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ferson Davis to be "president," and Alexander H. Stephens to be "vice-president" of the "Confederate States of America," and fixed the 18th as the day for their inauguration.

Stanton received a program of the proposed installation ceremonies from his friend Judge Archibald Roane of Alabama. Reading it in cabinet consultation, he exclaimed: "Such a proceeding cannot be permitted to take place within the confines of this nation. It is not a mock affair, but an earnest and desperate effort to break up this Union. It is just as much our duty to save the country from destruction by slave-holding John Browns as by abolition John Browns."

Buchanan replied: "It is now too late; we are helpless," to which Stanton retorted:

It is never too late to save the country. We are not helpless. If we supinely permit some upstart to be elected and inaugurated as president at Montgomery, we shall have to permit the same performance here in Washington, if undertaken. If we permit the secessionists to seize the Federal property and archives in South Carolina and Alabama, shall we not be obliged to permit them to seize and use the Federal buildings and records here in Washington? Would you, Mr. President, abdicate if Davis should come, which he may do, and demand possession of the White House? Shall we offer no resistance if the secessionists come here and attempt to seize the public records? If we do not resist them there, we cannot resist them here. If you would not abdicate in Washington, you cannot abdicate in Charleston or Montgomery. Mr. President, there must be no so-called inauguration of another president while you occupy that high office, never, never!

Buchanan was unmoved and those who had concocted a plot to prevent the electoral count on February 15 and the inauguration of President Lincoln on March 4, were allowed to inaugurate their own so-called president on February 18 without even a protest from the Government. Not only so, but immediately after the Confederate inauguration, Buchanan, circumventing the Union members of his cabinet, sent a communication by R. M. T. Hunter advising Jefferson Davis to despatch commissioners to Washington and he "would be happy to receive them" and transmit their wishes to Congress! Davis testifies that he acted on that advice and sent a commissioner (M. J. Crawford) who, however, was unable to reach Washington until "too late to accomplish anything."

More than once Stanton informed the President that active proceedings against the Government certainly must be stopped. The reply was that the army and navy were in such a crippled con

dition that nothing could be done. In answer he urged the President to ask Congress to strengthen the army and make it adequate to threatened emergencies, but without results. He thereupon went in person to his cousin, Benjamin Stanton (of Ohio), chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, and begged him to forthwith report a bill for an immediate increase in the number and equipment of the military forces. His cousin complied, but the Democrats largely opposed the measure, saying that if there were any real necessity for increasing the military strength of the country the President himself would urge Congress to do it!

And thus was chaos added to chaos, weakness to weakness, and the pathway to civil strife made broader and shorter.

On the 5th of March Stanton became a private citizen. His position had been one of extreme difficulty. Before he came into the cabinet secession moved forward with glee. To its leaders success appeared inevitable.* The President was in their confidence and indirectly contributing to their labors. William M. Boyce of Garfield, Virginia, one of the South Carolina congressmen, who, on December 9, 1860, made the written bargain with Buchanan at the end of several preliminary interviews, says: "Both the conduct and bearing of the President were and had been such as to make us feel sure of his sympathy and cooperation." The administration organ, the Washington Constitution, lauded secession incessantly from the moment Lincoln's election became known; called upon the South to "awaken and redress her wrongs," and demanded that Lincoln resign, receiving the while the support of Buchanan, who diverted to its disloyal columns the entire stream of Government advertising!

Thus, there was every reason for the secessionists, having substantial aid from Buchanan and the North, to anticipate victory, and if Stanton had not entered the cabinet and clung to it and

*Says General M. C. Meigs: "In January, 1861, when Mr. and Mrs. Jefferson Davis left Washington for the South, they rode together to give notice that they wished to retain their pew in Epiphany Episcopal Church. As they turned to go Mrs. Davis said with a confident smile: 'You keep the cushion, too, for we shall need it soon-when we come back.' Mr. Davis added: 'Yes, keep the cushion for us till we return.' And so they left us fully expecting to be back here within a brief period at the head of a nation which, in the meantime, they had broken in twain and reunited on a new basis."

fought in it to the end in spite of indignities, disagreements, false hopes, false words, betrayals, and broken promises, the Federal capital and its archives and the machinery of the Government would have fallen into their hands as planned; and Jefferson Davis instead of Abraham Lincoln would have been inaugurated in Washington and perhaps, as was hoped, without bloodshed!

