was inevitable. Like Stanton, his single purpose was to vanquish the enemy, tear the Rebellion to tatters, and he well knew, as did Stanton, that, especially when opposed by a splendid foe like ours, it could not be done for nothing.

On this point, too, McClellan failed. He had no clear comprehension of the real essence of war. Military men were astonished that he was not superseded sooner, and foreign critics that he was not court-martialed.

General U. S. Grant relates:

Having been at West Point and seen some service in Mexico, I borrowed money early in 1861 to go to Cincinnati, where General McClellan was in charge, to offer my services. I had known him in Mexico and went immediately to headquarters and was announced. Not being permitted to see him that day, I returned early in the morning, ahead of all other callers, and waited until night. He did not see me, nor fix a time for an interview, so I returned to Illinois. No harm was done; but when General McClellan attempted to subject Mr. Lincoln and especially Secretary Stanton to the same kind of treatment, the result was serious.

Major A. E. H. Johnson says Stanton "never spoke harshly of McClellan," never went further than to declare that he was “incapable of leading a fighting army and should be suspended for the safety of the Union; never questioned his motives or discussed his objects."

No sane man takes a step without "motives." In his "Own Story" McClellan says: "Taking both East and West and counting losses also by disease, I do not doubt that more than half a million of men* were sacrificed unnecessarily for the sake of insuring the success of a political party." Thus he terms the triumph of the Union arms the "success of a political party!"

As he did not belong to that party, he must have desired its defeat-which meant the defeat of the Union. At any rate, he admits his own defeat, where, on page 35 of his "Own Story," he says:

Many of the Democratic leaders did me great harm by using my name for party purposes without my knowledge or consent; and without intending it, probably did more than my armed enemies in the way of ruining my military career.

on,

*Adjutant-General R. C. Drum gives the total losses in battle and prisand from murder, drowning, suicide, accident, and unknown causes in the Union army from April 15, 1861 to December 20, 1867-at 359,528! McClellan was not referring to the entire war period when he put the "unnecessary" political sacrifices at "more than half a million," but to that portion following Stanton's advent, in 1862. Thus, the misstatement becomes so great that the world must be astonished that even McClellan dared to use it!

Thus he admits, first, that his "military career" was "ruined"; second, that, since the "Democratic leaders" did, Stanton did not ruin it!

If McClellan had followed the advice given by Stanton in the Barlow letter of November, 1861, which was to "mind his own Department and win a victory"-"keep out of politics"*-he might have been elected president in 1864-certainly in 1868.

"Capture Richmond and fetch Jeff Davis to Washington," said Stanton to him in February, 1862, "and the Rebellion will be ended and you will be president." But he would not do it, nor try to do it; so Richmond was the last while Stanton insisted that it should be the first Confederate city to fall, and McClellan's "military career" was "ruined."

In 1864 the righteousness of Stanton's acts concerning McClellan were put upon trial. The so-called Democratic national convention nominated McClellan for president on a platform declaring the war a failure, and appealed to the people for a "vindication." The result was an overwhelming vindication for Stanton, only three States-Delaware, New Jersey, and Kentucky-giving their votes to "Little Mac."

*On July 27, 1861, McClellan wrote to his wife: "By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the center of power. I receive letters often alluding to the presidency, dictatorship, etc. I would cheerfully take the dictatorship and lay down my life when the country is saved!" To assume command of and run everything, to establish himself as a dictator, became an infatuation which apparently never left him till he was dismissed from the army. After dining with McClellan in Washington, Dr. Ives, the Confederate spy, telegraphed to the New York Herald: "If the factious abolition leaders do not speedily draw in their horns they may find in General McClellan such a Tartar as the Long Parliament found in Cromwell and the Council of Five Hundred in Napoleon Bonaparte." Evidently he had disclosed to Dr. Ives his plan to imitate Cromwell by seizing the capital and driving out Congress with the bayonet. He put in writing his scheme to secure control of the entire War Department, while Cameron was yet secretary, by preparing a memorandum advocating the abolishment of the adjutant-general and the inspector-general and their Departments and "merging their functions in those of his general staff officers." He prepared an array of seventy heads of Departments to be under his own control, so that no order could be given to any officer or part of the army without his approval, thus doing away with the president and secretary of war in military affairs.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

DISAPPOINTED IN MEADE AT GETTYSBURG.

