position. They add: "The cargo is jointly owned by the owners of the A. 1 boat, we are happy to tell you the famous boat arrived ten days ago, with four hundred and sixty casks spirits, ninety bales cotton, and fifty to sixty barrels No. 2 rosin in bulk, which we shall send to you as soon as a chance offers. We have also twenty-eight bales on hand." Mr. Donohue, for appellants: For the vessel the following points are made: First. As matter of fact, no cause whatever existed, either at the time of seizure or trial, for her capture. Judge Betts finds that all her papers were regular and fair; that she was bound on a legitimate voyage and in its due prosecution. Second. No belligerent power or right in any way authorizes the seizure or detention of a vessel, the papers of which show a bona fide destination from a neutral to a neutral port. Nothing is shown, in any way, against this vessel to authorize her seizure; and being a neutral, owing us no allegiance and taken on the high seas, she is entitled to recompense for her damages. As to the cargo: Third. It is clear that this cargo, if proved to have run the blockade, had reached a foreign nation and the home of one of the claimants, and was within his power in such neutral country; that the mere fact of so having run the blockade no more subjects it to forfeiture than most of the cotton to be found on the high seas between Havana, Matamoras, Nassau, and European or American ports. In fact, every day shows arrival and entries of such cotton in our ports. This point is rendered familiar by the yet fresh discussion in the Mason and Slidell Case. As to both vessel and cargo: Fourth. By the nature of prize evidence, the claimant has but little means of proving bad faith, or showing bad faith in the captors; but in this case, we respectfully submit that the seizure was a speculation, and the acts of the seizors subsequent to the seizure, not only unjustifiable, but proving an intent to make the appearance of official duty cover an ulterior and interested motive. Extraordinary conduct in such cases is liable to severe censure. 2 Dodson, 240. Where a claimant prevaricates or suppresses or attempts to cover, he is not allowed to be heard; and these parties, certainly, stand no better. Where further proof is necessary, it will not be allowed to persons guilty of fraudulent acts. The Anna, 1 C. Rob. 125; 2 C. Rob. 104. And bad conduct subjects captors to loss of salvage. Irregularity by the captors subjected them to loss of salvage in The Barbara, 3 C. Rob. 171. Even delay in consenting to restore, subjects them to costs and damages. Damages pronounced for delay in consenting to restitution in a proper case. 1 C. Rob. 288. The statement of the case in The Triton by Sir W. Scott, 4 C. Rob. 104, when the captors had picked up a passenger and, through him, attempted to make a case, is much like the present. See The Triton, 4 C. Rob. 78, 79. Her being on a neutral voyage and with proper papers fixes that they had no right to seize. Sixth. No amount of good intentions or good faith can excuse a damage to a neutral, if the captor is mistaken in law as to his rights, and he has the means before him to ascertain the facts. The Acteon, 2 Dod. 54. In the case of The John Beck, 2 Dod. 336, the court says, p. 339: "Most certainly it is not sufficient for a party to plead ignorance as a legal excuse for making compensation to another, if his ignorance was vincible to himself at the time at which the transaction took place." Messrs. James Speed, Atty. Gen., and Titian J. Coffey, for the United States: These letters and the evidence show that the cargo of the Isabella Thompson consisted certainly in part, and probably in whole, of the cargo which had broken the blockade of the port of Wilmington on the Argyle; that it was transhipped from the Argyle to the Isabella Thompson without any landing whatever at Nassau; that no change of ownership or possession of the cargo took place at Nassau; that it never entered into the commerce or became part of the common stock of Nassau, and that its transfer to the Isabella Thompson for carriage to Halifax was part of the commercial venture which had its origin in Wilmington, and would have had its end in Halifax. The cargo brought from Wilmington to Nassau on the Argyle had no commercial destination to Nassau; and that port can in no just commercial sense be called the end of its voyage from Wilmington. It was simply an intermediate port for transhipment on the way from Wilmington to Halifax. The evidence discloses the existence of an organization of blockade breakers, represented at Nassau by Martin & Co.; at Halifax by B. Wier & Co.; at New York by Dollner, Potter & Co., and of which Clements, one of the claimants, is also an active partner. Adopting the familiar devices by which blockade breakers sought to lessen the risks of their business, they divided their operations into two parts: First, running vessels from the blockaded port to Nassau; and secondly, transhipping their cargoes at Nassau to other vessels, on which they were transported, as if on a new voyage to Halifax or some other port of real destination. It is obvious, on the whole evidence, that this cargo was shipped at Wilmington with no