expectation was that by such a plan New Mexico would become a slave state, and the northern territory would be free. Seward's whole argument about slavery in the territories was similar to that of the northern Whig compromisers of 1850, and was entirely inconsistent with what he had been saying for the past twelve years.

But it must always be remembered that Seward's two immediate objects during these months were to foster sympathy between the loyalists of both sections and to prevent a conflict with the Confederates before Lincoln's inauguration, and that these objects were of supreme importance.

No one knew better than he how many unionists in both sections honestly believed that the Republicans designed to initiate a revolutionary policy. There never was a day before the surrender at Appomattox when the Republicans alone could have saved the Union. Because Seward and Weed saw how helpless their party must remain, they aimed to win for it as much confidence and support as possible. "The North is divided," wrote Seward, on January 13th. "Two-thirds of the Republican Senators are as reckless in action as the South. They imagine that the government can go on and conquer the South, while they, themselves, sit still and see the work done." "The Union cannot be saved by proving that secession is illegal or unconstitutional." The only way in which the North as a whole could be brought to the point of fighting for the preservation of the Union was by making it plain that the Republicans had not provoked the South into secession and that there was still enough loyalty in the border slave states to warrant the expectation of an easy victory over the Confederacy.❜

1 2 Seward, 496.

* Speech, January 12th, 4 Works, 652. 3 See M. H. Grinnell to Seward, Appendix B.

But the urgent task was to preclude a violent outbreak during Buchanan's term. The constant aim of the secessionist leaders ever since the election had been to destroy all hope of reconciliation, and when they found the unionists in the border slave states exerting unexpected power, they charged them with being the dupes of the Republicans.' And Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, suggested to Toombs, on February 12th, that it would be a good plan to bring on a conflict so as to open a gulf between the southern border states and the North.2

On January 23d Seward wrote home: "Once for all, I must gain time for the new administration to organize and for the frenzy of passion to subside." Until the Republicans could command the physical and material strength of the government, any positive offer to compromise would weaken them more than their enemies.*

1 Editorial articles in Semi-Weekly Richmond Enquirer, February 19 and 22, 1861, are good illustrations.

2 Crawford's Genesis of the Civil War, 270.

2 Seward, 497.

4 Six years afterward Seward described his purpose at this time as follows:

'In regard to February, 1861, I need only say, that, at the time the secession leaders were all in the Senate and House, with power enough, and only wanting an excuse, to get up a resistance in the capital to the declaration of Mr. Lincoln's election and to his inauguration-in other words, to have an excuse and opportunity to open the civil war here before the new administration and new Congress could be in authority to subdue it-I desired to avoid giving them that advantage. I conferred throughout with General Scott and Mr. Stanton, then in Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet. I presume that I conversed with others in a way that seemed to me best calculated to leave the inauguration of a war to the secessionists, and to delay it, in any case, until the new administration should be in possession of the gov ernment. It was less military demonstration that was wanted at that particular moment than political discretion.

"Discretion taught two duties-namely, to awaken patriotism at the North, and to get the secessionists, with Buchanan's administration, out of Washington. Mr. Adams well and thoroughly under

There is no reason to doubt that Seward's policy warded off the most imminent dangers and bridged over the chasm between November and March. No one but Buchanan had the power-and he wholly lacked the capacity and the courage-to develop a better and more far-reaching method of dealing with secession. What Seward did was less a deliberate policy than tactics for an emergency, but it was timely and effective for the immediate purpose, and amazingly so when all the difficulties are given due consideration. This was the hour of Seward's supreme greatness.

Seward's self-conscious bearing at this time has been much criticised; and it has been alleged that he imagined himself another Atlas on whose shoulders rested the whole weight of the Union. He assumed, as has been noticed, "a sort of dictatorship for defence"; and he wrote home, January 18, 1861: "It seems to me that if I am absent only three days, this administration, the Congress, and the District, would fall into consternation and despair. I am the only hopeful, calm, conciliatory person here." At that time the Senators from Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi were about to withdraw from the Senate, and Georgia was hourly expected to pass her ordinance of secession. One needs

stood me. On the 22d of February, in concert with Mr. Stanton, I caused the United States flag to be displayed throughout the northern and western portions of the United States."-Seward to William Schouler, June 13, 1867. 1 Schouler's Massachusetts in the Civil War, 41, 42.

