rights of property it operates, has no means of knowing anything of it while before the Senate, it would be wrong in principle to hold him bound by it, as the law of the land, until it was ratified and proclaimed. And to construe the law, so as to make the ratification of the treaty relate back to its signing, thereby divesting a title already vested, would be manifestly unjust, and cannot be sanctioned." Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 230. The Court said: "In their legal aspect, the duties exacted in this case were of three classes: (1) the duties prescribed by General Miles under order of July 26, 1898, which merely extended the existing regulations; (2) the tariffs of August 19, 1898, and February 1, 1899, prescribed by the President as Commander in Chief, which continued in effect until April 11, 1899, the date of the ratification of the treaty and the cession of the island to the United States; (3) from the ratification of the treaty to May 1, 1900, when the Foraker act took effect. "There can be no doubt with respect to the first two of these classes, namely, the exaction of duties under the war power, prior to the ratification of the treaty of peace. While it is true the treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898, it did not take effect upon individual rights, until there was an exchange of ratifications. Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32." TREATIES OF PEACE, EFFECT OF. Moral obligation. Treaties of peace, when made by the competent power, are obligatory upon the whole nation. If the treaty requires the payment of money to carry it into effect, and the money cannot be raised but by an act of the legislature, the treaty is morally obligatory upon the legislature to pass the law, and to refuse it would be a breach of public faith. Kent, vol I, p. 180. The effect of a treaty of peace is to put an end to the war, and to abolish the subject of it. Peace relates to the war which it terminates. It is an agreement to waive all discussion concerning the respective rights of the parties, and to bury in oblivion all the original causes of the war. It forbids the revival of the same war, by taking arms for the cause which at first kindled it, though it is no objection to any subsequent pretensions to the same thing on other foundations. After peace, the revival of grievances arising before the war is not to be encouraged, for treaties of peace are intended to put an end to such complaints; and if grievances then existing are not brought forward at the time when peace is concluded, it is to be presumed that it is not intended to bring them forward at any future time. Peace leaves the contracting parties without any right of committing hostility, for the very cause which kindled the war, or for what has passed in the course of it. It is, therefore, no longer permitted to take up arms again for the same cause. But this will not preclude the right to complain and resist, if the same grievances which kindled the war be renewed and repeated; for that would furnish a new injury and a new cause of war equally just with the former war. If an abstract right be in question between the parties, the right, for instance, to impress at sea one's own subjects from the merchant vessels of the other, and the parties make peace without taking any notice of the question, it follows, of course, that all past grievances, damages, and injury, arising under such claim, are thrown into oblivion, by the amnesty which every treaty implies; but the claim itself is not thereby settled, either one way or the other. It remains open for future discussion, because the treaty wanted an express concession or renunciation of the claim itself. Kent, vol. I, pp. 182, 183; The Eliza Ann, 1 Dodson, 249; The Molly, 1 Dodson, 396. A treaty of peace leaves everything in the state in which it finds it, if there be no express stipulation on the subject. If nothing be said in the treaty of peace about the conquered country or places, they remain with the possessor, and his title cannot afterwards be called in question. During war, the conqueror has only a usufructuary right to the territory he has subdued; and the latent right and title of the former sovereign continues, until a treaty of peace, by its silence or by its express stipulation, shall have extinguished his title for ever. Kent, vol. I, pp. 183, 184; The Molly, 1 Dodson, 396. Private rights not related to the war. The peace does not affect private rights which had no relation to the war. Debts existing prior to the war, and injuries committed prior to the war, but which made no part of the reasons for undertaking it, remain entire, and the remedies are revived. There are certain cases in which even debts contracted or injuries committed between two subjects of the belligerent powers, during the war, are the ground of a valid claim, as in the case of ransom bills, and of contracts made by prisoners of war for subsistence, or in a trade carried on under a license. This would be the case if the debt between them was contracted, or the injury was committed, in a neutral country. Kent, vol. I, p. 184; Alcinous v. Nigreu, 4 El. & Bl. 217, 219; Crawford v. The William Penn, 3 Wash. 484. Titles quieted by peace. Another question arose subsequent to the treaty of Ghent, of 1814, in one of the British vice-admiralty courts, on the validity of a recapture, by a British ship of war, of a British vessel captured by an American privateer. The capture made by an American cruiser was valid, being made before the period fixed for the cessation of hostilities, and in ignorance of the fact; but the prize had not been carried into port and condemned, and while at sea she was recaptured by the British cruiser after the period fixed for the cessation of hostilities, but without knowledge of the peace. It was decided that the possession of the vessel by the American privateer was a lawful possession, and that the British cruiser could not, after the peace, lawfully use force to divest this lawful