noon of April 6th a special messenger from Pensacola harbor had reported that the United States officer in command there had declined to land troops at Fort Pickens, because, as has been mentioned, instructions from Scott could not be recognized as overruling those of Buchanan issued by his Secretaries of War and of the Navy.

During the first days of April Seward's communications with the Confederate commissioners came to a climax. After April 1st the reports that hostile movements were preparing grew more positive from day to day. On the 4th the commissioners credited the rumor that the United States intended to resist the acquisition of Santo Domingo by Spain. The next day they suspected that this might be a ruse. By the evening of the 6th they thought the armaments were to be used against Fort Pickens, and perhaps against Sumter.' Early the following (Sunday) morning Campbell was again called in. He then sent a note to Seward, stating that various reports had caused the commissioners "anxiety and concern for two or three days"; that he had repeated to them the assurances that the administration would give notice to Governor Pickens before attempting to supply Sumter, and that he (Campbell) "should have notice whenever any measure changing the existing status prejudicially to the Confederate States is contemplated as respects Fort Pickens." He concluded with these sentences: "I do not experience the same anxiety or concern as they express. But if I have said more than I am authorized, I pray that you will advise me."" To this inquiry Seward answered, without date or signature: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see; other suggestions received, and will be respectfully considered." Campbell understood this

1 Telegrams to Toombs of the dates mentioned.

This is quoted from the copy preserved by the commissioners.

3 Crawford's Genesis, etc., 340. The copy that the commissioners

to mean that Governor Pickens should have notice before an attempt should be made to supply Sumter, but that the assurances as to Fort Pickens were no longer to be depended on.'

2

Sufficient had been learned to convince the commissioners that a "hostile movement "hostile movement" was on foot and that an expedition had sailed against the Confederate States. "It may be Sumter and the Mississippi. It is almost certain that it is Pickens and the Texas frontier." That evening the commissioners' secretary informed the Assistant Secretary of State-the Secretary not being at home-that an answer to the commissioners' note of March 12th would be called for the following afternoon." Seward's formal reply, which was dated March 15th, was found to be a clear and positive denial of all the requests and presumptions of the Confederate commissioners. In the events that had occurred in the seven states he saw

"not a rightful and accomplished revolution and an independent nation, with an established government, but rather

took of Campbell's letter, to which this was a reply, contains nothing to call forth the last eight words. It seems likely that after the commission's copy of Campbell's note was made, he added his offer to go to Montgomery, to which Crawford refers (ibid.), and to which Seward's eight words were probably an answer.

1 This is shown by his written statement to the commissioners, which is reflected in the following letter to Seward:

"WASHINGTON CITY, April 7, 1861. "DEAR SIR:-I have said to the commissioners to-day I believe that the government will not undertake to supply Sumter without notice to Governor Pickens.

I have said further that, heretofore, I have felt justified in saying 'That whenever any measure changing the existing status as respects Fort Pickens prejudicially to the Confederate States is contemplated I should have notice,' but that I do not feel at liberty to say this now.

"Very respectfully,

2 Telegram of April 7th.

"J. A. CAMPBELL.” -Seward MSS.

3 Memorandum of the secretary in the records of the commission.

a perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement to the inconsiderate purpose of an unjustifiable and unconstitutional aggression upon the rights and the authority vested in the Federal government, and hitherto benignly exercised, . . . for the maintenance of the Union, the preservation of liberty, and the security, peace, welfare, happiness, and aggrandizement of the American people."

For a cure of the evils, he said, he looked patiently and confidently "to regular and considerate action of the people of those states, in co-operation with their brethren in the other states, through the Congress of the United States, and such extraordinary conventions, if there shall be need thereof, as the Federal Constitution contemplates and authorizes to be assembled."1

In a long rejoinder the commissioners reproached Lincoln's administration for being "persistently wedded to those fatal theories of construction of the Federal Constitution always denied by the statesmen of the South," and they tried to make it appear that the United States were responsible for the impending war because no negotiations would be entered into with the representatives of the Confederacy. They had no fear of the results; their people could never be subdued "while a freeman survives in the Confederate States to wield a weapon." They advised Seward to dismiss as delusions his hopes of bringing the Confederate States into submission. Evidently angered by what he had said about a "perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement," they sarcastically replied: "If you cherish these dreams you will be awakened from them and find them as unreal and unsubstantial as others in which you have recently indulged."" On the 10th they reported their mission to be closed.

3

The ships of the Sumter expedition left New York on the 8th, 9th, and 10th. In compliance with the promise, Governor Pickens was officially informed on the first

1 McPherson's Rebellion, 109.

" McPherson, 109, 110.

3 Crawford, 416.

date that an attempt would be made to put provisions into Fort Sumter; but that, unless this should be resisted or the fort attacked, no troops or military supplies would be thrown in without further notice.' The sending of supplies to United States troops in a state that had seceded was regarded in the South as evidence of an intention to coerce the states. The Confederate leaders fully realized the undesirability of a conflict, but every suggestion of force had to be resisted in order to keep up popular confidence and to win the actual support of a large majority of the people of the slave states that were still nominally loyal. They chose war and its necessary accompaniments of blood and destruction in order to preclude the possibility of a reaction in favor of union. The different batteries around the harbor opened a converging fire on Fort Sumter early on the morning of April 12th. Throughout that day, and until the afternoon of the next, Anderson and his men doggedly kept up the contest against vastly superior forces. Then, seeing no likelihood either of relief or of being able to hold out much longer, they agreed to capitulate.

But for two unforeseen occurrences the result might have been different. A part of the fleet reached the rendezvous off Charleston harbor on the day the attack began, and in time to succor the fort if the other ships had arrived as was planned. A storm had scattered the tugs which were necessary to perform some of the work inside the harbor; and the ships that were ready for action waited for the Powhatan the Powhatan in which Porter was hastening to Fort Pickens-for she was counted upon as the head of the Sumter fleet and had been specially equipped for the most difficult part of the work to be done in Charleston harbor. Before Fox could organize a forward movement out of the

1 2 Lincoln's Works, 32.

meagre resources at command, the firing of the guns ceased.

At Fort Pickens the conditions were favorable. A second order to land the troops already in the harbor had been issued and obeyed before the Seward-Porter expedition arrived. The coming of the ships with supplies and reinforcements made it possible to put the fort on a safe footing; and thenceforth, throughout the war, the stars and stripes defied the neighboring Confederate batteries.

Seward's acts in connection with these expeditions have been the cause of two serious charges: First, that he wilfully tried to prevent the relief of Fort Sumter; and, second, that he acted dishonorably toward Justice Campbell and the Confederate commissioners.

1. Welles and Blair were the chief accusers on the first charge.' Their suspicions began with the assumption that the Powhatan was taken out of the Sumter fleet. The President and the Secretary of the Navy each on April 1st sent instructions for the Powhatan to be fitted out as soon as possible. Lincoln's original intention was to have her go with the Pickens expedition, and he issued instructions to this effect, as already mentioned. Welles expected to use the Powhatan as the flag-ship of the Sumter fleet, but did not give his orders until four days later. It was natural that each should desire the Powhatan. After what has been learned of Seward's methods, it would hardly be warrantable to express confidence that his despatch to Porter was not the result of subtle calculation. But the probability that he was half-distracted by the occurrences of that day, and the well-known fact that he was the real chief of the expedition-these seem sufficient to explain his failure to telegraph the command in the President's name.

1 Welles, 61-67.

2 3 Nicolay and Hay, 439.