intention of being landed at Nassau as the end of its voyage, but with the intention of being there transhipped for further transportation to its market, with unchanged ownership and control. This intention in the original shipment furnishes the test by which a prize court will determine the status of the cargo when captured, if the cargo be taken on the voyage prosecuted Damages given for failure of captors to con- in execution of that intention, and the mere sent to restore in a proper case in time. 4 Cranch, 71. Fifth. No suspicious or unfair testimony or advantage obtained by the captors can add to their rights or save them from damages. fact of stoppage and transhipment at an intermediate neutral port as part of the original scheme of voyage, will not purge the cargo of its guilt. The court will adjudge the question of guilt according to the fact of intention and not according to the form by which that inten- | Justice Marshall's definition of probable cause tion is sought to be concealed. in Locke v. U. S. 7 Cranch, 348. This principle has been frequently applied to vessels and cargoes prosecuting a voyage to an interdicted port, where a lawful character was attempted to be given to it by a colorable stoppage at a neutral port. The Thomyris, Edw. Adm. 17; The Maria, 5 C. Rob. 365; The William, 5 Rob. 385. If the cargo be in delicto at any stage of the voyage, the liability to capture instantly at taches; The Columbia, 1 C. Rob. 154; The Vrow And when guilt was attached, it will be pre- But assuming, as we do, that this cargo was shipped from Wilmington with no intention of being landed at Nassau as the end of its voyage, but for the purpose of being there transhipped for delivery at another port, the liability of the goods to capture after the transhipment has been expressly decided. The Maria, 6 C. Rob. 201; The Charlotte Sophia, 6 C. Rob. 205, note 1, where both ship and cargo were condemned. If these views be correct, it is submitted that they would have furnished the court good ground for condemning the cargo, if not the vessel also. Did the court err, then, in refusing the claimants cost and damages? If the cargo or vessel should have been condemned, of course the claimants cannot complain of a decree which restored their property with loss of costs and damages. But even if the proved facts would not have justified condemnation, we submit that, beyond question, they justified the refusal of costs and damages, for they amount to proof of probable cause of capture, and this is the test by which in doubtful cases, prize courts determine whether costs and damages ought to be allowed or refused; and the question is one purely in the discretion of the court. If, therefore, there be a reasonable suspicion of illegal traffic, or a reasonable doubt as to the proprietary interest, the national character or the legality of the conduct of the parties, it is proper to submit the cause for adjudication before the proper prize tribunals, and the captors will be justified, although the court should acquit without the formality of ordering further proof. 1 Mason, 26, 27; see also The St. Antonius, 1 Acton, 113. Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the court. The district courts of the United States have original exclusive jurisdiction in questions of prize, and are authorized to decree restitution in whole or in part when the capture is wrongful; and if it is made without probable cause, may order and decree damages and costs against the captors. Glass v. The Betsey, 3 Dall. 16; act of June 26, 1812, ch. 107; 2 Stat. 759. In time of war, the party who makes a seizure does not always act at his peril, and is not always liable to damages and costs if he fails to establish the forfeiture of the vessel. In fact, prize courts deny damages in cases of restitution when there was probable cause for the seizure, and are often justified in awarding to the captors their costs and expenses. The Apol lon, 9 Wheat. 373. The question recurs, What, in the sense of the prize law, is meant by the terms "probable cause." Chief Justice Marshall, in Locke v. U. S. 7 Cranch, 339, held that the terms "probable cause," according to their usual acceptation, meant less than evidence which would justify condemnation, and in all cases of seizure had a fixed and well known meaning; that they import a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. The court in that case were construing the 71st section of the Collection Law of 1799 (act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 622) which provided that the onus probandi should be on the claimant only where probable cause was shown for the prosecution. It was "Where, upon the hearing in the first instance contended, in order to justify seizure, the eviupon the papers and documents found on board dence must be such as, if unanswered, would the vessel and the examination in preparatorio justify condemnation. But the court held that taken by the commissioners, it appears that for such a construction would render totally inany cause in the judgment of the court, resti-operative the provision of the act of Congress. tution should be decreed in favor of the claim- Judge Story, in the case of The George, 1 ants, the question