products for articles and materials important to the prosecution of the war and to the comfort of the people; and by keeping foreign countries aloof from the contest, so as to bar them from giving the Confederacy either moral or material support. The military and naval features, as such, do not come within the scope of this narrative; and even the blockade is important to it only in connection with the diplomatic questions to which it gave rise. It was early recognized that to ward off foreign intervention, aid, or substantial sympathy, was the most important task before the Secretary of State. The President's proclamations of April 19th and 27th were not designed to mark the actual beginning of the blockade; they were merely explicit declarations of intention. This was prudent, for otherwise the United States would have deserved more than the ridicule of all maritime nations. Although there were about forty ships in the United States navy, only three were immediately available for the service of closing one hundred and eighty-five harbor openings. Nearly all the others had been ordered to foreign stations by Buchanan's peace-loving administration, and the remainder were either unserviceable or were already engaged in important enterprises. In such circumstances it was evident that the Secretary of the Navy must be very energetic and the Secretary of State very diplomatic to make the injury to the Confederacy greater than the danger likely to result to the United States from the attempt to shut off commerce between Confederate ports and foreign nations; for a blockade that was only partially effective would give just grounds for complaint, and would be sure to create sympathy with the new government. '4 Spear's History of Our Navy, 32; Soley's The Blockade and the Cruisers, 26. From the extent of British interests involved, it was to be expected that Lord Lyons would early obtain from Seward an explicit statement as to the leading features of the forthcoming blockade. As the conversation took place before the end of April,' it was too soon for Seward to be clear and positive on all questions that might arise; but Lyons reported that as far as the Secretary's "assurances in general terms" went, "nothing could be more satisfactory." Seward's expectation was that the blockade would not be announced publicly at each port, but that no vessel would be liable to seizure that had not been individually warned. This was very discreet. If there should be no United States ship to serve notice, there would be no obstacle to entering the port, and therefore no ground for complaint; on the other hand, the presence of a United States ship would be an actual demonstration of an effective blockade. When it was suggested that it would be impossible to watch the entire coast beyond the Chesapeake, Seward replied that it would all be blockaded, and blockaded effectively. He stated that the foreign vessels in port at the time of the beginning of the blockade would be allowed to leave with their cargoes. And, he added, if any of the rules should seem to bear with undue severity on British ships, he would be ready to consider any representations as to the equities of the matter. His confidence of success seems less surprising when we know that on the day of Lincoln's first proclamation of a blockade twenty steamers were ordered to be purchased and armed.2 G. J. Pendergrast, commander of the United States home squadron, issued a proclamation at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, April 30th, declaring that he had a force 1 1 Lyons to Russell, May 2, 1861, quoted Bernard, 228–30. sufficient to carry out the blockade of the Virginia and North Carolina coasts, and that all vessels coming from a distance would be warned off. Otherwise difficulty would have arisen with the first seizure on the North Carolina coast, for, as no blockaders were there, it was not actually blockaded. By the purchase and arming of many merchant-vessels and the recall of governmental ships from foreign ports, the actual blockade rapidly extended southward, although at first it skipped some important ports. The usual practice was to regard the President's April proclamations as general notices; then the announcement of the commander of the ship or of the fleet appearing before such ports as Charleston, Savannah, or Mobile marked the actual beginning of the blockade, although vessels coming from a distance were not seized without due warning unless there was a fair presumption against them. It was two or three months before there was much danger, except at a few points, in attempting to run the blockade. As time went on and knowledge of the blockade might be assumed, the practice of individual warning was given up, and a merchantman bound for any Confederate port was liable to capture at sea, as international law allowed. Another feature of this blockade was the question of its continuance, under certain conditions. The repudiation of paper blockades compels the continual, but not the continuous, presence of ships, so as to introduce at least a decided element of danger to blockade-runners. In May, 1861, the Niagara began the blockade at Charleston, but after a few days she left the port unwatched. Lord Lyons sent a note to Seward expressing the expectation that if the blockade was to be begun again, it would only be after due notification and the regular period had elapsed for the departure of neutral vessels with cargoes. Seward replied that the blockade at Charleston had been "neither abandoned, relinquished nor remitted"; that the intention of the government was to have the Harriet Lane replace the Niagara, but she had been delayed a day or two by accident; that he did not consider the blockade impaired by a temporary absence, but that it would remain in effect until notice of its discontinuance should be given by proclamation of the President; that the purpose was to maintain it constantly and vigorously. Seward's claim was arbitrary, but Great Britain did not find it worth while to insist on the established rule that in case a blockade is voluntarily raised, fresh notice must be given should a reinvestment be decided on.' The first effects of the blockade were very encouraging to the United States. The ships in southern ports that were allowed to leave with their cargoes were not many. Nearly all foreign shippers and ship-owners immediately adopted the prudent course of avoiding the Confederacy; so the supply of foreign goods was largely cut off. This was no surprise to the would-be founders of a new nation; in fact, they believed that this discontinuance in the profitable exchange of southern products for European goods would lead to a demonstration of the full power of "King Cotton." From the beginning, sailing vessels and small steamers stole out through the blockade at many places. But their cargoes of cotton and tobacco were never large. In returning-if not captured-they brought in contraband of war and articles of general use, not heavy or bulky in proportion to their value. Such craft were the blockade-runners. 1 Douglas Owen's Declaration of War, 9; see Bernard, 237 ff., for the correspondence and comment. "When the Niagara arrived off Charleston on the 11th of May, she remained only four days; and, except for the fact that the Harriet Lane was off the bar on the 19th, there was no blockade whatever at that point for a fortnight afterward."-Soley, 35; see also p. 84. Their fortunes and misfortunes were strange and thrilling, and but for their assistance the Confederacy could hardly have lived two years. It was foreseen that some of the industries of England and of France were to be greatly embarrassed by the blockade. Yet there was so general an expectation that the South could not be conquered, and that the attempt would not continue long, that many concluded that foreign aid to the Confederacy would be unnecessary, even to the realization of any selfish aims. Seward's bold warnings against interference made such opinions most expedient. The blockade had scarcely begun when Mercier recommended that France and Great Britain should insist on having it opened for the exportation of cotton.' About the same time Lord Palmerston, the Premier of the British Cabinet, said that he would count the day on which he could put an end to the American war one of the happiest of his life; but the shrewd old statesman, who had no scruples against profitable interference, saw that the attempt would then lead to more harm than good.' Europe was, indeed, without the markets and supplies of the South, but those of the North remained open and were never more valuable. If Seward's language was to be taken seriously, it meant that an attempt by one or more foreign nations to disregard the blockade would cause war and entail a loss in trade with the North, perhaps without any substantial gain from commerce with the South. None of the powers could figure out a profitable bargain in such an enterprise. So Great Britain and France continued to postpone action on this question, confident that a decisive battle would soon convince the United States that the Confederacy was invincible. Then European 12 Walpole's Russell, 344; 2 Ashley's Palmerston, 210. |