Limitation does not run during the war. On the other hand, though the principal of a debt survives, interest, even if agreed upon, will not run whilst hostilities continue, except "when an agent appointed to receive the money resides within the same jurisdiction with the debtor " or " when one of several joint debtors resides within the same country with the creditor, or with the known agent of the creditor."

Latifi, p. 51; Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532; Hoare v. Allen, 2 Dall. 102; Ward r. Smith, 7 Wall, 452; Paul et ux. Extx. of Dean v. Christie, 4 Harris and McHenry 161.

Decisions in the United States.

It has also been held in the United States that no interest can be recovered after the peace for the time during which the debtor was prevented from paying the principal by the legal doctrine that all rommercial communication with enemy subjects is forbidden: Hoare v. Allen, 2 Dallas 102, Scott 498; Foxcroft v. Nagle, 2 Dallas 182, Scott 500, and see C. N. Gregory in 25 Law Quarterly Review 297, 314. But this rule does not apply when the creditor resides or has an agent in the country of the debtor, for then the debtor might have paid the interest, and it would not have been his offense if it has been sent to the enemy country; Conn. v. Penn, 1 Peter C. C. 496; Denniston v. Imbrie, 3 Washington C. C. 396. But the agent must have been appointed before the war: U. S. v. Grossmayer, 9 Wallace 72. See also Small's Administrator v. Lumpkin's Executor, 28 Grattan 832, Scott 538.

Westlake, vol. 2, pp. 52, 53.

Shares and debentures of corporations.

The shares and debentures of companies incorporated under British law which are held by enemy subjects at the outbreak of a war will not cease to exist, but must continue as properties, whatever be decided as to the ownership of those properties. There is therefore no alternative but either to confiscate them for the benefit of the British government, which in many cases would be contrary to treaty and in all cases is now out of the question, or to regard the enemy shareholders and debenture holders as continuing to be such. To strike out the enemy subjects from the list of persons interested, without more, would practically be to confiscate their properties for the benefit of the other shareholders, a proceeding which would be grotesque in its injustice, and which would fall within the spirit if not within the letter of treaties prohibiting confiscation. But the dividends on the shares and the interest on the debentures, so far as not represented by coupons payable to bearer and of which therefore the ownership would not be apparent to the companies, cannot be paid to the enemy subjects during the war. After its close they will be entitled

to claim the back dividends and interest, but not to interest on debentures after their maturity, subject, in the case of shareholders, to their paying any calls made in the meantime.

Westlake, vol. 2, p. 53.

Debts.-Debts already subsisting between individuals divided by the line of war are suspended during the war, both as regards the right of action of the creditor and the duty of payment on the part of the debtor. Any such payment would indeed be illegal if it involved a transmission of money to the enemy country. Nor will any interest, even though otherwise payable, be due to the creditor, in respect of the period covered by the war; for the reason that interest is payable "for the forbearance of money," whereas in time of war payment cannot be exacted, and there is therefore no forbearance. But this will not apply where the debt is payable at a fixed date-as is usual in cases where the debt is secured by mortgage or other form of security-for in such a case interest is due not for forbearance but by virtue of the original agreement; although even in this case, if the agreed date for payment of the principal should be reached during the war no further interest will be due. Subject to these reservations, the right of the creditor to recover both principal and interest will revive on the return of peace. Nor, if the debtor is sued, will it be open to him to set up any plea of limitation, as regards the period covered by the war; for the reason that during that period the right of action is deemed to have been in abeyance. Debts contracted during the continuance of war are of course, irrecoverable, save in the case of transactions specially excepted under the jus belli.

Cobbett, pt. II, pp. 86, 87.

The suspension during the war of interest on an obligation depends upon the relations of the parties to the obligation to each other directly or through an agent.1

G. G. Wilson in 40 Cyc. p. 323.

Interest on pecuniary contracts suspended by war.

The American law is that no interest is recoverable after peace for the time during which the debtor was prevented from paying the principal debt by the law which forbids commercial intercourse with the enemy (Hoare v. Allen, 2 Dallas, 102; Foxcroft v. Nagle, ibid. 182). But this rule only applies to cases, where interest is recoverable as damages; for interest, expressly stipulated for in the contract, is not affected by war (Yeaton v. Berney, 62 Ill. 61; Lash v.

1 See Interest, 22 Cyc. 1562. See also Kent v. Chapman, 18 W. Va. 485; Rogers v. Arthur, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 12,006.

A debtor cannot plead in claiming reduction of interest that the Embargo Act of his country prevented payment of the debt. Consequa v. Fanning, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 587.

Lambert, 2 American Reports, 142; but see Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wall. 185, for a contrary view). Where the debtor, or one of several joint debtors, resides in the same country as the creditor or his duly authorized agent, provided such agent was appointed before the war (United States v. Grossmayer, 9 Wall. 72), interest on the debt is not suspended by war. (Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 452, 455.) This is also the case where a surety for an enemy principal resides in the same country as the creditor, and the action is brought against him (Bean v. Chapman, 62 Ala. 58; Paul v. Christie, 4 Harr. & M. (Md.) 161). An agreement by a debtor after peace to pay interest for the time during which war continued is binding (Inglis v. Nutt, 2 Desauss. Eq. (Supreme Court) 623; Bainbridge v. Wilcocks, Baldw. 536). But such an agreement in England would probably require consideration, if not expressed in a deed, although it would hold good in Scotland (Trotter's Law of Contract in Scotland, pp. 9, 46, 54). In Rowe v. Hardy, 75 American State Reports, 811, it was held that where a judgment had been recovered upon a debt, both for principal and interest, it was error in an action on such judgment to abate the interest on the principal debt for the period of the Civil War.

