ments were held out. What was offered to France in the spring and summer of 1862 was to be made much more inviting in propositions to both France and Great Britain. In a long despatch of December 11, 1862, Benjamin instructed Mason and Slidell to urge upon these two governments the adoption of certain measures promising great returns. "The almost total cessation of external commerce for the last two years" had " produced complete exhaustion of the supply of all articles of foreign growth and manufacture." The Confederate Secretary of State estimated that there would be a demand for three hundred million dollars' worth of imports within the first six months after a treaty of peace, and that the Confederacy had accumulated cotton, tobacco, and naval stores with exchangeable value much beyond that sum. The North would reap the great commercial advantages of returning peace unless England or France should make special efforts. He suggested that the merchants of neutral nations should purchase the Confederate products in advance. The Confederacy was ready to promise not to destroy them in any case, if the government of the foreign owner would agree to protect them from seizure or destruction by the United States. The establishment of depots of supplies in the West Indies, with improved means of transportation, would enable foreigners to take advantage of the opening of the ports. Of course it was foreseen that, if these things should be brought about, every interested merchant would become an active ally of the Confederacy. But the great panacea, in Benjamin's opinion, would be a complete armistice on land and sea for six months, for it would remove the restrictions to commerce for that length of time. Undoubtedly Napoleon had had some such dream, except that he expected to gain the lion's share of the profits if his lead should be followed. Now he was in a dilemma: if he should give up his plan of telling the belligerents how to settle their difficulties, it would be a confession to the world that he dared not proceed singlehanded. If he should undertake to show that his proposition was practicable, might he not embroil himself in just such a war as he had long suspected that Great Britain desired to see him engaged in? He had been wise in one thing: he had repeatedly told the United States that his aims were friendly, and that he did not contemplate doing more than to make recommendations; so he had saved his bridges. It was only a few days after he received the replies of Great Britain and of Russia that the signs from the United States became more favorable to his scheme. The November elections of 1862 indicated a popular disapproval of Lincoln's administration, and many conservative politicians and newspapers advocated a policy that pointed toward a peaceful separation. Later in November came the news of Grant's reverses in Mississippi, but a much more serious matter was the battle of Fredericksburg. Because McClellan had not pursued Lee after the victory at Antietam, but had halted at Harper's Ferry, and then moved slowly into Virginia-all the time displaying an almost contemptuous independence of the administration-he was removed from command. Burnside superseded him, and soon moved the Army of the Potomac from Warrenton to Fredericksburg. After a delay of about a month, of which Lee took advantage, Burnside sent his troops against the Confederates in such an uneven.encounter that on December 13, 1862, the Federal soldiers were the victims of terrible and useless slaughter to the number of thirteen thousand. The North trembled with horror, factions increased their wrangling, and many patriotic men despaired when they recalled the fatalities and blunders of the numerous campaigns in Virginia. To Napoleon this looked like an opportunity for a hearing. His thoughts, as he wished them to be understood, were expressed in a speech to the French Parliament, and in two instructions from Drouyn de Lhuys to Mercier, all in January, 1863.' He told the legislature that "the condition of the Empire would be flourishing if the war in America had not dried up one of the most fruitful sources of our industry," and that he would ask for an appropriation to aid those who had suffered from the misfortune. Mercier was informed that the Emperor would have been "chilled" by "the little success" of his overtures to Great Britain and Russia if he had not been guided by friendship for the United States. His "sentiments" were too sincere for indifference to find a place" in his thoughts, and he could not be otherwise than "painfully affected, whilst the war continues to rage"! Aside from repeating his well-known opinions about the importance of peace, he now urged that commissioners from the two belligerent governments should meet on neutral ground to devise a means of bringing hostilities to an end. 2 On February 3, 1863, Mercier presented to Seward the instructions; and three days later the reply of the United States was sent to Dayton. As on former occasions, Seward diplomatically expressed his belief that friendly motives had actuated France; he spoke of “the earnestness" of the Emperor's "benevolent desire for the restoration of peace," and said that he did not forget the traditional friendship between the two countries, which, he assumed, had suggested this counsel. He maintained that the cause of the Union had steadily advanced; that there were no "North and South, and no southern and northern states," but only "an insurrectionary party, which is located chiefly upon and adjacent 1 McPherson's Rebellion, 345; 6 Moore's Rebellion Record, Diary, 35. 2 McPherson's Rebellion, 345, 346. to the shore of the Gulf of Mexico," and that the Federal resources were yet abundant, and its credit adequate to the existing emergency. At best these statements were only partially true, but they had their purpose and effect. The great strength of the paper was in the directness and brevity of a few paragraphs, the gist of which may be given in these sentences: Could the French Minister of Foreign Affairs fail to see that it would be impracticable for the United States government, while engaged in an attempt to maintain its constitutional authority, to enter into negotiations involving the renunciation of that authority? If commissioners should be appointed they must come to one of three conclusions: that the Union should stand; that it should be dissolved, or that the war should go on. There was no possibility of the first, for the representatives of the Confederacy would surely oppose it, and the loyal people of the South would have no voice in the matter. On the other hand, the Federal government had not the least thought of relinquishing its trust or its aims; "and if it had any such thought, it would still have abundant reason to know that peace proposed at the cost of dissolution would be immediately, unreservedly, and indignantly rejected by the American people. It is a great mistake that European statesmen make, if they suppose this people are demoralized." This was rightly called a great despatch. It was an impressive suggestion to France to halt. Like the answer in the Trent case, it was soon published; it was doubtless written with that end in view, for the public opinion of the North was a very important consideration. Some rather superfluous remarks explanatory of the Constitution, and the declaration that at least the people of the United States were not demoralized, were features sure to elicit popular applause. Henry J. Raymond wrote from New York that Seward's reply met with "universal approval" there.' And Weed called it the ablest paper his friend had ever written.2 Early in March both houses of Congress passed resolutions declaring that every proposition of foreign interference in the present contest was regarded "as so far unreasonable and inadmissible that its only explanation will be found in a misunderstanding of the true state of the question, and of the real character of the war in which the republic is engaged"; that because it would encourage those in insurrection, Congress would be "obliged to look upon any further attempt in the same direction as an unfriendly act." The warning was positive, but it was expressed in diplomatic language. And the President was requested to have the resolutions transmitted to the Ministers of the United States for communication to the governments to which they were accredited.' This not only brought all loyal people to a full knowledge of what was to be expected, but it also told the world to keep aloof. Yet this was only giving wider notice of what Seward had said repeatedly, and often in stronger words. The strength of the influences for or against intervention varied from time to time. Until the spring of 1863, the distress caused by the lack of cotton was the most serious of all the European grievances. Although Great Britain suffered most, the chance of obtaining cotton from new sources-subsequently realized to a great extent-made interference seem less imperative. The certainty of incurring enormous losses in case of a conflict with the United States acted as her chief restraint. Mason was entirely right, as all signs indicated, when, on February 9, 1863, he reported that al 1 February 17, 1863. Seward MS. 2 R. M. Blatchford to Seward, March 7, 1863. Seward MSS. |