upon the party the proof of the regularity of the proceedings by which the land became a street, or of the authority by which the street was established. The existence of obstructions in a street is such evidence of negligence as requires of the authorities explanation, in order to escape liability. Before the corporate authorities can be held llable for negligence, it must be shown that they knew of the existence of the cause of injury, or had been notified of it, or such a state of circumstances must be shown that notice would be implied. [No. 127.] N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The case is sufficiently stated by the court. Messrs. Richard O'Gorman and John Devlin, for the plaintiff in error: E. 1. The stump over which the defendant in error fell was not in a public street. (a) The claim in this action is that, by reason of the neglect of the plaintiff in error to remove an obstruction from a public street, the injuries complained of were received and the damages recovered, sustained. The evidence clearly establishes that, prior to 1847, the place where the accident occurred and the stump stood, was a part of the City Hall Park. The only evidence that such place ever be came a part of a public street, is the resolution of the common council authorizing the street commissioner to curve the lower end of the park, and the action of that officer under that resolution, in cutting off twenty feet from the park. The question then is: Did this resolution, the action of the street commissioner under it, and the subsequent use by the public of the space cut off from the park, constitute that space a part of a public street? The resolution cannot have that effect, for the reason that the common council had no power to pass it. Washb. Ease. 156; Com. v. Alburger, 1 Whart. 469, 485; Com. v. Rush, 14 Pa. 186; Lawrence v. Mayor, 2 Barb. 577. The ordinance being void, the act of the street commissioner was without authority. Indeed, both that officer and the common council could have been restrained from such action, at the suit of any citizen interested. Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510; Cady v. Conger, 19 N. Y. 256. (b) The space in question as a part of the public park was a portion of the real estate owned by the corporation of the city of New York. In 1844 this real estate was, by an ordinance duly enacted, pledged to the redemption of the city debt. This pledge was, in 1845, confirmed and made absolute. Revised Ordinances of 1859, ch. 9, p. 190-202; Session Laws of 1845, ch. 225, p. 248, § 5. The effect of this ordinance and act was to deprive the common council of any power to sell or dispose of any of the real estate of the corporation. It would be quite as competent for the common council by resolution to convert a street into a park, as to devote any portion of the public parks to the use of the public for streets. Neither the resolution of the common council nor the act of the street commissioner could constitute the space in question a part of a public street, for the reason that the resolution is void. (c) In the city of New York, the laying out, opening, altering, and widening of public streets is regulated by statute. Sess. Laws 1813, ch. 86, §§ 176, 178. By this statute it is provided that whenever any street is to be laid out, opened, enlarged, or improved, the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty must apply to the supreme court for the appointment of commissioners. It is made the duty of the commissioners to view the land and tenements required for the improvement, and to make a just and equitable assessment of the loss and damage over the benefit and advantage. The statute further provides, that if any lands, tenements, or premises belonging to the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the city of New York, shall be required for the improvement, they shall be compensated for the loss and damage they sustain in like manner as other owners and proprietors of premises. The statute then enacts that, upon the confirmation by the supreme court of the report which the commissioners are required to make, the lands taken shall be appropriated and kept open for a public street forever. Until, therefore, this space in question is shown to have been taken in conformity with requirements of statute, it cannot be regarded as a public street. Matter of Commonwealth, 1 Wend. 262; Oswego v. Oswego Can. Co. 6 N. Y. 257; Clements v. West Troy, 16 Barb. 251; Northumberland v. Atlantic & St. Lawrence R. Co. 35 N. H. 574; Com. v. Kelly, 8 Gratt. 632; Holmes v. Jersey City, 1 Beasl. (N. J.) 299; Reed v. Cornwall, 27 Conn. 48; Underwood v. Stuyvesant, 19 Johns. 181. The space in question having never been accepted as a part of a public street, in the manner provided by law, the corporation was not bound to remove the stump, nor is it liable for the injuries received by the defendant in error. Bowman v. Boston, 5 Cush. 1. 