The Evening Journal of February 14, 1861, said that if the peace conference did nothing else, it had shown "that northern states do not regard southern ones as enemies, and by securing what is of the first importance in all this business-time for the excitement to cool, and for the madness of secession to be realized. . . . The only objection that can be raised to either of these [methods of changing the Constitution] is, that it requires time and prevents' precipitation into revolution.' This is precisely why we commend it.”

1 2 Seward, 497.

but to read the records of the proceedings in the Senate three or four days later, after these Senators had departed, to see how easily consternation and despair might have prevailed if Seward had not been there to insist with serene assurance on proceeding with the regular business and to oppose entering into an exciting and futile debate, which some of the secessionists tried to stir up. On January 23d he again wrote to Mrs. Seward: "Mad men North, and mad men South, are working together to produce a dissolution of the Union by civil war. The present administration and the incoming one unite in devolving on me the responsibility of averting those disasters. My own party trusts me, but not without reservation. All the other parties, North and South, cast themselves upon me." Great as his egotism appears, it was not out of proportion to his su periority and responsibility at the time. And his intimacy with Lincoln during these months fully warranted the statement about the incoming administration.

On December 8, 1860, Lincoln began the definite selection of his Cabinet by inviting Seward to be Secretary of State. The newspapers had circulated a rumor to the effect that the offer was to be tendered merely as a compliment, with the expectation that it would be declined. Lincoln informed Seward that the rumor was groundless, and with characteristic frankness made this handsome acknowledgment: "I now offer you the place in the hope that you will accept it, and with the belief that your position in the public eye, your integ rity, ability, learning, and great experience, all combine

12 Seward, 497.

2 To no one else did Lincoln write so many important letters during this period (see 1 Lincoln's Works, 653 ff.), and Seward seems to have had no extensive correspondence with any one besides Lincoln, excepting Mrs. Seward and Thurlow Weed.

1

3

to render it an appointment pre-eminently fit to be made." No proposition could have been less a surprise to Seward, but he knew the wisdom of asking for time to reflect. As it was impracticable for Seward and Lincoln to meet at this time, Weed soon went to Springfield. When he returned he brought Lincoln's memorandum suggesting what concessions the Republicans might make, and a request that Seward should write to him about the status in Washington. On the 26th of December Seward sent Lincoln an elaborate statement about political affairs, and two days later he formally accepted the proffered secretaryship. When the acceptance became public, early in January, Lincoln paid Seward this high compliment: "Your selection for the State Department having become public, I am happy to find scarcely any objection to it. I shall have trouble with every other northern Cabinet appointment, so much so that I shall have to defer them as long as possible, to avoid being teased to insanity to make changes."

Seward was anxious to have in the Cabinet one or more southern unionists that had not been identified with the Republican party, and he suggested the names of John A. Gilmer and Kenneth Raynor, of North Carolina, Robert E. Scott and James Barbour, of Virginia, Randall Hunt, of Louisiana, and Meredith P. Gentry, of

11 Lincoln's Works, 657.

2 On December 13th he replied to Lincoln: "You will readily believe that, coming to the consideration of so grave a subject all at once, I need a little time to consider whether I possess the qualifications and temper of a minister, and whether it is in such a capacity that my friends would wish that I should act if I am to continue at all in the public service. These questions are, moreover, to be considered in view of a very anomalous condition of public affairs. I wish, indeed, that a conference with you upon them were possible."-3 Nicolay and Hay, 350. The same day he wrote to Weed: "I have now the occasion for consulting you that you have expected."-2 Seward, 481. 3 Seward, 484. 4 2 Seward, 484, 485, 487.

5 1 Lincoln's Works, 665.