CHAPTER XVIII.

LETTERS TO BUCHANAN-LINCOLN EXCORIATED.

As he returned to Wheatland (near Lancaster, Pennsylvania), after the inauguration of Lincoln, Buchanan requested Stanton to supply a record of the course of public events by means of a systematic correspondence. The letters written in response to this request were sent generally by mail, but sometimes confided to personal messengers. As, in July, August, and September, 1861, many letters failed to reach their destination, the correspondence for that reason was discontinued altogether.

These entirely private communications,* composed in the utmost freedom and confidence, have been savagely criticized because of the severity with which they describe the initial operations of the Lincoln administration, but the absolute truth of their essential statements cannot be denied.

The first letter mentions that Stanton was requested by W. H. Seward, secretary of state in Lincoln's cabinet, to draft a nomination of John J. Crittenden, a Democratic senator from Kentucky, to be a justice of the United States Supreme Court, with which request he says he complied. Lincoln desired to reward Crittenden for his "compromise" resolution, which proposed the absurd plan of prohibiting slavery forever north and granting it forever south of 36°, 30', and binding Congress forever from interfering with this hybrid arrangement; but there was such an outcry of opposition to the nomination that Stanton's draft was never sent to the Senate. In the same letter he discussed General Scott's "Comments" on the evacuation of Fort Moultrie, saying, among other things:

The third point relates to what General Scott calls an informal truce entered into by you [Buchanan] with certain persons from the seceding States under which the reinforcement of Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens was suspended. My recollection of that transaction is that General Scott

*Published nearly in full in George Ticknor Curtis's Life of Buchanan.

and Mr. Holt concurred with you in that arrangement which, when proposed in cabinet, was opposed by Judge Black and myself.

He also makes a further disclosure concerning the matter:

In his conversation with me Mr. Seward mentioned that Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet, when this subject came up, would desire me to be present and also Mr. Holt. I told him that if ALL OF THE LATE CABINET were requested to be present I would have no objection; but I did not think it proper UNLESS ALL were present. He said that of course the invitation would be extended to ALL. As I never heard anything more on the subject, I suppose they have found it necessary to consult only Mr. Holt, who continues acting as secretary of war.

In his letter of March 14, he predicted that if the Lincoln administration should continue four years, changes would be made in the Supreme Court which would "affect its constitutional doctrines." In December following, Senator J. P. Hale presented a resolution in Congress ordering an inquiry into "the expediency of abolishing the present Supreme Court" and "creating a new one" to take its place. The effort failed, but its inception proves that Stanton was taking a remarkably accurate measure of the influences which were to shape future events.

His letter of April 11 contains the following:

There is great "soldiering" in town the last two days. The yard in front of the War Office is crowded with District militia who are being mustered into service. The feeling of loyalty to the Government has greatly diminished in this city. Many persons who would have supported the Government under your administration refuse to be enrolled. Many who were enrolled have withdrawn, and refuse to take the oath.

The administration has not acquired the respect and confidence of the people here. Not one of the cabinet or principal officers has taken a house or brought his family here. Seward rented a home "while he should continue in the cabinet," but has not opened it, nor has his family come. They all act as though they meant to be ready to "cut and run" at a minute's notice. Their tenure is like that of a Bedouin on the sands of the desert. This is sensibly felt and talked about by the people in the city, and they feel no confidence in an administration that betrays so much insecurity. And besides, a strong feeling of distrust in the candor and sincerity of Lincoln personally and of his cabinet has sprung up. If they had been merely silent and secret there might have been no grounds of complaint. But assurances are said to have been given and declarations made in conflict with the facts now transpiring in respect to the South, so that no one speaks of Lincoln or any member of his cabinet with respect and regard.