2. The exceptions to the charge of the learned judge were well taken. Under this charge (contained in the opinion) no question was left to the jury; for if the existence of the obstruction constitutes the negligence, it is clearly impossible to disprove the negligence, without disproving the existence of the obstruction. Mr. William P. Sheffield, the defendant in error, in his own behalf: The points in the charge of the presiding judge, to which the plaintiffs in error except, are: 1. That the corporation of the city of New York was bound to keep the streets and sidewalks within the corporate limits in good and safe condition. 2. If the city authorities leave an obstruction on the face of the sidewalk, on which a person stumbles-boxes, if you please, left out on the sidewalk on a dark night, or barrels, over which a person stumbles and falls in the absence of want of care on his part-they are liable for the injury. 3. That the obstruction of the street or side wolk was evidence of negligence on the part o the defendant. 4. That in order to escape from liability wher. the obstruction existed, the burden was throw upon the defendant to disprove it. The plaintiffs in error were commissioners of highways for the city of New York made such by act of March 21, 1787 and as such commissioners have the care of the highways within the corporate limits of the city of New York, and are subjected to the duty of keeping them in repair. See 2 Rev. Stat. N. Y. ch. 16, p. 381, § 1. When individuals or corporations have fixed and certain duties assigned them of a mere ministerial character, and the means placed at their disposal are sufficient for their perform ance, they are under obligation to perform them at the risk of their being made to answer for the consequences of their neglect. Hudson v. N. Y. 5 Sandf. 289; Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463; Mayor etc. of N. Y. v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612; Hickok v. Tr. of Plattsburgh, and West v. Tr. of Brockport, reported in a note to the case of Conrad v. Trustees of Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 161; Smith v. Wright, 24 Barb. 170; Weightman v. Corp. of Washington, 1 Black, 49, 17 L. ed. 57. See, Ang. & Durfee, Highw. § 300. The municipal authority of the corporation might well dispose of the lands of the city, and especially when they may lay out highways, may those authorities appropriate the lands of the city in proper cases to widening the public thoroughfares. And it will not be said that the appropriation of the lands of the city to the widening of Broadway and Chatham streets was not a proper appropriation of this land. There is nothing in the law better settled than that the proprietor of lands may dedicate them to the public for a public highway. Rex v. Hudson, 2 Str. 909. Trustees of Rugby Charity v. Merryweather, 11 East, 375, quoted by Chancellor Kent in 3 Kent, Com. Am. Law, 450. This subject of acquiring highway by dedication has often been before the courts. See Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510; In the matter of 32d Street, 19 Wend. 128; 39th Street, 1 Hill, 191; Ward v. Davis, 3 Sandf. 502; Enning v. Roome, 6 Wend. 651; Hobbs v. Lowell, 19 Pick. 409; Cincinnati v. White's Lessee, 6 Pet. 431; New Orleans v. U. S. 10 Pet. 662, 712; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498, 504. The whole subject is discussed and the authorities are considered in Washb. Eas. 128157. Sidewalks are a part of the public streets, and as such are to be kept, like the streets themselves, in a safe and convenient state of repair through their entire width. See Ang. & D. Highw. §§ 260, 263; Clapp v. Providence, 17 How. 167, 15 L. ed. 75, and cases there cited. By the act of 1854, ch. 324, § 2, 2 Rev. Stat. of N. Y. § 158, p. 409, the commissioners of highways of the several towns in the state of New York were authorized to expend a part of he highway tax upon the sidewalks in the highvay districts. In this case the city was the owner of the park, and made the sidewalk at its own expense and upon its own lands, and in accordance with the laws of the state and its own orlinances. There is, therefore, a well-marked distinction between the case at bar and the case of the trustees of a village not authorized to construct a sidewalk or between this and a case where the sidewalk was not owned and constructed by the corporation. