lowed to complete them notwithstanding the termination of the German occupation-the claim was rejected by the French Government on the ground that when the German occupation came to an end, the rights of the former owner reverted, with the result that all rights derived from or through the occupant were put an end to. And this view appears to have been accepted even by the German Government as a correct exposition of the law. The jus postliminii may still, perhaps, be said to apply where property belonging to individuals is seized or occupied by an enemy; although the need of it is now not very apparent, as the only purposes for which it can be taken are in themselves provisional and temporary. But in the case of immovable property belonging to the State the jus postliminii has now been replaced by positive regulation, under which the rights of the belligerent occupant are expressly limited to those of a usufructuary.

(ii) Its Operation on Territory and Sovereignty. (1) After Occupation.-According to the earlier view, the seizure and occupation by one belligerent of territory belonging to the other was deemed to work a complete-or, at a later time, a partial-substitution of sovereignty. But here, again, the anomaly of attributing sovereignty and title to a possession manifestly contingent on the hazards of war was relieved by the doctrine of postliminium; which, by predicating a restitution of the original sovereignty and title in the event of the withdrawal or expulsion of the occupant, the latter's title merely provisional and defeasible. This view, whilst consistent with the exercise of all necessary authority over occupied territory, yet excluded any attempt at alienation or permanent change of system until the occupation had been converted into conquest. And this, in its turn, appears to have paved the way for the modern rule under which military occupation is deemed to confer only a possessory or provisional interest; the rights and duties of the occupant meanwhile resting on the broad ground of military necessity. But, even on this view, the results of a withdrawal of control are still those derived from the doctrine of postliminium. So, when the occupation comes to an end, the authority of the legitimate government will be restored; the operation of the territorial law and the jurisdiction of the Courts, in so far as previously suspended, will revive; whilst private rights and relations, in so far as they were previously affected, will be renewed. Acts done by the occupant in excess of his rights, such as changes in the political system or pretended alienations of property not subject to appropriation, will be wholly annulled; but acts done by him within his rights under the jus belli, such as the levy of contributions and requisitions and the alienation of property subject to appropriation, will hold good in so far as they have taken effect; whilst acts done in the ordinary

course of civil or judicial administration, such as the collection of taxes or the infliction of punishment for civil offences, will be binding on the restored Government, unless revoked in due course of law. (2) After temporary or partial Conquest.-It may happen, however, that a belligerent who intends a conquest and purports to establish his sovereignty over the territory appropriated, is, after an interval, displaced by the former Sovereign. Strictly, in such a case the operation of the jus postliminii will depend on whether there was or not, according to the tests previously indicated, a completed conquest. If there was then, on the subsequent displacement of the conqueror, the jus postliminii will not apply; the rights of the parties, both on conquest and reconquest, being strictly determinable made the latter's title merely provisional and defeasible. This view, by the rules of succession. But if there was not a completed conquest, then the jus postliminii with its attendant consequences would in strictness apply. Nevertheless, even in this case-and especially if there was any apparent basis for the claim of sovereignty put forward by the intermediate government- the preferable view would seem to be that all rights acquired under its dispositions and in good faith ought to be respected; for the reason that in such circumstances private persons are often not competent to judge of the true character of political changes.

Cobbett, pt. II, pp. 252-256.

Therefore, in a war between the United States and a belligerent which admits of slavery, if a person held in bondage by that belligerent be captured by or come as a fugitive under the protection of the military forces of the United States, such person is immediately entitled to the rights and privileges of a freeman. To return such person into slavery would amount to enslaving a free person, and neither the United States nor any officer under their authority can enslave any human being. Moreover, a person so made free by the law of war is under the shield of the law of nations, and the former owner or State can have, by the law of postliminy, no belligerent lien or claim of service.

Lieber, par. 43.

The Santa Cruz, 1 C. Rob. 50, pp. 60–62.—The court said: "If I am asked, under the known diversity of practice on this subject, what is the proper rule for a State to apply to the recaptured property of its allies, I should answer, that the liberal and rational proceeding would be, to apply in the first instance the rule of that country to which the recaptured property belongs. I admit the practice of nations is not so; but I think such a rule would be both liberal and just; to the recaptured, it presents his own consent, bound up in the legislative wisdom of his own country; to the recaptor, it cannot be considered

as injurious. Where the rule of the recaptured would condemn, whilst the rule of the recaptor prevailing amongst his own countrymen, would restore, it brings an obvious advantage; and even in the case of immediate restitution, under the rules of the recaptured, the recapturing country would rest secure in the reliance of receiving reciprocal justice in its turn."