posssession. The restoration of peace put an end, from the time limited, to all force, and then the general principle applied, that things acquired in war remain, as to title and possession, precisely as they stood when the peace took place. The uti possidetis is the basis of every treaty of peace, unless it be otherwise agreed. Peace gives a final and perfect title to captures without condemnation; and as it forbids all force, it destroys all hopes of recovery as much as if the vessel was carried infra praesidia, and condemned. A similar doctrine was held in the case of the Schooner Sophie, and a treaty of peace has the effect of quieting all titles of possession arising from the war, and of putting an end to the claim of all former proprietors to things of which possession was acquired by right of war. Kent, vol. I, p. 187; The Legal Tender, Halifax, 1815, cited in Condition in which things are restored. If nothing be said to the contrary, things stipulated to be restored are to be returned in the condition in which they were taken; but this does not relate to alterations which have been the natural consequence of time, and of the operations of war. A fortress or a town is to be restored in the condition it was when taken, so far as it shall still be in that condition when the peace is made. There is no obligation to repair, as well as to restore, a dismantled fortress or a ravaged territory. The peace extinguishes all claim for damages done in war, or arising from the operations of war. Things are to be restored in the condition in which the peace found them; and to dismantle a fortification or to waste a country, after the conclusion of the peace, and previous to the surrender, would be an act of perfidy. Kent, vol. I, pp. 187, 188. Amnesty, claims, and complaints. It is the usual practice to introduce a leading article in a treaty of peace declaring an amnesty or a perfect oblivion of what is past; but although the treaty should be silent on this subject, the amnesty is, by the very nature of peace, necessarily implied in it. A treaty of peace puts an end to all claims for indemnity for tortious acts committed during the war under the authority of one government against the citizens or subjects of another, unless they are specially provided for in its stipulations. All personal complaints of losses sustained or injuries committed by subjects of the belligerent powers during the war are, as a general rule, silenced and extinguished by the treaty of peace. There are, however, certain exceptions to this rule, in cases where a valid claim may be subsequently made from peculiar transactions during the war, as in cases of ransom bills, of contracts made by prisoners of war for subsistence, and of trade carried on under a license. So, also, in cases of debts contracted, or injuries committed. during the war by such belligerent subjects in a neutral country. In all these cases the remedy may be asserted subsequently to the peace. Although private rights existing before the war may not be remitted by a treaty of peace, the presumption is otherwise as to the rights of kings and nations. (Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 3. cap. 20, § 19; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 4, § 3; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 2, §§ 19-21; The Eliza Ann, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 249; The Molly, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 396; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 168; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, p. 142; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1 cap. 13; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 9, § 6; Heffter, Dro International, § 180; Kluber, Droit des Gens Mod., § 325; Pando. Derecho Pub. Int., p. 582.) Claims. Halleck, pp. 851, 852. A treaty of peace does not extinguish claims unconnected with the cause of the war. Debts, existing prior to the war, and injuries committed prior to the war, but which made no part of the reasons for undertaking it, remain entire, and the remedies are revived. (Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 3, cap. 20, §§ 16, 18; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 4, § 3; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 169; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, pp. 142, 143; The Molly, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 394.) Halleck, p. 853. The effect of a treaty of peace is to put an end to the war, and to abolish the subject of it. It is an agreement to waive all discussion concerning the respective rights and claims of the parties, and to bury in oblivion the original causes of the war. It forbids the revival of the same war by resuming hostilities for the original cause which first kindled it or for whatever may have occurred in the course of it. But the reciprocal stipulation of perpetual peace and amity between the parties does not imply that they are never again to make war against each other for any cause whatever. The peace relates to the war which it terminates; and is perpetual, in the sense that the war cannot be revived for the same cause. This will not, however, preclude the right to claim and resist, if the grievances which originally kindled the war be repeated-for that would furnish a new injury and a new cause of war, equally just with the former. If an abstract right be in question between the parties, on which the treaty of peace is silent, it follows, that all previous complaints and injury, arising under such claim, are thrown into oblivion, by the amnesty, necessarily implied, if not expressed; but the claim itself is not thereby settled either one way or the other. In the absence of express renunciation or recognition, it remains open for future discussion. And even a specific arrangement of a matter in dispute, if it be special and limited, has reference only to that particular mode of asserting the claim, and does not preclude the party from any subsequent pretensions to the same |