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: The defendant in error recovered against the plaintiff in error a judgment for injuries received by him in falling over an obstruction on the sidewalk of one of the streets of the city of New York. 1. The first error claimed to be found in the record of this *case is based on the [*194 proposition of the defendant below, that the locus in quo was not a legally established public street, and therefore the city was not liable for its condition. On this point the court ruled adversely to the city. The facts as shown by the bill of exceptions in reference to this matter are in substance these: The place where the accident occurred was formerly a part of the City Hall Park, the property of the corporation of the city of New York. In November, 1847, the city council ordered that the lower corner line of the park be so adjusted as to make a curve, instead of corners and angles, from Broadway to Chatham street. The execution of those orders placed in the street the ground where the plaintiff received his injury, and it became a part of the sidewalk at that place. It is now argued that this is not a street, because the land was not condemned agreeably to a certain statute of the state for the opening and widening of streets. This statute was intended to secure to private land owners compensation for their property taken for public uses, and can have no application to the case of an appropriation, by the city council of land owned by the city, to the purpose of a street. It is also said that the park is, both by contract and by statute, pledged for the redemption of the city debt, and therefore cannot be thus appropriated. It will be time enough to consider this question when some creditor of the city shall raise it. The legal title and the present use and possession are in the city, and were when the land was converted into a street, and it does not lie in the mouth of the city authorities, under these circumstances, to claim exemption for their negligence in the manner of making this conversion, under the plea that the act was a violation of their duty to public creditors. If the authorities of a city or town have treated a place as a public street, taking charge of it and regulating it as they do other streets, and an individual is injured in consequence of the negligent and careless manner in which this is done, the corporation cannot, when it is sued for such injury, throw the party upon an inquiry into the regularity of the pro- [*195 ceedings by which the land became a street, or the authority by which the street was originally established. tified by the testimony. It would have been superfluous. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF ROCK v. STATE BANK. (See S. C. 4 Wall. 435-447.) 2. The second error is supposed to have been found in an exception to the following language of the court in the charge to the jury: "If they (the corporate authorities) leave an opening in the sidewalk which is sometimes done, and a person coming along in the night falls into it, THE UNITED STATES, on the Relation of the without any want of proper care on his part, the defendants are liable for any injury that may be occasioned. So, if an obstruction in the face of a sidewalk over which a person stumbles-a box, if you please, left out on the sidewalk on a dark night, or barrels, over which a person stumbles and falls in the absence of want of care on his part-the defendants are equally liable for the injury. The opening, in the one case, and the obstruction, in the other, constitute the negligence on the part of the authorities who have control of the matter and, in order to escape from the charge of liability, the burden is thrown upon them to disprove the negligence." To this charge it is objected that it precluded the defendants from any attempt to show that they were not guilty of negligence, because, if the obstruction constituted the negligence, the existence of the obstruction being proved, no defense could be offered. But this is a verbal Judgment not collaterally questioned — when power given public officer, by permissive language, implies a duty. A judgment cannot be collaterally questioned; it Submitted Jan. 26, 1867. Decided Feb. 13, 1867. The case is stated by the court. Messrs. B. C. Cook and J. B. Hawley, for plaintiff in error: There is but one mode known to the laws of Illinois, by which payment of a judgment against a county can be coerced, and that is by the procurement of a county order from the county authorities upon the county treasury. Purple, Ill. Stat. (1856), ch. 27, § 20; Coun criticism not justified by the language of the court, which in the same sentence declares that, in order to escape from liability, the burden is thrown upon defendants to disprove the negligence. No one can read the charge without seeing that the jury must have understood the court as meaning that the existence of those obstructions was such evidence of negligencety of Pike v. Hosford, 11 Ill. 175; County of as required of the authorities explanations in Pike v. People, 11 Ill. 202; Randolph Co. v. order to escape liability. Another objection to this charge is that it ignores the necessity of notice to the authorities of the existence of the obstruction. It is certainly true, as a general proposition, that before the corporate authorities can be held liable in this class of cases, it must be shown that they know of the existence of the cause of injury, or had been notified of it, or 