then arises whether, under Mason, 24, which was a libel for damages for an such restitution, the damages, costs and ex- alleged illegal capture, gave the same exposition penses are to be paid by the captors, or the costs of the terms "probable cause" in matters of and expenses by the claimants. This rests en- prize, and held that the capture of a ship tirely in the discretion of the court, and by the was justifiable where the circumstances were practice of prize courts, has been made to de- *such as would warrant a reasonable [*163 pend upon the proof of probable cause of cap- ground of suspicion that she was engaged in an ture. Wherever, upon the evidence taken in the illegal traffic. And such is the view held by all first instance, the case is so doubtful that an writers on maritime warfare and prize. Story's order of further proof is made by the court, the Notes, by Pratt; The St. Antonius, 1 Acton, costs and expenses are never allowed to the 113. To adopt a harsher rule, and hold that the claimant." captors must decide for themselves the merits of each case, would involve perils which few would be willing to encounter. Upton, Mar. War and Prize, 273, 274; The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 372, Story, J. What constitutes probable cause for capture as prize of war, is well stated by Justice Story in The George, 1 Mason, 27, adopting Chief Testing this case by these principles, was the district court justified in decreeing restitution without costs and damages against the captors! Clerk, on Behalf of Fernie Brothers & Co., Owners of Ship, Appts., The brig Isabella Thompson, on her return | THE SHIP ADMIRAL, M. K. Coxe, Head voyage to Halifax from Nassau, was captured at sea on the 16th of June, 1863, by the government steamer, the United States, and sent into the port of New York for adjudication. The capture was made on suspicion that the vessel had broken the blockade, or had on board a cargo brought from a blockaded port, and transferred to her under circumstances justifying condemnation. The schooner Argyle, from Wilmington, North Carolina, with a valuable cargo of cotton and spirits of turpentine, having escaped the vigilance of our fleet, had reached the harbor of Nassau. She did not discharge her cargo at the wharf, but hauled alongside the Thompson, which was at anchor, and transferred enough of her cargo to load the latter vessel. Does not this fact afford a reasonable ground of suspicion that there was concert between the vessels, and that the Thompson was purposely at Nassau to receive the cargo of the Argyle? And if further evidence was wanted to fix the character of the transaction, it is furnished in the letters of Martin & Co., who claim, in conjunction with Captain Clements, the ownership of the cargo, to Wier & Co., of Halifax, and Dollner, Potter & Co., of New York. These letters are written in a strain of high exultation. The Argyle has arrived with a cargo worth $42,000, in which Clements is interested, and Martin & Co. are sending steamers to southern ports for return cargoes of cotton, in which ventures they want the participation of Weir & Co. The famous boat with cotton, rosin and casks of spirit has also reached port, and would be sent forward as soon as an opportunity offered. And, withal, Martin & Co., as if fearing evil, dread to have their property shipped on their account to the United States. Could any foreign merchant interested in lawful commerce wish to avoid the markets of this country? It is too plain for controversy, that all these parties were extensively engaged in illegal traffic with the states in rebellion, and that the business was profitable. And the whole evidence tends strongly to show that the voyage 164] from Wilmington "to Halifax was a continuous one; that there was no intention to terminate it at Nassau, and that the cargo of the Argyle was to be reshipped with unbroken ownership and control, so that it could be taken to a port which furnished a better market. If such was the intention, when the cargo left Wilmington, then its status is fixed, and the original guilt continued to the time of the capture, notwithstanding the stoppage at an intermediate port, and transhipment. The Thomyris, Edw. Adm. 17; The Maria, 5 C. Rob. 365; The Maria, 6 C. Rob. 201; The William, 5 C. Rob. 385; The Charlotte Sophia, 6 C. Rob. 205, note. A case of "probable cause" is clearly made out, and it is unnecessary to discuss the evidence with a view of showing whether the cargo or vessel should have been condemned, as the captors do not complain of the judgment of the court below. The district court committed no error in refusing to give the claimants damages and costs, as against the United States, or the captors. The decree of the District Court is, therefore, affirmed, with costs. บ. THE UNITED STATES. (See S. C. "The Admiral," 3 Wall. 603-616.) Admiralty-jurisdiction of district court-appellate jurisdiction in blockade attempt to enter blockaded port-previous warning— sailing for blockaded port. 1. Prior to the act of the 3d of March, 1863, the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction in prize causes, except when the same were brought up from the circuit courts. 2. Exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction by the 9th section of the judiciary act conferred upon the district courts. ring jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime causes,' 3. The settled rule is that the phrase, "conferalso includes and confers jurisdiction in causes of prize. the district courts to the circuit courts, in prize 4. Appeal was allowed, under the prior act, from causes as well as in other admiralty and maritime causes, where the matter in dispute exceeded the sum or value of $50; and from the circuit court to the Supreme, where the matter in dispute exceeded the sum of $2,000; but the existing provision is that appeals in prize causes shall be made directly from the district courts to Supreme Court. 5. Present case, however, was transferred to the circuit court before the passage of that act, and, consequently, is properly before the court. at the inception of the voyage is admitted, and the 6. Knowledge of the existence of the blockade proofs warrant the conclusion that the vessel sailed for a blockaded port with the intention of violating the blockade regulations. 7. The established rule of this court is that a vessel which has a full knowledge of the existence of a blockade is liable to capture if she attempts to enter the blockaded port in violation of the blockade regulations. 8. Previous warning is not necessary in such a case, nor is it necessary that any warning should have been previously indorsed on her register. 9. Mere sailing for a blockaded port is not an offense; but where the vessel has a knowledge of the blockade and sails for the blockaded port with the intention of violating the regulations, she is clearly liable to capture. 10. Evidence of the unlawful intent is full and satisfactory, and every pretense of innocence is negatived by the circumstances. [No. 87.] Submitted Dec. 29, 1865. Decided Jan. 15, 1866. PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. A The British ship Admiral, with a cargo of salt and coal, was captured on the afternoon of the 11th of December, 1861, by the Alabama, a naval vessel of the United States, in latitude north, 31 degrees and 34 minutes; and longitude 86 degrees and 10 minutes, west, about thirty miles off Tybee Island, while standing in for the port of Savannah, Georgia, and was proceeded against, together with her cargo, as prize of war, in the United States district court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania. The vessel was claimed by the master on be half of the firm of Fernie Brothers & Co., of Liverpool, England; and the cargo on behalf 1. Headnotes by Justice Clifford, who delivered the opinion: NOTE.-Blockade; what constitutes; right to; blockaded port; necessity may justify entry of such violation of; penalty; termination of; inquiry at port-see note to Prize Cases, 17 L. ed. U. S. 459. of the firm of W. & R. Wright, of St. Johns, New Brunswick, in British America, all of which parties were alleged to be, and we believe are, British subjects. The cargo was restored to the owners by decree of the district court, and the vessel condemned by decree of said court, pronounced on the 10th of March, 1862. The claimants of the vessel, having prosecuted an appeal from said decree to the circuit court of the United States for said district, that court, on the 12th of September, 1862, affirmed said decree and condemned the ship. The case of the vessel is now before this court upon an appeal from said decree of the circuit court. The Admiral was chartered at Liverpool by the New Brunswick firm or W. & R. Wright, to proceed with a cargo of salt off the port of Savannah, and if the blockade is raised, then proceed into port and deliver the salt as her bill of lading; and if the blockade be not raised, then the ship to proceed to St. Johns, N. B., and there deliver the same with the usual dispatch of the port. The stipulated freight was thirty shillings per ton if the cargo should be landed at Savannah, and fifteen shillings per ton if landed at St. Johns. The owner's letter of instruction to the master, inclosing the charter-party, directed him to call off Savannah, and if he should find the blockade still in force, to get the officer in command of the blockading ship to indorse on the ship's register that she had been warned off. Under this charter-party and this letter of instructions, the Admiral sailed from Liverpool | upon a direct course for Savannah, on the 12th of September, 1861, with a certificate of clearance on board which expressed St. Johns, New Brunswick, as the sole port of her destination. Her actual primary destination was thus at the port of her departure in the most important public paper of the ship, the clearance, wholly suppressed, concealed and falsified. The capture was affected while she was standing directly in for Savannah, that port being then and there under efficient blockade. Upon these facts, both the district and circuit courts were of opinion that the Admiral was confiscable for breach of the blockade of Savannah, and they accordingly pronounced for her condemnation. Mr. C. Donohue for claimant. Mr. James Speed, Atty. Gen., Mr. J. Hubley Ashton, Assistant Atty. Gen., and Mr. Titian J. Coffey for the United States. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court: Capture of the ship, together with the cargo, was made on the 11th day of December, 1861, as lawful prize of war, and both were regularly prosecuted as such in the district court. Claim for the ship was presented by the master on behalf of Fernie Bros. & Co., of Liverpool, in which he alleged that they were British subjects and the true, lawful and sole owners and proprietors of the vessel, her tackle, apparel and furniture. Record also shows that the master filed at the same time a claim for the cargo on behalf of W. & R. Wright, of St. Johns, in the province of New Brunswick, in which he alleged that they were the true, lawful and sole owners and proprietors of the same, and that they also were British subjects. Accompanying the claims for the ship and cargo is the test affidavit of the master, which was filed at the same time and which contains substantially the same allegations. Preparatory proofs were duly taken, and the parties were fully heard. District court entered a decree condemning the vessel as lawful prize, but acquitted the cargo, and ordered that the same be restored to the owners. Claimants of the vessel appealed to the circuit court of the United States for that district, where the decree of the district court condemning the vessel was affirmed, and thereupon the claimants appealed to this court. 1. Appeal to the circuit court was allowed before the passage of the act of the 3d of March, 1863, ch. 81 (12 Stat. 760), which requires that appeals from the district courts in prize causes shall be made directly to the Supreme [*612 Court. Prior to the passage of that act the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction in prize causes, except when the same were removed here from the circuit courts. Exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was by the 9th section of the judiciary act conferred upon the district courts, and it was conclusively determined, at a very early period in our history, that prize jurisdiction was involved in the general delegation of admiralty and maritime powers as expressed in the language of that section. 1 Stat. at L. 77. First decision to that effect was that of Jennings v. Carson, 1 Pet. Adm. 7, but the question was shortly afterwards authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in the same way. Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 16; 1 Kent, Com. 389; 2 Stat. at L. 761. Admiralty and maritime causes, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeded the sum of value of $300, might, under the judiciary act, be removed by appeal from the district courts to the circuit courts, but such causes could only be transferred from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court by writ of error. Provision, however, for appeals from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court was afterwards made in cases of equity, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of $2,000. Same act also reduced the minimum sum or value required for appeals from the district courts to the circuit courts to the sum or value of $50, exclusive of costs, and made it the duty of the circuit courts to hear and determine all such appeals. 2 Stat. at L. 244. Present case was appealed from the district court to the circuit while the last mentioned provision was as applicable to prize cases as it still is to all the other matters of jurisdiction therein specified, and consequently the case under [*613 consideration is properly before the court. 2. Coming to the merits of the controversy, it is proper to refer to the evidence exhibited in the record, and to deduce from it as far as possible the real character of the adventure, which is the subject of investigation. Owners of the ship were Fernie Bros. & Co., of Liverpool, and the charterers were W. & R. Wright, of St. Johns, New Brunswick. Charter-party was dated at Liverpool on the 9th day of September, 1861, and the principal stipulation as to the voyage was that the ship should proceed off the port of Savannah, and if the blockade was raised, then to proceed into port and deliver the cargo as per bill of lading; but if the blockade was not raised, then the ship was to proceed to St. Johns, New Brunswick, and there to deliver the same with the usual dispatch of the port. Stipulated freight was thirty shillings per ton if the cargo should be landed at Savannah, and fifteen shillings per ton if landed at St. Johns, for which latter port the vessel was cleared, as represented in the clearance certificate. Charterers furnished the cargo, but the owners were to have an absolute lien on the same for all freight, dead freight, primage and demurrage. Vessel sailed for the port of Savannah, and there is not a fact or circumstance in the case tending to show that her primary destination was such, or was ever intended to be such, as is described in the clearance. On the contrary, the owners, in their letter of instructions to the master, admit that the charterers, being anxious to procure a particular cargo from Savannah, made it a condition in taking the ship that she should proceed off that port, so that if the port was open they might secure the very first shipment. When the ship sailed the mate