Page images
PDF
EPUB

1

from the President instructed the commandant of the New York navy-yard to "fit out the Powhatan to go to sea at the earliest possible moment under sealed orders”; and another order of the same date directed him "under no circumstances communicate to the Navy Department the fact that she is fitting out." Seward not only had the management of the whole movement, but Welles and Cameron were to know no more about it than if they were Confederates. Seward had given Lincoln's oral order to Scott; he had recommended Porter's appointment and instructions." Keyes, Meigs, and Porter made the preparations under his advice and that of Scott; and Scott prepared and gave to him, for the President's signature, the order for the departure of the expedition.' When the movement seemed to be endangered from lack of available money, Seward went to his department and took from the secret-service fund ten thousand dollars in gold, which was put at Meigs's disposal. Nothing then known to others accounts for

such acts as these."

When Campbell called on the Secretary of State, April 1st, he was informed that the President was much disturbed by Governor Pickens's telegram and Lamon's pledge, for Lamon had had no commission or authority." Campbell asked what he should tell the commissioners about Sumter. Seward took up his pen and wrote that

1 4 Naval Records of the Rebellion, 109. 2 2 Lincoln's Works, 28.

4 Crawford, 411.

3

3 3 Nicolay and Hay, 439.

5 Lincoln signed the orders without having time to consider their meaning, and subsequently repudiated whatever interfered with the Fort Sumter expedition. The only defence that has ever been made of Seward's concealment from Welles and Cameron was that there were disloyal clerks in the War and the Navy Departments. The explanation does not explain why the Secretaries of these departments, as well as Seward, might not have kept the secret and avoided using any one under suspicion. The real reason will soon appear.

Crawford, 337.

the President might desire to supply Fort Sumter, but would not undertake to do so without first giving notice to Governor Pickens. Campbell was greatly surprised by the statement, for he had supposed that evacuation was only a matter of time. Now he feared lest the suggestion that the fort might be provisioned should indicate a change of plan and cause the South Carolinians to attack it. Seward expressed his belief that the fort would not be supplied. Campbell suggested that it would not be well to give the commissioners an answer that did not represent the purpose of the government. Seward then went to consult the President. When he came back he wrote this sentence for Campbell to repeat to the commissioners as his own: "I am satisfied the government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens." Seward's explanation of the opposition to the plan of withdrawing from Sumter convinced Campbell that there had been no change of policy and that evacuation was merely delayed, or that the administration was waiting for Anderson to be starved out."

By this time Seward recognized that he was in dire straits. For months he had firmly believed he was the only man that could save his country from countless disasters. Now a course of action that was contrary to his previous plans, advice, and expectations was likely to begin. In fact, expeditions for the relief of the two critical points were already preparing. If the Sumter

1 Crawford, 337, 339; McPherson, 111.

2 Campbell to Davis, April 3d; 3 Nicolay and Hay, 411; Commissioners to Toombs, April 1st; Crawford, 338.

In a brief note to Mrs. Seward, in Auburn, he wrote, April 1st: "But I am full of occupation, and more of anxieties. . . . Dangers and breakers are before us I wish you were near enough to share some of my thoughts and feelings, and fears, and trials."-2 Seward, 534.

expedition should be ordered forward-and the current was very strong in that direction-the world would understand that Seward's counsel had been rejected and that he had lost his power. It would humiliate him by making it plain that either he himself had been deceived or that he had tried to deceive others, and perhaps both. If the Fort Pickens expedition-which was Seward's almost exclusively--should be despatched as designed, and be successful, it would save a part of his prestige. But if either expedition should be carried out, southern Unionism would swing into secession, and a civil warwhich he confidently believed would end in complete disunion and the overthrow of his party-would soon break out. Was there no way to avert these calamities?

Evidently as a last, desperate effort he laid this novel, elaborate, and dashing programme before the President:

Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration,
April 1, 1861.

First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy either domestic or foreign.

Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters.

Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the administration, but danger upon the country.

Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But how? I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.

Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is built upon this idea as a ruling one, namely, that we must

CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon

UNION OR DISUNION:

In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question to one of patriotism or union.

The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free states, and even by the Union men in the South.

I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last administration created the necessity.

For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and reinforce all the forts in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under martial law.

This will raise distinctly the question of union or disunion. I would maintain every fort and possession in the South.

FOR FOREIGN NATIONS

I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once.

I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention.

And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France,

Would convene Congress and declare war against them. But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.

For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly.

Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. It is not in my especial province;

But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility.'

2

Even if Seward had not supplemented these propositions by having certain naval officers transferred so that they came into his plans, we should have no doubts as to who expected to take command. Lincoln had as yet 12 Lincoln's Works, 29.

2 3 Nicolay and Hay, 439-41; Welles, 69, 70.

THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD

given few, if any, public indications of possessing greater abilities than such men as Bates, Smith, and Welles. His policy-or, rather, his lack of one-during March cannot be defended successfully; it can only be explained and excused. He had halted between two opinions and had acted on none.

[ocr errors]

It was Seward's foreign policy that was most startling. It resembled a reckless invention of a mind driven to desperate extremes, as the sole means of escape from ruin, rather than a serious outline for national and international action. Two or three days before the Thoughts" were written, the newspapers reported that a revolution had overthrown the Dominican republic and had raised the flag and proclaimed the sovereignty of Spain. For some time, too, it was well known that France, Spain, and Great Britain were considering the question of intervening in Mexico in order to redress and stop the wrongs that their subjects had suffered from the anarchy and violence there. It was also rumored that a plan was developing to put a European prince upon a Mexican throne. Citizens of the United States had been subjected to so many outrages in Mexico that Buchanan had recommended to Congress that forcible intervention should be resorted to, but our domestic affairs had engrossed the attention of the statesmen at the Capitol. The three European powers had not yet reached any agreement; and it was wholly unwarrantable for the United States to assume that they intended to do more than enforce their just claims. As to Russia, the basis for demanding an explanation was to be found in the false reports in southern newspapers and in political circles in Washington that she was about to open diplomatic relations with the Confederacy."

The following letter from the Assistant Secretary of State of that time is especially interesting because the diplomatic archives

134

« PreviousContinue »