196*] such a state of circumstances must be shown that notice would be implied. And it is true that this charge makes no reference to notice whatever. But when we look into the facts of this case, as shown by the bill of exceptions, we discover a very plain reason why this was omitted. The question of notice, as a fact, could not be disputed, and therefore did not arise as a matter on which the jury required instructions. Ralls, 18 Ill. 29. It was upon a statute of Illinois, passed Feb. 16, 1863, that the defendant in error mainly relied, and upon which the court gave judgment against the plaintiff in error. The statute is as follows: An Act to Enable Counties Owing Debts to Liquidate the Same. "Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the people of the state of Illinois, represented in the general assembly, that the county courts for county business in counties without township organization, and the boards of supervisors of counties under township organization, in such counties as may be owing debts which their current revenue under existing laws is not sufficient to pay, may, if deemed advisable, levy a special tax not to exceed in any one year one per cent upon the taxable property of any such county, to be assessed and collected in the same manner and at the same time and rate of compensation as other county taxes, and when collected, to be kept as a separate fund in the county treasury, and to be expended under the direction of the said county court, or board of supervisors, as the case may be, in liquidation of such indebtedness. The city authorities, in converting the part of the Park already mentioned into a street, had cut down a tree, and left the stump standing from six to eight inches above the surface, and from fourteen to eighteen inches inside the curbstone, on the sidewalk. This was done in 1847; and this stump, thus left by the city authorities, who had cut down the tree, remained in that condition until the time of the accident after its passage." Approved Feb. 16, 1863. to plaintiff, in 1857. These facts were uncontradicted, and stronger proof of notice could not be given. It closed the question, and the omission in the judge's charge of any reference to that subject was jus "Sec. 3. This act shall be enforced from and NOTE. When "may" in a statute means "must" or "shall."" When a power for public purposes is conferred, a duty arises to execute that powersee note to Minor v. Mech's B'k of Alex. 7 L. ed. U. S. 47. The defendant in error argued in the circuit court, that this statute gave the plaintiff in error increased power of taxation, and that the plaintiff could be coerced to levy the one per cent tax thereunder, or so much thereof as might be necessary for that purpose, and apply the same in payment of its judgment. The statute says, the board of supervisors "may, if deemed advisable, levy a special tax." If not deemed advisable, certainly the tax is not to be levied, because these words cannot be rejected, and while they remain there is no room, as the plaintiff contends, for construction. The statute is not a mere grant of power, but it is a grant upon condition, and that condition is, that it shall be thought advisable by the board of supervisors. If the statute simply said "may levy a tax," it might then well be said, that in cases where the interests of a third party were concerned, the court would construe "may" to mean "shall," and would enforce the levy. But it is not so here. They may upon a condition, and that condition is, that the board, and none other shall deem it advisable. This statute does not repeal any other, but is in addition; it is cumulative. If the words "may, if deemed advisable," | vest discretion in the plaintiff, then it cannot be controlled by the court. It will be seen that the statute provides, that in case such special tax shall be levied and collected by the board of supervisors, it shall be "kept as a separate fund in the county treasury, and to be expended under the direction of the said county court or the board of supervisors, as the case may be." If the board of supervisors is to direct how the money is to be paid out of the treasury, then it is vested with discretion to pay it to whom and for what debt it may choose. A statute ought to be so construed that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant. United States v. Seaman, 17 How. 225, 15 L ed. 226; United States v. Guthrie, 17 How. 301 (105); Ex parte Black, 1 Ohio St. 30, 37; City of Louisville v. Kean, 18 B. Mon. 17; McDougall v. Bell, 4 Cal. 177; Magee v. Supervisors, 10 Cal. 376; Green v. Purnell, 12 Md. 329. In the case of King v. Mayor, etc., of Fowey, 2 Barn. & C. 584. Halroyd, J., observes: "By the charter, the mayor and aldermen are to elect such and so many free burgesses as they shall think fit. It is not competent, therefore, to the court to grant a mandamus directing them to elect any." Com. v. County Commissioners, 5 Binn. 536; People v. Supervisors of Albany, 12 Johns. 