the first Republican party into power against and over a party ready to resist and dismember the government. Partisan as he was, he sank the partisan in the patriot, in his inaugural address; and propitiated his adversaries by declaring, 'We are all Federalists; all Republicans.' I could wish that you would think it wise to follow this example, in this crisis. Be sure that while all your administrative conduct will be in harmony with Republican principles and policy, you cannot lose the Republican party by practising, in your advent to office, the magnanimity of a victor.

"Very faithfully your friend,

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

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GENERAL REMARKS

"The argument is strong and conclusive, and ought not to be in any way abridged or modified.

"But something besides, or in addition to, argument is needful to meet and remove prejudice and passion in the South and despondency and fear in the East: some words of affection; some of calm and cheerful confidence.""

Nor was this the limit of Seward's soothing influence. He was especially anxious that Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederacy-the formation of which practically began at Montgomery, February 4th-should believe that Lincoln would favor reconciliation and peace. Seward knew that if Davis considered war to be inevitable, he would prepare the Confederacy for it, and thereby make the problem more difficult. Senator Gwin, of California, had been bred in the school of Calhoun, and continued to be the trusted friend and adviser of Davis. Seward and Gwin had been intimately associated as advocates of a railroad to the Pacific. Seward now persuaded Gwin to write to Davis saying that if Seward should go into Lincoln's Cabinet, he would be a firm advocate of the amicable settlement of every ques

1 2 Seward, 512, 513.

tion between the sections. Shortly before the inauguration it became known that Chase was to go into Lincoln's Cabinet. In order to relieve himself from further responsibility, Gwin prepared a despatch to Jefferson Davis saying that this was understood to indicate a change to a war policy. When Ward showed the prospective despatch to Seward, he altered it so that Davis was advised that, in spite of Chase's appointment, the administration would be for peace."

After watching a public man's words and acts concerning a question for several weeks or months, there would ordinarily be no doubt as to his opinions regarding it. But Seward believed that circumstances made it best to remain uncommitted as to the precise method that he thought would be effective. Nevertheless, he had certain definite aims. It will be less difficult to indicate what they were after we know whether he and Weed were substantially of one mind.

In the long article of November 30th, Weed twice declared that he spoke only for himself. Several times Seward implied or asserted that he was not responsi ble for Weed's course, but so far as is known he never directly affirmed that he was opposed to Weed's opinions. Weed and Seward saw shortly after the election

1 Gwin's posthumous article in the Overland Monthly, 2d series, 467. Gwin and Seward often used Samuel Ward, popularly known as "King of the Lobby," and they met at his house to avoid attracting attention. A memorandum from Ward, written shortly after Lincoln's inaugural address, reports to Seward the receipt of this letter by Davis.-Seward MSS. 218 Overland Monthly, 2d series, 469.

3 "I talked very little, and nothing in detail," continued to be his rule. When writing confidentially to Lincoln he stated facts with precision, but he seemed studiously to keep back his own ideas as to remedies. Even then he enjoined secrecy, and added: "My power to do anything would be seriously impaired, if what I write were made known."-2 Seward, 484, 485. * 1 Greeley, 361.

• December 2d, Seward wrote home: "You will see that Mr. Weed

that the Southerners were in earnest and that civil war and disunion were threatened. What could be done to avert either or both depended upon the public opinion of the North. It was urgent that some one should make tentative propositions to test northern sentiment. Seward could not do this without wasting his popularity in mere experiments. So the initiative was left to

lets me out of responsibility for his well-intentioned but rather impulsive movements. He promised me to do so." The same letter said: "I am engaged busily in studying and gathering my thoughts for the Union." Evidently he had not fully made up his mind as to a course. (2' Seward, 479.) Again, December 4th: "Mr. Weed's articles have brought perplexities about me which he, with all his astuteness, did not foresee. But you need not expect, or rather fear, that I will act unwisely or wrong." (2 Seward, 480.) Notwithstanding these sentences, Mrs. Seward became so much concerned lest the Senator might favor a compromise that she wrote to him expressing her fears. Again he shunned giving her a clear and comprehensive answer: "I am, thus far, silent, not because I am thinking of proposing compromises, but because I wish to avoid, myself, and restrain other Republicans, from intermeddling." (2 Seward, 480.) A

Republican senatorial caucus was called on the first day of the session for the purpose of finding out if Seward agreed with Weed's suggestions about compromise. Seward snubbed his indiscreet colleagues, and declined to give them any satisfaction. (2 Weed, 308.)

