General Marcy is here and will take you cheering news.

Be sure that you will have the support of this Department and the Government as cordially and faithfully as was ever rendered by man to man; and, if we shall live to see each other face to face, you will be satisfied that you have never had from me anything but the most confiding integrity.

Edwin M. Stanton,
Secretary of War.

Before the "cheering news" thus promised had been fully communicated to General Marcy, Stanton was called peremptorily to the bedside of his child. In his extreme grief, and while his carriage was waiting at the door, he hastily penned a note to General Marcy and another to General McClellan, the latter as follows:

My Dear General:

Washington, D. C., July 5, 1862.

I have talked to General Marcy and meant to have written to you by him, but am called to the country where Mrs. Stanton is with her children, to see one of them die.*

I can therefore only say, my dear General, in this brief moment, that there is no cause in my heart or conduct for the cloud which wicked men have raised between us for their own base and selfish purposes.

No man ever had a truer friend than I have been to you and shall continue to be. You are seldom absent from my thoughts, and I am ready to make any sacrifice to aid you. Time allows me to say no more than that I pray Almighty God to deliver you and your army from all peril and lead you on to victory.

Yours truly,

Edwin M. Stanton.

The threats of General Marcy must have been made substantially as alleged by Major Johnson, or the throbbing sentences of Stanton's communication to McClellan would have been then and would be now, meaningless.

To this letter McClellan replied on the 8th, that "of all the men in the nation," Stanton was his "choice" for secretary of war; that it was not too late for them, working together, as Stanton had said in the beginning, "to save this country," and that "it is with feelings of great relief that I now say to you that I shall at once resume on my part the same cordial confidence which once characterized our intercourse."

*The child, James H. Stanton, was buried on the 10th,

If "cordial confidence" had not been broken off by McClellan, would there have been any "cordial confidence" for him to "at once resume"?

While watching his dying child, Stanton requested Lincoln to go in person to cheer McClellan in camp; learn his wants and grievances; dissuade him from surrendering* and discover whether he could not be induced to proceed against the enemy and thus stop the public clamor against him. Lincoln arrived on the 8th, spent the night with McClellan and returned next day; but McClellan wrote to his wife that day that he did not think "his excellency profited much" by the visit; that is, McClellan conducted himself in such a rebellious manner that the journey of the President, his anxious commander-in-chief, was fruitless!

On the 10th-the day Stanton was burying his child-McClellan wrote to his wife: "I do not know what paltry trick this administration will play next," on the 13th, that he had "no faith in the administration," at 1:30 P. M. of the same day, that he "hated to think" that “humanity could sink so low" as he found it in Stanton, but nevertheless that "his opinion was just as he had told her," concluding thus: "He [Stanton] has deceived me once; he can not and never will again. Are you satisfied now, lady mine? I ever will hereafter trust your judgment about men. Your woman's tact and your pure heart make you a better judge than my dull apprehension. I remember what you thought of Stanton when you first saw him. I thought you were wrong. I now know you were right. Enough of the creature!"

Did he "at once resume" his "cordial confidence" with Stanton? Was he sincere when, five days before, he wrote to Stanton that he would do so? Is it not wonderful that Stanton was able to pierce the maze of falsehood and mystery which was flung about him from so many directions and such high places? Is it now difficult to see why the Army of the Potomac won no decisive battles? Is there, in the face of the testimony of McClellan's own friends and private letters, any language of execration, condemnation, and contempt that is strong enough adequately to characterize his conduct toward Stanton?

*General Lew Wallace says that at this time he called upon Lincoln, who told him that he was just going to the front to try to dissuade McClellan from surrendering.

CHAPTER XXXII.

GREAT BATTLE WITH THE PEN-POPE SLAUGHTERED.

Being required to report, McClellan stated that thirty-eight thousand, two hundred and fifty able-bodied men were absent from his command on furloughs. This fact coming up in the cabinet meeting of July 22, Stanton "very earnestly" suggested that "McClellan be compelled to modify his course or resign; otherwise the country will and ought to hold the administration responsible for the failure of the peninsular campaign. A bankrupt treasury is bad enough, but if we bankrupt national patriotism, the obloquy of all time will not be a sufficient condemnation of our course."

Chase added that "the change proposed by the Secretary of War is a financial necessity; there are now ten million dollars of unpaid requisitions out and the amount is increasing." Lincoln refused to act, however, and Stanton returned to his altogether discouraging task.

Telegrams from Lee to Stuart, intercepted on July 17, disclosed that the Confederate purpose was to mass a great force in front of Pope and suddenly crush him before the Army of the Potomac, which McClellan was mobilizing about Fortress Monroe, could come to the rescue, and then rush on and capture Washington. McClellan was advised of this plan. He could have gone to Pope, who, knowing what Lee proposed, retreated behind the Rappahannock; or he could have advanced upon Richmond and compelled Lee to return to save the Confederate capital. He did neither, and refused steadily to obey all commands to do either.

The first telegram along this line, on July 30, ordered him to send off his sick, for whom quarters had been prepared, in order to be ready to move his army. He did not obey, so another telegram was sent August 2 saying the President wished a reply. On the 3d he replied: "Until I am informed what is to be done with this army I cannot act understandingly for the good of the service." He was answered: "It was expected that you would send off your sick as directed without waiting to know what were or