you at the Department to-morrow.' I prepared a statement of my application and went to the War Department and was received among the hundreds as though I had not known him intimately and fondly from childhood nor passed the previous night in his house. In his public duties he knew no friends or foes except the friends and foes of his country."

A remarkable feature of these morning receptions was that no matter how numerous the callers, Stanton managed to dispose of every case within the hour. On entering the room, while passing to his desk, he made a quick calculation of the number present and the amount of time he could give to each, and gauged his work accordingly. Occasionally Lincoln dropped in to see "Old Mars," as he called Stanton, "quell disturbances"-a feature of no previous or succeeding administration, and one which kept Stanton more closely in touch with the masses than any other that he could have adopted.

CALIFORE

CHAPTER XXVI.

APPROVES MCCLELLAN'S PLANS.

Having prevented the forward movement fixed for Washington's birthday and secured a reconstruction of the President's plan as well as a modification of the order of March 8, McClellan still refused to obey the command to go ahead under his own plan. On the 13th he assembled a "council of generals" at Fairfax Court-house to "consider the military situation." The handful of Confederates at Manassas having quietly withdrawn, so that he had no "vastly superior forces" to cow him into inaction, the council formulated a new plan based on a movement from Old Point Comfort, a naval display against the forts on the York River, "neutralizing" the Merrimac and leaving force enough about Washington to "give a feeling of entire security for its safety." When this had been agreed upon, McClellan telegraphed to Stanton that McDowell was en route to submit it for approval. Stanton instantly responded: "Whatever plan has been agreed upon, proceed at once to execute it without waiting an hour for my approval.”

When McDowell arrived with the details, Stanton advised Lincoln that the new plan or nothing would have to be accepted and telegraphed to McClellan that it was approved, but that in choosing. a new base of operations he must "leave Washington entirely secure" and a sufficiently large force at Manassas so the "enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication." The closing paragraph declared:

3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events move such remainder of the army in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

*The Merrimac blockaded the James River after McClellan was ordered to advance upon Richmond, thus increasing the difficulties of carrying out his own plan and the dangers attendant upon making Fortress Monroe his base.

Still there were objections and complaints. McClellan wanted to know what would become of General Wool's authority at Fortress Monroe in case he himself should ever reach that place and make it his base of operations. Stanton telegraphed at 5:20 that day, the 13th:

General Wool will be relieved from command whenever you desire to assume it and if you determine to make Fortress Monroe your base of operations you shall have control of the forces under General Burnside. All the forces and means of the Government will be at your disposal.

An hour later Stanton telegraphed again:

General Patrick was nominated upon your request. I took the nomination myself to the President and saw him sign it and I will go to the Senate to-morrow to urge confirmation. Any others you may designate will receive like attention. Nothing you can ask of me or of this Department to aid you in any particular will be spared.

The next morning before 8 o'clock Stanton ordered General Wool, who ranked McClellan, to submit to an inferior commander, and before 9 o'clock had informed McClellan that the order would be complied with.

It is possible to go on almost indefinitely with evidence from official and private records to prove that Stanton did everything within his power to satisfy and strengthen McClellan whenever it was supposed there was to be a forward movement, remaining in his office night and day to answer telegrams and grant requests.

"Of course I had an inside view of many things that passed between Stanton and McClellan and the other generals," says L. A. Somers of Cleveland, Ohio, an expert telegraph operator stationed in the War Department. "Stanton put forth his energies to help McClellan, to satisfy him with men and materials. His constant questions were-and many of them I sent and received with my own hands-'What can I do for you?' 'What do you need?'”

What were the results? Fiddling, dawdling, telegraphing, complaining, protesting, advising, wanting, objecting. Up to this time, too, the fortifications around Richmond had been little better than works of straw, so that at any moment when Lee was absent, the Confederate capital could have been taken without firing a gun.*

*Before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Gilman Marston and others testified that an attempt to take Richmond after the