There is some authority for assuming that the English law is the same as the American. In Du Belloix v. Lord Waterpark, 1822, 1 Dow. & Ryl. 16, Abbott, C. J., said-" But there is another objection to the plaintiff's recovering interest on the debt " (as damages), "for during the greater part of that time he was an alien enemy, and could not have recovered even the principal in this country, and, at all events, during that period of the time the interest could not have run, and it would even have been illegal to pay the bill whilst the plaintiff was an alien enemy" (ibid. at p. 19).

Trotter, pp. 49, 50.

Interest did not run during war on a mortgage debt due by an inhabitant of the United States to a British subject. The reporter in a note states that this had been the uniform holding in the courts. of Pennsylvania.

Moore's Digest, vol. VII, p. 252; Hoare v. Allen, Supreme Court of Pa., 1789, 2 Dall. 102.

This principle was affirmed in the case of Foxcraft and Galloway v. Nagle, Supreme Court of Pa., 1791, 2 Dall. 132.

See, to the same effect, Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wall. 177.

See, Moore, Int. Arbitrations, IV. 4313.

There should be no abatement of interest on a judgment during the war, the counties in which the plaintiff and defendant respectively lived being judicially known not to be territories which were hostile to one another.

Kent, Paine & Co. v. Chapman, 18 W. Va. 485.

Moore's Digest, vol. VII, pp. 252, 253.

LICENSES.

Either country may license trading with the other under such restrictions as it may deem best. Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73; Snell v. Dwight, 120 Mass. 9.

Kent, vol. 1, p. 81, note.

A single belligerent may grant licenses to trade with the enemy, and dilute and weaken his own rights at pleasure, but it is otherwise when allied nations are pursuing a common cause. The community of interests and object and action creates a mutual duty not to prejudice that joint interest; and it is a declared principle of the law of nations, founded on very clear and just grounds, that one of the belligerents may seize and inflict the penalty of forfeiture on the property of a subject of a co-ally, engaged in a trade with the common enemy, and thereby affording him aid and comfort whilst the other ally was carrying on a severe and vigorous warfare. It would be contrary to the implied contract in every such warlike confederacy, that neither of the beligerents, without the other's consent, shall do anything to defeat the common object.

Kent, vol. 1, p. 83; The Nayade, 4 C. Rob. 251; The Neptunus, 6 C.
Rob. 403.

The effect of a license given by the enemy to the subjects of the adverse party, to carry on a specified trade, has already been considered, in respect to the light in which it is viewed by the government of the citizens accepting it. A very different effect is given to these licenses by the government which grants them, and they are regarded and respected as lawful relaxations or suspensions of the rules of war. It is the assumption of a state of peace to the extent of the license, and the act rests in the discretion of the sovereign authority of the state, which alone is competent to decide how far considerations of commercial and political expediency may, in particular cases, control the ordinary consequences of war. In the country which grants them, licenses to carry on a pacific commerce are stricti juris, as being exceptions to a general rule; though they are not to be construed with pedantic accuracy, nor will every small deviation be held to vitiate the fair effect of them. An excess in the quantity of goods permitted to be imported might not be considered as noxious to any extent; but a variation in the quality or substance of the goods might be more significant. Whenever any part of the

trade assumed under the license is denuded of any authority under it, such part is subject to condemnation.

Another material circumstance in all licenses is the limitation of time in which they are to be carried into effect, for what is proper at one time may be very unfit and mischievous at another time. Where a license was limited to be in force until the 29th of September, and the ship did not sail from the foreign port until the 4th of October, yet, as the goods were laden on board by the 12th of September, and there was an entire bona fides on the part of the person holding the license, this was held to be legal. But where a license was to bring away a cargo from Bordeaux, and the party thought proper to change the license, and accommodate it to another port in France, it was held by the English admiralty, in the case of the Twee Gebroeders, that the license was vitiated, and the vessel and cargo were condemned. It has also been held that the license must be limited to the use of the precise persons for whose benefit it was obtained. The great principle in these cases is, that subjects are not to trade with the enemy without the special permission of the government; and the material object of the control which the government exercises over such a trade is that it may judge of the particular persons who are fit to be intrusted with an exemption from the ordinary restrictions of a state of war.

Kent, vol. I, pp. 178-180; The Cosmopolite, 4 C. Rob. 8; The Abigail
Stewart, Vice-Adm. 360; Schroeder r. Vaux, 15 East, 52; 3 Camp. 83;
The Twee Gebroeders, Edw. Adm. 95; The Jonge Johannes, 4 C.
Rob. 263.

There are but two exceptions to this general rule interdicting trade with the enemy: First, the mere exercise of the rights of humanity, and, second, the trade sanctioned by the license or authority of the government. The first of these exceptions would permit intercourse with the enemy, to such a limited extent, and of so rare an occurrence, as to require no particular discussion; the second, results from the fact, that on certain occasions it is highly expedient for the state to permit an intercourse with the enemy, by commerce or otherwise; but the state alone, and not individuals, must determine when it shall be permitted, and under what regulations. Without such direct permission of the state, no commercial intercourse with the enemy is allowed to subsist. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 1, §13; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 556; The Hoop, 1 Rob. Rep., pp. 199, 200; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 123; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 2, $3; Heffter, Droit International, $123; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 245; Jacobsen, Seerecht, $$719-731; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. ? $75.

Halleck, p. 498.