416. United States v. Seaman, 17 How. 230, 15 L. ed. 227, Taney, Ch. J., giving the opinion of the court, says: "The rule to be gathered from all these cases is too well settled to need further discussion. It (the mandamus) cannot issue in a case where discretion and judgment are to be exercised by the officer." United States v. Guthrie, 17 How. 304, 15 L. ed. 106; Chase v. Blackstone Canal Co. 10 Pick. 246; Ex parte Black, 1 Ohio St. 37; Louisville v. McKean, 18 B. Mon. 17; McDou gall v. Bell, 4 Cal. 178; Magee v. Supervisors, 10 Cal. 376. In the case at bar it will be observed that the alternative writ of mandamus avers that relator demanded the evy of the tax of one per cent, and that plaintiff in error refused and neglected to make the levy for the defendant's benefit. It thus appears that the board of supervisors has exercised the discretion vested in it by the law of Feb. 16, 1863, and deemed it unadvisable to levy the special tax of one per cent to pay defendant's debt. The circuit court, by its judgment, requires the board of supervisors to pay interest on the judgment against said board. Plaintiff in erJames v. Dubois, 1 Harr. (N. J.), 285; ror insists that no power existed in the court Hutchen v. Niblo, 4 Blackf. 148; Opinion of the to make such requirement and that, under the Justices, 22 Pick. 571; United States v. War-law of the state of Illinois, interest upon judgner, 4 McL. 463; McHay v. Detroit & Erin Plank R. 2 Mich. 138; United States v. Ragsdale, 1 Hemp. 497; Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507, 13 Mass. 324. In support of the position that the statute gives discretion to the supervisors to levy, or not to levy the tax, and that such discretion cannot be controlled, the plaintiff in error cites the following authorities: Application for Mandamus v. School Com'rs, 4 Am. Law. Reg. 163; Com. V. Com'rs, 5 Binn. 536; Com. v. Cochran, 6 Binn. 456: People v. Pres. and Trustees of Brooklyn, 1 Wend. 318, 2 Johns. Cas. 217, 232, note, §§ 31, 34, 38, and 39, where the doctrine is clearly laid down and authorities, English and American, fully cited. Tapping, Mandamus, marg. pp. 12, 13, 14; People v. Supervisor of Albany, 12 Johns. 414; Hull v. Supervisors of Oneida, 19 Id. 269; Ex parte Farrington, 2 Cow. 407; State v. Washington Co. 2 Chand. (Wis.) 247; Ang. & Ames, Corp. § 707, 708; Towle v. State, 3 Fla. 202. This is a strong case reviewing the authorities, English and American, upon the subject. Opinion by Douglas, Ch. J. ments against counties cannot be recovered. In support of this position, plaintiff in error cites the following authorities: Ch. 27, § 20 of Purple, Stat. of Ill., supra; Madison County v. Bartlett, 1 Scam. 71; Pike Co. v. Hosford, 11 Ill. 175; City of Pekin v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 529. Messrs. James Grant and Chas. M. 08born, for defendant in error: The plaintiff in error admits that it has no funds to pay with; so the issuance of a county order would be unavailing. We therefore insist that the argument and citation of authorities as to the method of paying debts when the money is at hand to do it with, has nothing to do with the question of raising the money to pay them with. The relator insists that if the supervisors have power to levy a tax in order to raise money to pay this judgment they are bound to do so. Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376, 16 L. ed. 735. There appear two peculiarities in the reading of the statute of Feb. 16, 1863. First, that the board of supervisors "may, if deemed advisable," levy a tax; and, second, that the tax when collected is "to be expended | 10 Wend. 363; Supervisors of Sand Lake v. under the direction of said board of super- Supervisors of Berlin, 2 Cow. 485; People v. visors." It will be apparent that the last men- Supervisors of Albany, 12 Wend. 257; Com. tioned peculiarity vests no new discretion on v. Johnson, 2 Binn. 275. the board of supervisors; for, by the general laws of the state, no money can be expended except under the direction of the board of supervisors. They must draw an order on the treasury for the payment of the money, so that these words are mere surplusage. Purple, Ill. Stat. (1856), ch. 27, § 20; Pike Co. v. Hosford, 11 Ill. 202; Randolph Co. v. Ralls, 18 Ill. 29; Pike Co. v. People, 11 Ill. 202. It is, however, claimed that the words "may, if deemed advisable," vest an "arbitrary discretion" in the board of supervisors, to levy or not to levy the tax as they may see proper, and that this "discretion" cannot be controlled by the courts. The real questions we consider to be: 1st. Do the words "may, if deemed advisable," | vest any further discretion than the word "may" vests without the words "if deemed advisable?" 