Stanton was full of aggressive excitement over Lee's proposed invasion of the North which ended in the great battle of Gettysburg, in which, on both sides, fifty-three thousand were killed, wounded, and missing. Apparently, at first, Pittsburg was the initial objective. He therefore resolved to mass an intercepting army near the border of Pennsylvania; sent all the field artillery at Watervliet (New York) Arsenal to Pittsburg by express, and telegraphed to W. T. H. Brooks, on June 10, 1863:

Intelligence received this morning of enemy's designs makes it certain that you cannot be too early or too busily at work. Pittsburg will be a point aimed at by Stuart's raid. Frankly inform the people of Pittsburg that they must be at work.

Four days later the secret service reported that Philadelphia was to be captured first and Stanton so informed Governor Curtin and, on June 14, suggested that the War Department would "offer no objection" to calling out the militia of Pennsylvania. Next day he telegraphed to all the loyal governors explaining Lee's purpose and asking how many men could be forwarded to Pennsylvania at once if the President should call for them. The replies were such that Lincoln immediately issued his proclamation and the near-by States, especially New York, began to hurry forward their militia.

By June 27 Lee's exact route was definable-Chambersburg, Carlisle, and York to Philadelphia. On that day Governor Curtin called out the militia and Stanton telegraphed that all the men enlisting under the call would be armed and equipped at Federal expense on the requisition of General Couch, who had been sent to Harrisburg.

The strength of Lee's army is a matter yet in dispute, but General Herman Haupt, director of Military Railways, and Thomas

A. Scott of the Pennsylvania railway made a careful count at Chambersburg and found two hundred and thirty-six pieces of artillery and ninety-two thousand men-all veterans and as high grade fighters as the world ever produced.

Stanton had gathered perhaps a greater army near Gettysburg, but many were raw recruits. Lee's troops, although veterans, were weary, scantily supplied with provisions, and not overstocked with ammunition, while the Federals were generally fresh and provided with everything that an omnipotent war minister and an opulent Government could supply.

General Hooker had been in command but, on the 27th, Stanton relieved him and appointed General George G. Meade in his stead. His reasons for this sudden change are not recorded; but Meade was a Pennsylvanian and, fighting in and for his native State, would call out its forces and enthusiasm. Besides, Stanton had become much dissatisfied with Hooker for permitting his camp to swarm with newspaper reporters and women,* and exasperated with him for making no decisive move to intercept Lee's raid into Pennsylvania.

General Haupt, after several interviews with him at Fairfax, learned that Hooker did not intend to oppose Lee's Northern invasion nor make any other move "without orders." Haupt hastened to Washington to disclose that fact to Stanton and General-inChief Halleck, and was informed, after reporting the situation, that Hooker would be superseded.†

Having appointed a new commander, massed all the troops he could get, and poured unlimited quantities of munitions and stores into southeastern Pennsylvania, Stanton, on the 29th, issued his usual "extraordinary discretion" to those in charge. General Haupt was authorized to do anything he pleased; General Dana

*The following is an official telegram of June 6, 1863, from Stanton to Hooker: "I have been trying to keep the women out of your camp, but, finding that they were going in troops under passes, as they said, from your provost marshal and commanders, I have given up the job."

"At my interview with General Halleck," says General Haupt, "I was shown correspondence in which Hooker proposed to let Lee go unmolested into the North, while he took the Army of the Potomac South to capture Richmond. Both Stanton and Lincoln were astonished at this plan, the latter, I think, writing that to exchange Washington for Richmond would be an inexcusably bad bargain."