A few days later, when the Albany Evening Standard asserted positively that he had aided in the preparation of an important article on compromise in the Evening Journal, the Auburn Advertiser printed the following: "Mr. Seward, in conversation, fully repudiates the telegraph and newspaper assumptions of his authority for or concurrence in the Albany Journal's article of yesterday. He says he wonders how long it will take newspapers to learn that when he desires to be heard he is in the habit of speaking in his proper place for himself.”—Cited 3 Rhodes, 159. This is not considered final. Nor would it be if it were plainly authoritative, for Seward was determined to conceal his opinions. In public he called secession impossible and a "humbug," while in private he was conducting a “dictatorship for defence,” and studying how to avert civil war and disunion. Had he openly approved Weed's course, the radical Republicans would have made a bold attack upon him, which would have deprived him of most of his influence in the party, and it would have cost him his prospective place in Lincoln's Cabinet. Even as it was, his difficulties were very great.

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the Evening Journal, of which his son Frederick, the future Assistant Secretary of State, was associate editor. The New York Times and the Courier and Enquirer followed. Weed and Seward were never in closer communication than during these months. Weed's two most elaborate articles, those of November 30th and December 17th, appeared just after he and Seward had held long conferences. Had there been any considerable difference in their opinions, Seward would hardly have asked Weed to go to Springfield to express to Lincoln his (Seward's) views on public affairs.' It has been positively stated that Weed favored the Crittenden compromise.' However, he objected to the proposition that in all the present and future territory south of 36° 30' slavery should be recognized, but he thought that that could be rendered satisfactory if provision should be made so that territory should be acquired only by treaty or by a two-thirds vote of Congress.' Seward explained his non-committalism as to any specific plan, by telling the Senate, on January 31st, that no propositions had been offered that promised to bring about reconciliation. There was a close resemblance" between the expressions employed by Seward and Weed respectively when speaking of the need of amending the

12 Seward, 482.

22 Weed, 312.

3 Evening Journal, December 19, 1860, January 22, 1861. * 4 Works, 671

5 44 Is it strange, then, that this complex system of our govern. ment should be found to work, after the lapse of seventy years, a little roughly, and that it requires that the engineer should look into the various parts of the engine, and see where the gudgeon is worn out, and watch that the main wheel be kept in motion'?" -Seward, 4 Works, 647.

"After more than seventy years of 'wear and tear,' of collision and abrasion, it should be no cause of wonder that the machinery of government is found weakened, or out of repair, or even defective."-Weed, quoted 1 Greeley, 361.

2

Constitution and of the question of slavery in the territories.' Weed spoke with equal boldness for a compromise and in condemnation of Buchanan's failure to enforce the laws and to defend the forts. Circumstances forbade that Seward should be explicit about either. However, no conflict of opinion on any essential point has been found, while numerous unmentioned signs indicate that they had a common aim. Each adopted the course best suited to his surroundings, but, nevertheless, they were in close alliance.*

"There has been a real, a vital question in this country for twelve years at least a question of slavery in the territories of the United States. It has been an earnest and, I regret to say, an angry controversy; but the admission of Kansas into the Union yesterday settled at least all that was vital or important in the question, leaving behind nothing but the passions which the contest had engendered."-4 Works, 673.

The continued blindness of the Democracy and the continued madness of slavery enabled us to elect Lincoln. That success ends our mission, so far as Kansas and the encroachments of slavery into free territory are concerned. We have no territory that invites slavery for any other than political objects, and, with the power of territorial organization in the hands of Lincoln, there is no political temptation in all the territory belonging to us. The fight is over. Practically the issues of the late campaign are obsolete "-Weed to Preston King, 2 Weed, 309.

2 Evening Journal, December 21, 22, 1860, January 4, 11, 12, 16, 17, 22, and 25, 1861

The following letters from Weed show that he and Seward were working together like the two hands of one man.

"ALBANY, January 9, [1861]. "DEAR SEWARD,-I am now less anxious about time than I was. Monday will answer and is better than you should be hurried.

"I wish I could see what you intend in its completeness. Now that you print speak for all. Words should be weighed.

"The war spirit is rising and raging. The sooner the war is, the safer the ground you propose to occupy. I enclose Mr. Lincoln's propositions, in the hope that you substantially accept his views on the two kindred questions