Mr President

Your

The undersigned feel compelled by a profound sense of duty to the government and people of the United States and to yourself as constitutional advisers respectfully to recommend the immediate removal of George B. McClellan from the command of any army of the muted States. We are constrained to urge by the conviction that after a sad and humiliating treal of twelve mouths and by the frightful and useless thousands of brave men. sacrifice of the lives of many and the waste of many means he has proved to be incompetent for any important military command. And also because by recent disobedience to superior orders and inactivity he has twice imperilled the army commanded by sencial Pope, and while he continues in command will daily haz the fate of existence, exhibiting no sign of a dispontion capacity to restore the national hover

millions

National

and

our armies and our national

STANTON'S INDICTMENT OF MCCLELLAN,

to

that has been so deeply tarnished in the eyes of the world by his military failures. We are unwilling to be accessary the waste of national resources, the protraction of the war, the destruction of our armies, and the imperilling of the union and the Government itself which we believe must result from the continuance. of George 13 M to lellan

command and seek therefore by his prompt removal to afford an opportunity to capable Officers, under Gods Provedence, to preserver

our national existence.

Be have the honor to be with great respect

Sear of the heasury

Seentary of Naw

and place.

am tired of serving fools.

I am sick and weary of this business. I

July 21-I see that the Pope bubble is likely to be suddenly collapsed. Jackson is after him and the young man who wanted to teach me the art of war will, in less than a week, either be in full retreat or badly whipped. July 30-I am sorry to say that * too much faith can

not be rested in Halleck.

August 2-When you contrast the policy I urged in my letter [of July 8] to the President with that of Congress and Mr. Pope, you can readily agree with me that there can be little confidence between the Government and myself. We are the antipodes of each other. But I shall consult my sense of right and my own judgment, not deferring to that of others.

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August 8-I will issue to-morrow an order giving my comments on Mr. John Pope. I will strike square in the teeth of all his infamous orders and give directly the reverse instructions to my army. I have received my orders from Halleck. They are as bad as

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they can be and I regard them as almost fatal to our cause.

I shall obey the orders unless the enemy gives me a very good opening. * * I had another letter from Halleck to-night. I strongly suspect him.

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August 10-The absurdity of Halleck's course in ordering the army away from here is that it cannot reach Washington in time to do any good, but will be necessarily too late. I hope to be ready to-morrow afternoon to move forward in the direction of Richmond. Halleck is turning out just like the rest of the herd. half apprehend they will be too quick for me in Washington and relieve me before I have the chance of making the dash. I am satisfied the dolts in Washington are bent on my destruction. * * They are committing a fatal error in withdrawing me from here * I think the result * will be that Pope will be badly thrashed within ten days and they will be glad to turn the redemption of affairs over to me.

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August 14-I shall conduct the march to Fortress Monroe and attend to the embarkation thence; my mind is pretty much made up to try to break off at that point.

August 21-I still think they will put me on the shelf or do something disagreeable to get me out of the way. I shall be glad of anything that severs my connection with such a set. They may go

to the deuce in their own way.

August 22-I shall be only too happy to get back to quiet life again. I am not fond of being made a target for the abuse and

Islander of all the rascals in the country.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

SLAVES-STANTON THE REAL EMANCIPATOR,

Lincoln was elected on a strong pro-slavery platform, which he endorsed in his letter of acceptance. In his inaugural address he declared: "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so."

Jefferson Davis, the insurgent president, entertained the same view and made war to enforce it.

Stanton, coming on a year later, declared that Lincoln was not bound by the platform of 1860, nor by his letter of acceptance, nor yet by his inaugural address. Conditions had changed since then. "Those pledges had been wiped out by the very war they had been expected to avert," he urged. Lincoln adhered to different views, so Stanton was compelled to take practical action upon matters as he found them. His situation was difficult. The upheaving ferment of war was inciting thousands of slaves to escape into the Union armies and communities. General B. F. Butler had termed them "contraband of war" and set them to work. General John C. Fremont had proclaimed all slaves within his jurisdiction (Missouri) free, which proclamation Lincoln annulled; General Phelps, disregarding Lincoln's revocations, declared from Ship Island, Mississippi, that the slaves within his district were free, and General Grant forbade any party from crossing the Federal lines to hunt escaped slaves or the return of slaves "used by the enemy in any manner hostile to the Government" and that they should "be employed for the benefit of the Government."

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Stanton lost no time in urging the necessity of "knocking the main prop" from under the secession cause, but Lincoln and the remaining members of the cabinet (except Chase) seemed to be immovably set against his policy. However, Lincoln soon realized the fatality of unalterable opposition in time of war to his war minister, and unfolded his proclamation of March 6, 1862, in which

Congress was asked to cooperate financially with any State wishing to gradually abolish slavery.

"Such a proposition on the part of the general Government," said Lincoln, "sets up no claims of right by Federal authority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring as it does the absolute control of the subject in each case to the State and its people immediately interested."

"We shall be compelled to retreat from that policy or retreat from Washington," urged Stanton. "We shall be forced to deal with slaves as with any other form of enemy's property. There will be no action whatever under the resolution you propose. Besides, it commits the administration to the theory that this is not a nation, the very theory for which the secessionists are contending with force and arms."

Lincoln, without responding to Stanton's argument, put the question to a vote and his proclamation was approved 3 to 2, Stanton not voting. Thereupon it was uttered, but as Stanton predicted, "no action whatever" was taken under it by any of the States affected. It was not even published by the newspapers of those States.

The earliest official utterance indicative that Stanton did not agree and could not successfully act in accord with Lincoln's views on slavery, is contained in a letter dated May 5, 1862, to General Mitchell, in which he said:

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The assistance of slaves is an element of military strength which you are fully justified in employing. It has been freely employed by the enemy and to abstain from its judicious use when it can be employed with military advantage would be a failure to employ means to suppress the Rebellion and restore the authority of the Government.

On May 9, 1862, General David Hunter issued a proclamation declaring all the slaves in his territory-Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina-"forever free." Lincoln promptly set it aside as void, but the Africans looked upon it as valid and flocked to its author by thousands. He subsisted and made use of them as if they were free, whereupon Congress asked Stanton whether he had permitted certain generals to profit by the work and services of colored persons and whether he had issued arms and clothing for those "slaves." He made a significant answer: He had no "official" information as to whether General Hunter had organized a regiment of "black men, fugitive slaves," and that while Hunter had