*

**

"So much it might be necessary to explain myself on the mere question of propriety; but it is much more material to consider what is the actual rule of the maritime law of England on this subject. I understand it to be clearly this: that the maritime law of England, having adopted a most liberal rule of restitution on salvage, with respect to the recaptured property of its own subjects, gives the benefit of that rule to its allies, till it appears that they act towards British property on a less liberal principle. In such a case it adopts their rule, and treats them according to their own measure of justice. This I consider to be the true statement of the law of England on this subject. It was clearly so recognized in the case of the San Iago; a case which was not, as it has been insinuated, decided on special circumstances, nor on novel principles, but on principles of established use and authority in the jurisprudence of this country. In the discussion of that case, much attention was paid to an opinion found amongst the manuscript collections of a very experienced practitioner in this profession (Sir E. Simson), which records the practice and the rule as it was understood to prevail in his time. The rule is, that England restores, on salvage, to its allies; but if instances can be given of British property retaken by them and condemned as prize, the Court of Admiralty will determine their cases according to their own rule.""

Nostra Signora del Rosario, 3 C. Rob. 10, 11.-This was a case of a British prize ship which had been taken by the Spaniards, and sent out as a merchant ship, with a letter of marque.

"On the ship. The King's Advocate submitted that, although the vessel appeared to have been a British prize ship, there were two grounds on which the captors were entitled to have her condemned to them. First, that she was fitted out for war; and secondly, that the condemnation to the former captors at Gibraltar must be taken to have divested the original British proprietors of their interest: "Court. The first ground is fully sufficient. Was there a commission of war?

"King's Advocate. Yes. The master says to the second interrogatory that he had a commission from the King of Spain, but that he had orders from his owners to interrupt no vessel, but to proceed direct to Lima; on the thirty-first interrogatory it appears that he had twelve guns on board.

"Ship and cargo condemned to the captors."

TERMINATION OF WAR.

How war is terminated.

War is terminated by the conclusion of a treaty of peace, by simple cessation of hostilities, or by the conquest of one, or of part of one, of the belligerent states by the other.

Hall, p. 579.

Cessation of hostilities.

The termination of war by simple cessation of hostilities is extremely rare. Possibly the commonly cited case of the war between Sweden and Poland, which ceased in this manner in 1716, is the only unequivocal instance; though it is likely that if anything had occurred to compel the setting up of distinct relations of some kind between Spain and her revolted colonies in America during the long period which elapsed between the establishment of their independence and their recognition of the mother country, it would have been found that the existence of peace was tacitly assumed. No active hostilities appear to have been carried on later than the year 1825, and no effort was made to hold neutral states or individuals to the obligations imposed by a state of war; but it was not till 1840 that intercourse with any of the Central or South American republics, except Mexico, was authorised by the Spanish government. In that year commercial vessels of the republic of Ecuador were admitted by royal decree into the ports of the kingdom, and at various subsequent times like decrees were issued in favour of the remaining states. It was only however in 1844, three years after commercial relations had been established, that Chile, which was the earliest of the republics except Mexico to receive recognition, was formally acknowledged to be independent; and Venezuela, which was the last, was not recognized till 1850.

The inconvenience of such a state of things is evident. When war dies insensibly out the date of its termination is necessarily uncertain. During a considerable time the belligerent states and their subjects must be doubtful as to the light in which they are regarded by the other party to the war, and neutral states and individuals must be equally doubtful as to the extent of their rights and obligations. Nevertheless a time must come sooner or later at which it is clear that a state of peace has supervened upon that of war. When this has arrived, the effects of the informal establishment of peace are identical with those general effects flowing from the conclusion

of a treaty which are necessarily consequent upon the existence of a state of peace. Beyond this it is difficult to say whether any effects would be produced. It is at any rate certain that the pretensions which may have given rise to the war cannot be regarded as abandoned, and that the quarrel cannot be assumed to have been definitively settled. It would always be open to either side to begin a fresh war upon the same grounds as those which supplied the motive for hostilities in the first instance.

Hall, 586, 587.

How wars may end.

The normal condition between two States being peace, war can never be more than a temporary condition; whatever may have been the cause or causes of a war, the latter cannot possibly last for ever. For either the purpose of war will be realised and one belligerent will be overpowered by the other, or both will sooner or later be so exhausted by their exertions that they will desist from the struggle. Nevertheless wars may last for many years, although of late European wars have gradually become shorter. The shortening of European wars in recent times has resulted from several causes, the more important of which are:-conscription, the foundation of the armies of all the great European Powers, Great Britain excepted; the net of railways which extends over all European countries, and which enables a much quicker transport of troops on enemy territory; and lastly, the vast numbers of the opposing forces which usually hasten a decisive battle.

Be that as it may, a war may be terminated in three different ways. Belligerents may, first, abstain from further acts of war and glide into peaceful relations without expressly making peace through a special treaty. Or, secondly, belligerents may formally establish the condition of peace through a special treaty of peace. Or, thirdly, a belligerent may end the war through subjugation of his adversary.

Oppenheim, vol. 2, p. 32
322.

Cessation of hostilities.

The regular modes of termination of war are treaties of peace or subjugation, but cases have occurred in which simple cessation of all acts of war on the part of both belligerents has actually and informally brought the war to an end. Thus ended in 1716 the war between Sweden and Poland, in 1720 the war between Spain and France, in 1801 the war between Russia and Persia, in 1867 the war between France and Mexico. And it may also be mentioned that, whereas the war between Prussia and several German States in 1866 came to an end through subjugation of some States and through treaties of

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