2d. Is the discretion vested by the words of the statute that kind of a discretion which cannot be controlled by the court? We insist that the words "if deemed advisable" have the same legal signification as the word "may" alone, or "shall have power," and no other. In Rex v. Barlow, 2 Salk. 609, it was held that "when the statute directs the doing of anything for the sake of justice or the public good, the word 'may' is the same as the word 'shall,' for he is compelled to do it." In Mayor of N. Y. v. Furze, 3 Hill, 614, the words, "it shall be lawful for the mayor, aldermen, and council of the city to cause common sewers, drains, and vaults to be made in every part of the city, etc.," are construed to be mandatory. In Mason v. Fearson, 9 How. 248, the words "it shall be lawful," are construed as mandatory. In laying down the rule for the construction of words of permission, the court says: Whenever it is provided that a corporation or officer 'may' act in a certain way, or that 'it shall be lawful' for them to act in a certain way, it may be insisted on as a duty for them to so act if the matter, as here, is devolved on a public officer, and relates to the public or third persons; citing Rex v. Barlow, 2 Salk. 609; King v. Inhab. of Derby, Skin. 370; Blackwell's Case, 1 Vern. 152–154; 2 Chitty, 251; Dwar. Stat. 712; Newburgh Turnpike Co. v. Miller, 5 Johns. Ch. 113; N. Y. v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612, 613; Minor v. The Mechanic's Bank, 1 Pet. 64. And again: "Without going into more details, these cases fully sustain the doctrine, that what a public corporation or officer is empowered to do for others, and it is beneficial to have done, the law holds he ought to do." See also Com. v. Pittsburgh, 3 Am. Law. Reg. 292; 34 Pa. 496; Newburgh Turnpike Co. v. Miller, 5 Johns. Ch. 113; Malcolm v. Rogers, 5 Cow. 188; Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376. 16 L. ed. 735; Justices Clark Co. Ct. v. P. & W. & K. R. T. Co. 11 B. Mon. 143; People ▼. Corp. of Albany, 11 Wend. 539; Atty. Gen. v. Lock, 3 Atk. 164; Stamper v. Miller, 3 Atk. 212; People v. Supervisors of Columbia Co. In the case of People v. Superior Court of N. Y. City, 5 Wend. 125, the nature of a "discretion" that cannot be controlled by the court is discussed. The court says: "It is that discretion which is not and can. not be governed by any fixed rules. We will not set up our judgment in opposition to the judgment of a board of supervisors, as to what is a reasonable compensation for services performed by a constable. It is to their judgment and discretion, and not to ours, which the legislature have left the decision of that matter. But if they refuse to allow anything, either on the ground that they have no discretion upon the subject or that the officer has no right to compensation, then we will interfere and determine whether they have the power to make an allowance or whether the officer is entitled to be paid. The powers of the supervisors and the rights of the officer are questions of law. They are legal powers and rights if they exist at all;" citing 6 Cow. 392, 7 Cow. 361, 18 Johns. 242, 19 Johns. 260. Savage, C. J., in The People v. The Superior Court, 10 Wend. 285-290, says as to new trials: "In a case where there is no dispute about facts," "there is no discretion to exercise." Citing, Anon. 2 Halst. 160; Rex v. Justices of Worcestershire, 1 Chitty, 649; Rex v. Jus tices of Carnarvon, 4 B. & Ald. 86; Rex v. Justices of Monmouthshire, 4 B. & C. 844. It appears, therefore, from these authorities, that if the facts are not disputed, "there is no discretion" to exercise, and in this case the facts are admitted. If it is contended that the supervisors are to render a deliberate judgment on the law, we answer, that by the Constitution they can have no judicial power. Const. Stat. of Ill., art. 2, §§ 1 and 2, and art. 5, § 1; and if they could have such power, it can be controlled by the court. See See case of State of Ohio v. Chase, 5 Ohio St. 538. We think that an examination of the authorities cited by the plaintiff in error will show, that in every case cited the respondents were to judge of facts more or less uncertain, or otherwise were invested with judicial powers. In Com. v. County Commissioners, 5 Binn. 536, the court says: "The law has vested the commissioners with the power of approving or disapproving of the account, and we cannot take it away from them." The law provided that the commissioners should draw an order if they approved of the bill. The case of The People v. Supervisors of Albany, 12 Johns. 416, was a similar case to the last cited. In Ex parte Farrington, 2 Cow. 407, the decision is based on the supervisors, acting in judicial character, in determining the amount of allowance to be made for services, etc. The case of U. S. v. Seaman, 17 How. 225, 15 L. ed. 226, is decided on the ground that the superintendent of printing is obliged to examine evidence and form his judgment before he acted; and whenever that is to be done, it is not a case for a mandamus. In the case of U. S. v. Guthrie, 17 How. 301, 15 L. ed. 102, the court says: "The |