supposed that she was bound for St. Johns, but he soon found, as he states, that she was going too far to the southward for such a voyage, and he at once began to suspect that the master intended to go into a southern port. Master's instructions evidently contemplated that the ship might speak other vessels as she approached the coast of the United States, and that the master would be enabled through those 614*] *means to ascertain the exact state of affairs; but the master was not directed in any event to abandon the voyage and return. beyond the possibility of doubt that the master, the charterers and the owners had full knowledge of the existence of the blockade at the inception of the voyage, and there can be no doubt that it was the knowledge of that fact which induced the parties to commence the voyage under a clearance which misrepresented the primary destination of the vessel. 3. Settled rule as established by a majority of this court is, that a vessel which has a full knowledge of the existence of a blockade is liable to capture if she attempts to enter the blockaded port in violation of the blockade regulations; and that it is no defense against an arrest made under such circumstances *that [*615 the vessel arrested had not been previously warned of the blockade, nor that such previous warning had not been indorsed on her register. The Hiawatha, 2 Black, 677, 17 L. ed. 479. 4. Unlike what is usual in cases of this description it is conceded in this case that the primary destination of the vessel was to the blockaded port; but it is insisted that the mere act of sailing to a port which is blockaded at the time the voyage is commenced is not an offense against the law of nations where there is no premeditated intention of breaking the blockade. Take the proposition as stated, and it is undoubtedly correct; but it is equally well established that it is illegal for a ship having knowledge of the existence of a blockade to attempt to enter a blockaded port in violation of the blockade, and this court decided at the last term that after notification of a blockade the act of sailing for a blockaded port with the intention of violating the blockade is in itself illegal. The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135, 17 L. ed. 796; The Neptunus, 2 C. Rob. 110; Medeiros v. Hill, 8 Bing. 234; The Panaghia Rhomba, 12 Moore, P. C. 168. 5. But it is unnecessary even to consider any extreme rule in this case, as every pretense of innocence is negatived by the circumstances. Fraud is stamped upon the adventure from the commencement of the voyage to the moment of capture. Such a misrepresentation as that ex Substance of the directions in that event was that he was to be guided by any information he might thus obtain, so as not to infringe the blockade regulations, but the clear inference from the document is that the ship was never-pressed in the clearance might be used to adtheless to proceed off the blockaded port, and then if met by a blockading vessel to get the officer in command to indorse on the register that the ship had been warned off. Specific directions to the master are that he is to run no risk with the ship, but he is to proceed on the voyage and rather endeavor to satisfy himself as to the blockade, and then find the blockading vessel and get his register indorsed. Cautious as these instructions are, still there is enough in them to show the criminal motives of their authors, especially when it is considered that the ship, under the eye of the owners, sailed from the port of departure under a clearance expressing a false destination. Shippers doubtless expected considerable profits from the sale of the outward cargo; but their controlling motives in chartering the ship were the anticipated profits of the return voyage from the blockaded port. Shipowners were also deeply interested in the success of the adventure, as they were to receive double the amount for freight if the outward cargo was landed at the port of primary destination. Full proof of these facts is exhibited in the record, and it is shown vantage by the master, if his vessel was met by a cruiser in mid ocean, as a means to allay suspicion, and it was doubtless intended for some such purpose. While sailing for the blockaded port such a document mignt be very effectual to enable the master before he had passed the port of pretended destination to deceive belligerents and elude the vigilance of their cruisers. Successful use of that means of deception, however, could not be made at the time of the capture, because the vessel was then off Tybee Island, more than a thousand miles from the proper course to the port specified in the clearance. Seeing that such a pretense would not be likely to avail, the master did not [*616 present the certificate of clearance, but resorted to the terms of the charter-party and the letter of instructions, and insisted that those showed that the vessel did not intend to violate the blockade regulations. Arrested, as the ship was, when near the blockaded port, and when heading for the land, and when in point of fact she was in the act of entering the port, the master then, instead of presenting the clearance for the port which he had passed, set up the |