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and you will give no order either before or after your junction which can put him out of position to cover this city.

Notwithstanding McClellan's incessant appeal for more troops, more troops was not what he wanted, after all. He wanted authority, not soldiers, and he did not seem to care how the battle went, for he answered:

The Department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me; but General McDowell, and all other troops sent me, should be placed completely at my disposal. If I cannot fully control all his

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troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have and let others be responsible for results.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CAPTURES NORFOLK.

Benjamin F. Butler says in "General Butler in New Orleans," that in his initial interview with Stanton in January, 1862, he was asked why he could not capture New Orleans. It was the first time the suggestion had been made, and, he said, it "thrilled" him. Elaborating later, he gives this interesting information concerning that first interview:

Mr. Stanton had some decided notions about the conduct of the war. He mentioned, I should say, a dozen things he said must be done-in fact, that he intended to do. I distinctly remember five, all of which appealed to my judgment of approval: (a) Capture New Orleans; (b) blockade the James River and cork up the Confederate "Government"; (c) cut off the stream of supplies from Baltimore to the Confederacy through the Shenandoah Valley; (d) confiscate slaves of rebellious masters; (e) compel McClellan to besiege Richmond until it surrendered.

The first of these I helped to accomplish without anything further than a suggestion; but the others Mr. Stanton was compelled to do himself.

In February Stanton inquired of Secretary Welles whether the navy could not invest Norfolk, especially as the navy-yard there ought to be rescued, and was met with the suggestion that General Burnside be ordered to assault the city by land-in other words, "Do it yourself, Mr. Stanton."

In the meantime, the Merrimac, a remarkable craft, nearly submerged, heavily armed and roofed with bars of railroad iron, issued forth and on March 8 and 9 sunk the Federal frigates Congress and Cumberland, frightened the navy, and threw New York, Washington, and the seacoast cities into hysterics.

On the very night that she completed this destruction, Stanton telegraphed to H. B. Renwick at New York, to call together secretly Abram S. Hewitt, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and others like them to sit as a committee to devise a way of sinking the new insurgent monster. While this was being done he inquired into the condition of his own forts and forces in that vicinity. Finding

Fortress Monroe provisioned for only sixty days and with but two guns that could injure the Merrimac-one of 12-inch and the other of 15-inch bore but not mounted-he ordered provisions and munitions for six months to be thrown in at once.

"It would be a wonderful reproach to your Department," exclaimed Stanton to the chief of ordnance (General Ripley), "if this big gun should not be mounted when needed. The civilized world would execrate the officer who did not have this gun in fighting order ready for an emergency. I would not answer for the neck of the man loaded with such a responsibility."

On March 13, he advised Secretary Welles of the navy, that he could not embark the army for Norfolk previous to such a blockade of the Craney Island channel as would bottle up the Merrimac. The result of his communication was stated next day by himself to his bureau chiefs:

I addressed a letter to the Secretary of the Navy informing him that our hulk and coal vessels were at his disposal to blockade the Elizabeth River [in which the Merrimac was anchored], but my letter does not seem to have been received in good temper. I have a reply stating that when the army shall clear Sewall's Point of the enemy, the navy will be happy to do its duty in sinking vessels. This I understand means that the navy intends to make no attempt to blockade the channel while the batteries are there. * * The President sent for me. I found Mr. Fox [assistant secretary of the navy] present. We had a conference on the subject, but it led to no result. The President relies on Mr. Fox, who seems to think that he has in his possession the entire naval knowledge of the world. Under these circumstances my duty seems to be to give this serious matter active attention at once.

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On the following day he telegraphed to Cornelius Vanderbilt to name a price for bottling up the Merrimac or sinking her if she should attempt to steam out, and to come at once to Washington. Vanderbilt offered the swift and powerful sidewheel steamer Vanderbilt to Stanton, fully equipped, without price, and on March 20 received the following, his offer having been accepted:

Confiding in your patriotic motives and purposes as well as your skill, judgment, and energy, full discretion and authority are conferred upon you to arm, equip, manage, use, navigate, and employ the steamer Vanderbilt with such commander and crew as you may deem fit. Instructions will be given to the quartermaster-general to furnish you with supplies and to treat and recognize the Vanderbilt as in the Government service and under the special orders of this Department.

When the craft reached Fortress Monroe, General Wool turned her over to Commander Goldsborough of the navy, whereupon Stanton instructed him by telegraph to repossess her and use her "exclusively under the command of the War Department."

Assistant-Secretary Watson arrived at Fortress Monroe a few hours later and, finding Goldsborough without the jealousy that poisoned Washington and eager to avail himself of any means. within reach to destroy the Merrimac, he returned the Vanderbilt to him, with Stanton's approval.

Feeling certain that the Vanderbilt, although she herself might be destroyed by the impact, was able to run down and sink the Merrimac, and Fortress Monroe having been reinforced, Stanton instucted Wool to have his army ready for a sudden movement. He then invited Secretary Chase and the President to accompany himthe former because he wanted to use the revenue cutter Miami for the trip down the Potomac and the Chesapeake, and the latter because (not having invited the Secretary of the Navy) he wanted present, on arriving at the field of operations, full authority to take personal command of both army and navy, which the President as commander-in-chief of both, could and did give to him.

The party, accompanied by General Egbert L. Viele, left Washington at dusk on May 5, 1862. Unfavorable weather compelled the pilot to tie up during a portion of the night, so Fortress Monroe was not reached until the following evening. Stanton sent at once for General Wool and, after a brief conference, although it was 10 o'clock and the squadron flagship was some miles away, set out to consult Commander Goldsborough.

The following morning the party, accompanied by Wool and Goldsborough, visited the several ships in the Roads for the purpose of learning their condition for battle, and at noon-having found them "as fierce as one-eyed terriers for a fight"-Stanton decided to have the engagement open on the part of the navy at daybreak the next morning.

Lincoln more than willingly approved, and promptly as agreed three armed vessels, led by the Galena under John Rodgers, steamed up the James River Thursday morning and engaged the shore batteries, while the Monitor and Stevens cannonaded the works on Sewall's Point. At 8 A. M. Stanton telegraphed with delight to Assistant-Secretary Watson: "Tobacco, oil, and cotton are being

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