the use of his command to catch and return fugitive slaves on pain of dismissal, and established the famous Committee on the Conduct of the War, each member of which was provided with a card. of admission to Stanton's room "at all times."

Stanton possessed an unconquerable purpose to put down the Rebellion and restore the Union; but he must have men, money, supplies, and munitions to do it with, which came alone from Congress and the governors and legislatures of the loyal States. Governor Andrew stated bluntly that Massachusetts would raise and equip no more troops if they were to be placed under such commanders as Stone, and was sustained in that position by the other loyal governors, the press, and the majority of Congress. Stanton must either shut up Stone or shut off enlistments in Massachusetts and dampen military ardor throughout the North. He made no mistake in siding with Congress and the executives of loyal States.

As to holding Stone in long imprisonment without trial, Stanton himself declared: "To hold one commander in prison untried is less harmful in times of great national distress than to withdraw several good officers from active battle-fields to give him a trial. Individuals are nothing; we are contributing thousands of them to save the Union, and General Stone in Fort Lafayette is doing his share in that direction."

CHAPTER XXIV.

SUCCEEDS MCCLELLAN AS GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.

General George B. McClellan, who was brought to Washington by General Scott on the 26th of July, 1861, and on November 1 was given command of all the armies of the Union, had not yet made a decisive move with his splendid legions.

The Federal Treasury was on the verge of bankruptcy; capitalists were frightened, patriots discouraged. Stanton, coming into the arena fresh from the masses, comprehended the dangerous trend of affairs and gave articulation to the wrath of the people. He said to Lincoln: "You are commander-in-chief under the constitution and must act as such or the Government is lost. You must order McClellan to move. I think he will obey; if not, put some one in his place who will obey."

Lincoln, acting promptly, drew with his own hand "Presidential Order No. 1" and Stanton prepared the famous Special Order No. 1 of January 27, 1862, for a general advance against the insurgent forces on the 22d of February following-the day on which Davis was to be installed at Richmond-ending thus: "Especially the Secretaries of War and Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief * will severally be held to strict and full responsibility for the prompt execution of this order."

*

Although specially mentioning the Secretaries of War and Navy, McClellan assumed that the order was really intended for himself alone, so he alone objected to its execution. On the 3d of February Stanton received from him a voluminous memorandum of objections, one of the principal ones being the "uncertainty of the weather." So emphatic was McClellan that Lincoln, contrary to Stanton's advice, agreed to submit his own general plans of advance with McClellan's, to a council of twelve generals.

The council consisted of Generals Fitz-John Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, Negley, and Keyes who voted for, and McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Bar

nard* who voted against the McClellan plan.

In debating the judgment of this council the President said to Stanton: "We can do nothing else than adopt this plan, and discard all others. With eight out of twelve division commanders approving we can't reject it and adopt another WITHOUT ASSUMING

ALL THE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CASE OF THE FAILURE OF THE ONE WE

ADOPT." Stanton replied that while agreeing with the President's conclusion, he dissented from his arithmetic, because the generals who voted against the proposed plan were independent of the influence of the commanding general, while the others owed their promotions to him and were especially under his influence, voting his wish as one man rather than their own judgments; so that, instead of eight to four, there was really but one to four. Lincoln admitted the truth of this remark, but, to avoid friction and responsibility, decided to approve the plan endorsed eight to four by the council of generals, and on March 8 orders were issued bidding McClellan make the proposed move "as early as the 18th of March inst."

On the following day the public learned that the Confederate general had voluntarily abandoned his entrenchments at Manassas Junction, in front of Washington, a position he had been holding unmolested, "as a matter of cheek," with a small force of poorly fed troops-including wooden guns and stuffed soldiers! McClellan, who had all along claimed the enemy's force to be superior in numbers to his own,t now moved out for the purpose, he said, of "getting rid of superfluous baggage" and "giving the troops some experience on the march!"

*In "Peninsular Campaigns," General J. C. Barnard, McClellan's chief of engineers," says of the council: "To my great surprise, eight of the twelve officers present voted, off-hand, for the measure, without discussion; nor was any argument on my part available to secure a reconsideration."

+Stanton, learning that McClellan's claim that the Confederate forces between Washington and Richmond numbered 240,000 men could not be true, requested General B. F. Butler to prepare a statement, on the best obtainable evidence, of the enemy's strength about Washington and elsewhere, and submit it for use. Butler's report showed that the entire army menacing Washington could not exceed 70,000. Years afterward, when the War Department gave out the records for both armies, it was seen that even General Butler had over-estimated the Confederate force. McClellan had, "present for duty," 185,420 "officers and men," and 534 pieces of artillery-much of it the finest the world afforded. The Confederate force for the same moment, "present for duty," was 47,617, with perhaps 50 or 60 pieces of artillery.

But even this quest for "experience" was not made without protests. On the 9th he telegraphed to Stanton that he wished to suspend a portion of the President's order. To this Stanton instantly replied: “I think it is the duty of every officer to obey the President's orders, and I cannot see why you should not obey them in the present instance. I must therefore decline to suspend them.”

But McClellan insisted and on the 10th Stanton yielded, saying:

General:

I do not understand the President's order as restraining you from any military movement by division or otherwise that circumstances in your judgment may render expedient, and I certainly do not wish to delay or change any movements whatever that you have made or desire to make. I only wish to avoid giving my sanction to the suspension of a policy which the President has ordered to be pursued. But if you think that the terms of the order as it stands would operate to retard or in any way restrain movements that circumstances require to be made before any corps are formed, I will assume the responsibility of suspending the order for that purpose and authorize you to make any movement by division or otherwise, according to your own judgment.

My desire is that you should exercise every power that you think present circumstances require to be exercised, without delay; but I want you and me not to seem desirous of opposing an order by the President without necessity. I say, therefore, move just as you think best now and let the other matter stand until it can be accomplished without impeding movements.

In reply he received a telegram of thanks which also announced that "the troops are in motion." But it all meant nothing, and at the next cabinet meeting Stanton declared that "something must be done to relieve the other armies and the country of the Potomac incubus." So insistent was he that Lincoln (on March 11) issued an order stating that "Major-General McClellan, having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, is relieved of the command of the other military Departments, retaining the command of the Department of the Potomac." The order also required all Department commanders to report direct to the Secretary of War.

McClellan was greatly exasperated by this order, and his partisans instituted a series of venomous attacks on Stanton which have not ceased to this day. Blaine, in "Twenty Years of Congress," declared the order was an "egregious blunder," and other equally famous military experts have denounced Stanton for "assuming" and "usurping" the functions of general-in-chief, as if the