The result of the election of 1864 proved that Lincoln and Grant had the confidence of the North and could command its full strength. Before the end of the year Sherman had triumphantly reached Savannah. Grant, although still in front of Petersburg, was daily becoming more formidable. It was almost certain that the Confederacy could not hold out more than a few months longer, for the great bulk of the Federal troops in the East were to be concentrated about Richmond early in 1865, unless it should fall meantime. What Lincoln's administration wanted was peace and reunion, and it would have preferred to obtain them by negotiation rather than by battles. Near the end of December, 1864, Francis P. Blair, Sr., elaborated a scheme to overcome the difficulties. The gist of it was that the belligerents should enter into a military convention to cease hostilities between themselves, for a time at least, and devote their efforts to driving the French out of Mexico; that Jefferson Davis should command a union of Confederate, Federal, and Mexican forces-be made dictator, if necessary-expel "the Bonaparte-Hapsburg dynasty," establish order in Mexico, and perhaps round out the possessions of the United States to the Isthmus. This would restore the balance between the sections and make the South blossom again with prosperity. By that time it would be seen that there was really nothing more to fight about, for each side had adopted a policy toward slavery that would soon bring it to an end.' Lincoln neither knew Blair's plans nor assumed any responsibility for them, but gave him the necessary pass. The Confederate President received Blair as an old acquaintance and listened with much interest to the surprising propositions, for any strategy that offered a pos 1 For Blair's full programme, see 10 Nicolay and Hay, 91 ff. sibility of escape from the danger threatening the Confederate capital must not be neglected. Davis gave the visitor a written statement, to be shown to Lincoln, saying that he was ready to enter into a conference "with a view to secure peace to the two countries." Lincoln heard Blair's report of what had taken place, and wrote him a note, to be shown to Davis, expressing his willingness to receive any agent sent informally and authorized to consider the question of "peace to the people of our one common country." Vice-President Stephens advised Davis to meet Lincoln,' but the Confederate chief knew that in such an enterprise as this there was safety in numbers. So he appointed Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and John A. Campbell, then Assistant Secretary of War. The Confederates finally gave up trying to force an implied recognition of sovereignty by referring to the "two countries." On January 31, 1865, Lincoln instructed Seward to proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, "to meet and informally confer with" these three commissioners. The instructions were very explicit: "You will make known to them that three things are indispensable, to wit: First. The restoration of the national authority throughout all the states. Second. No receding by the Executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress, and in preceding documents. Third. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government. You will inform them that all propositions of theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they may choose to say, and report it to me. You will not assume to definitely consummate anything. After Seward had departed Lincoln was shown a 1 1 2 Stephens's War Between the States, 593. despatch from Grant in which a regret was expressed that the President was not to meet Stephens and Hunter, especially, who had impressed Grant as having good intentions and a sincere desire to restore peace and union. This persuaded the President to hurry off to take part in the consultation. It would have been a needless risk for one man, however reserved in conversation, to carry on such a conference with these three Confederates. Perhaps, too, Lincoln remembered Seward's unfortunate interviews with Campbell and Hunter, in 1861, and with Mercier a year later. What is known as the "Hampton Roads Conference," on account of the place where it occurred, was on board the Federal ship River Queen, February 3, 1865. It was on the Mexican scheme that the Confederates were basing their hopes. Stephens soon asked if there was not some side issue that could be used to divert the attention of the two sections until passions might cool-some continental question, after the solution of which they would be in a more amicable mood for adjusting difficulties among themselves. Lincoln understood the meaning of this reference, and explained that he was not responsible for what Blair had said; that he himself adhered to the declaration that a restoration of the Union was a prerequisite to any agreement whatever. Still, believing that the Mexican project was not positively barred, Stephens spoke of the hostility of the United States to the French invasion and of their desire to enforce the Monroe doctrine. He understood this to mean that the North would support the right of self-government to all peoples on the American continent, against the dominion or control of any European power. Could any pledge make a permanent restoration of the Union more certain than it would be after this doctrine had been asserted in regard to Mexico? Lincoln repeated what he had said about having nothing to do with an armis tice or with any proposition that did not involve the restoration of the Federal authority throughout the whole country. Campbell then thought it time to introduce another question, but Seward was so interested in Stephens's speculations that he wanted to hear them developed further; for, as he said, they had "a philosophi cal basis." It was to be expected that the very marked resemblance between Stephens's idea as expressed so far and the one Seward had advanced April 1, 1861, would interest the Secretary. But Seward's aim was to preserve the Union, whereas Stephens's plan was primarily to establish the principle of local self-government and the right of secession. This would have been a vindication -in the eyes of all Confederates, at least-of the aims of the South, although Stephens hoped that an "oceanbound Federal Republic" would come into existence "under the operation of this Continental Regulator—the ultimate absolute Sovereignty of each State." Moral suasion and self-interest were to be the only cohesive forces. Seward easily exploded the theory by pointing out that according to it Louisiana might shut up the Mississippi. Stephens had to admit that in case of wanton injustice on the part of a state, coercion might be used. Still Seward wanted to continue the speculation about the Mexican question, and he inquired as to how the Confederates expected to make their suggestions practical. This brought out the fact that the commissioners had neither the authority nor the wish to pledge Confederate military support to the effort to overthrow European influence in Mexico. The trap was thereby exposed. 2 Evidently Seward was desirous of peace, and very naturally; for, if he could have been instrumental in bringing it about now, it would be a great compensa 1 2 Stephens, 603. 22 Stephens, 604. 3 2 Stephens, 608. tion for his disappointment in the spring of 1861. The Confederates had not heard that Congress had just proposed the XIII. Amendment. Seward at least suggested that if the states in secession would promptly resume their old places, they might defeat the adoption of the amendment. Both he and Lincoln expressed their willingness to favor a plan for compensating the South for her slaves. It was thought that the North would prefer such an indemnity rather than expend the money in prosecuting the war. Lincoln said that some Northerners had mentioned as much as four million dollars for this peaceful purpose. Beyond the point of submission to the laws, and standing by what had already been done, the President promised to act with liberality in all matters that fell within his constitutional powers. But again and again he came back to his wise declaration that no agreement would be entered into until after the Confederates had laid down their arms. Hunter undertook to show that there was a precedent for such an agreement in the negotiations between Charles I. and the Roundheads. It was then that Lincoln gave the answer, as characteristic of himself as it was of his attitude toward Seward: "I do not profess to be posted in history. On all such matters I turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I. is that he lost his head in the end." After a session of four hours the conferrees concluded that there was no possibility of reaching any agreement. 1 The Confederates returned in sadness and anger to their capital, still unwilling to believe that Lincoln had never intended to offer some such terms as Blair had suggested. Stephens soon withdrew to the quiet of his Georgia home, as if to escape being crushed beneath a 1 2 Stephens, 613. |