The interests of a few citizens on the Pacific slope were the main-spring of the little that had been done. For more than a decade San Francisco had annually received a large amount of ice from Russian America,' and United States fishermen had been profitably engaged in different parts of the far northern Pacific. Those interests had rapidly increased from year to year. At the beginning of 1866 the legislature of Washington territory sent a petition to President Johnson, saying that an abundance of codfish, halibut, and salmon had been found along the shores of Russian America, and requesting him to obtain from the Russian government such concessions as would enable American fishing vessels to visit the ports and harbors of that region for the purpose of obtaining fuel, water, and provisions. Sumner says that this was referred to the Secretary of State, who suggested to Stoeckl that some comprehensive arrangement should be made to prevent any difficulties arising between the United States and Russia on account of the fisheries. About this time several Californians wished to obtain a franchise to carry on the fur-trade in Russian America. Senator Cole, of California, urged both Seward and Stoeckl to support the request. Seward instructed Cassius M. Clay, the United States Minister at St. Petersburg, to consult the Russian government on the subject. Clay reported in February, 1867, that there was a prospect of success. In fact, the time happened to be peculiarly opportune for negotiation. Russian America had never been brought under the regular rule of the imperial government. Since the beginning of the century its few thousand civilized inhab itants had been governed by a great monopoly called 1 H. H. Bancroft's Alaska, 587. the Russian-American Company. Its charter had expired with the year 1861, and had not been renewed; yet a renewal was expected. This monopoly was so unprofitable that it had sought and obtained special privileges, such as the free importation of tea into Russia. It had even sublet some of its privileges to the Hudson Bay Company. This sublease to Englishmen was to expire in June, 1867. By the usual means of communication Russian America was from Russia one of the most distant regions on earth. To organize it as a colony would involve great expense and continuous financial loss. To defend it in time of war with Great Britain or the United States would be an impossibility. When the Crimean war broke out common interest led the Russian-American and the Hudson Bay companies to induce their respective governments to neutralize the Russian and the British possessions on the northwest coast of America. Otherwise Great Britain might easily have seized the Russian territory. To the imperial government at the beginning of 1867 the problem resolved itself into these three questions: Shall the charter of the monopoly, with its privileges and unsatisfactory treatment of the inhabitants, be renewed? Shall an expensive colonial system be organized? Shall we sell at a fair price territory that will surely be lost, if it ever becomes populated and valuable? It was foreseen that unless sold to the most constant and grateful of Russia's friends, it was likely to be taken by her strongest and most inveterate enemy. Stoeckl was spending part of the winter of 1866-67 in St. Petersburg, and the different questions were talked over with him, for he had long been Minister to the United States. In February, 1867, as he was about to return to Washington, "the Archduke Constantine, the 1 Bancroft's Alaska, 570. brother and chief adviser of the Emperor, handed him a map with the lines in our treaty marked upon it, and told him he might treat for this cession."" The following month Stoeckl and Seward began negotiations. One named ten million dollars as a reasonable price; the other offered five millions. Then they took the middle ground-namely, seven million five hundred thousand as a basis. Seward urged and Stoeckl agreed that the half million should be dropped. The Russian-American Company still claimed privileges and held interests that could not be ignored. Seward saw the objections to assuming any responsibility for matters of this kind; so he offered to add two hundred thousand dollars to the seven millions if Russia would give a title free from all liabilities. On the evening of March 29, 1867, the Russian Minister called at Seward's house and informed him of the receipt of a cablegram reporting the Emperor's consent to the proposition, and then he added that he would be ready to take up the final work the next day, for haste was desirable. With a smile of satisfaction at the news, Seward pushed aside the table where he had been enjoying his usual evening game of whist, and said: "Why wait till tomorrow, Mr. Stoeckl? Let us make the treaty to-night." The needed clerks were summoned; the Assistant Secretary went after Sumner, the chairman of the Senate committee on foreign affairs; the Russian Minister sent for his assistants; and at midnight all met at the Department of State. By four o'clock in the morning the task was completed. In a few hours the President sent the treaty to the Senate. As only Sumner knew of what had taken place, it was supposed that the message announced was a veto of some recent bill." 1 Sumner, 9. 2 Most of the statements in this paragraph are based on 3 Seward, 347-49. On questions of foreign policy Sumner had great influence in the Senate at this time. He made a thorough study of the resources of Alaska, and championed the treaty with persistency and a very impressive array of facts; yet he was no enthusiast for expansion.' As the proposition of cession came from Russia, and at a time when the United States were in financial difficulties on account of the expenditures of the Civil War, it was made the object of much ridicule. Many persons assumed that the territory was a frozen region where there was but little animal or vegetable life, and that its inhabitants, excepting a few Russians, were Esquimaux, and its chief products polar-bears and glaciers. It was often spoken of as Walrussia. The area of the cession is five hundred and seventy-seven thousand three hundred and ninety square miles. Even if valueless except for furs and fisheries, there could be no great loss at the price agreed on. As the population, aside from the aborigines, numbered only about ten thousand,' and as no foreign complications were to be feared, there were no grounds for weighty political objections. However, there would have been no likelihood of ratifying the treaty if only the supposed desirability of the territory had been involved. The important fact was that Russia wished to sell. Both the government and the people of the United States still entertained feelings of gratitude toward her. She refused Napoleon's proposition of intervention in 1862, and about a year later "But there is one other point on which I file my caveat. This treaty must not be a precedent for a system of indiscriminate and costly annexation. . . . But I cannot disguise my anxiety that every stage in our predestined future shall be by natural processes without war, and I would add even without purchase. There is no territorial aggrandizement which is worth the price of blood. . . . Our triumph should be by growth and organic expansion in obedience to 'pre-established harmony,' recognizing always the will of those who are to become our fellow-citizens."-Sumner, 16. 2 Sumner, 24. she sent her fleet to New York and Washington, where there were great demonstrations of friendship between the two governments. It was widely believed-though without the slightest authority-that this fleet was to help the United States in case of war with France or Great Britain. Only two Senators voted against the treaty. Ratifications were exchanged and the treaty was proclaimed June 20, 1867. Doubtless to make it practically impossible for the House to refuse to appropriate the money, commissioners were appointed by each government within a few weeks, and the actual transfer occurred October 11, 1867, accompanied by military salutes between the Russian and the United States troops. At this time the name Alaska-which Seward had chosen from the many that had been suggested -came officially into use.' When the House took up the question of voting the appropriation, much ill-feeling was expressed on account of the speed and secrecy with which the treaty had been negotiated. Jealousy of the power of the Senate and hatred of the administration were also influential. But the desire not to exhibit any lack of appreciation of Russia's friendship prevailed with many members, and the bill was passed by a vote of one hundred and thirteen to forty-three." During the Civil War most of the inhabitants of the British, the Spanish, and the French West Indies sympathized with the Confederacy. Confederate cruisers usually received a welcome in those islands, and the local governors connived at almost everything that did not convict them of a flagrant violation of neutrality. On the other hand, Federal warships were treated with cold formality, watched, and denied coal and repairs whenever a plausible excuse could be found. In the 1 3 Seward, 369. 2 Globe, 1867-68, 4055. |