to ours, either in its extent, its power, or in the vastness of the benefits it would have conferred on humanity.

The imbecility of the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, rendered them careless about all questions of foreign policy, and instead, they weakly directed their attention, and that of the country, wholly to the domestic quarrel, and thus materially advanced and hastened the catastrophe.

In the third place; these two previous plans having failed, the effort was to unite the Southern States in feeling and action, so that they might, in an imposing manner, say to the North, "Let us come to a fair understanding as to this matter. If you are not willing to continue the system of our fathers, then let us part in peace and on fair terms." An appeal thus made, I thought, would have led either to a fair accommodation, or to a peaceable separation.

Fourthly however; if neither of these results could be attained, then the South being thus united, would have been able to protect itself by force of arms.

It seemed in the beginning of the year 1860, that we might fairly calculate on one of the two latter alternatives. Men of all parties in the South, began to see, that the North was in substance, as to its electoral vote, almost solidly united against our section, with a settled purpose, on the part of the leaders of the dominant party, to disregard the restrictions and limitations of the Constitution, and overthrow by force, if necessary, our social system. It was evidently practicable to unite the body of the South for defense. Clearly every principle of justice, and every motive of interest impelled us, thus to come together.

And yet, in the face of all these most powerful considerations, several persons, who from their former declarations, ought to have been expected to be the foremost in perfecting the union of the South, went deliberately to work to produce distraction and weakness, rather than strength. If many persons had labored for years to erect a great edifice, and at the moment when it was about to be completed, some of its pretended zealous friends, should industriously undermine and destroy it, such conduct on their part would find its parallel in the action of some of the pretended friends of the South at this period. So extraordinary was their conduct, so much was it at variance with the usual action of men thus situated, that we are reminded of the declaration, "the gods first make mad those that they intend shall be destroyed."

The tyranny and wickedness of Pharoah, drove the Israelites out of the fat land of Goshen, into Palestine: while there, hewing wood and

drawing water for the Philistines, served to correct their wickedness and idolatry. The act of Judas Iscariot, gave to humanity its greatest blessing. The extraordinary combination of circumstances, which led to such momentous results in our recent history, seems to carry a conviction to the mind, that the actors were instruments prepared to effect such purposes. No mere numerical calculation of chances appears sufficient to account for such a line of action.

It seems so wonderfully strange that, in the same century, and in the same country there should exist in contact, and with opportunity to act together, two such men as James Buchanan and Jefferson Davis, so plausible, so insincere, so selfish, so resentful and vindictive that all considerations in opposition to the gratification of these feelings, were ignored; and at the same time so childishly feeble in action for good, and so absolutely destitute of all administrative ability. And then, that they should have been able to delude so many persons, and secure their co-operation; while Douglas, as their opponent, lost his temper and judgment entirely, and thus assisted their operations.

If all these concurring circumstances could be presented together, men's minds would find it almost impossible to resist the conclusion that the effects produced, have as overwhelming evidence in favor of their being Providentially directed movements, as any other recorded in profane history.

It may be all the better for us in the South so to regard it. Thus accepted we can bear it with more resignation, and again move forward with a higher heart, to recover all, and more than all, that we have lost. Though placed by our adversaries (who sought to give the negro race an advantage over us) in a worse position than were the Spaniards in St. Domingo, we have not succumbed as they did, but have maintained our upright attitude.

Remember that after so many of our best men were slain in battle; after our territory was so wasted that it seemed impossible to escape starvation; after our State governments had all been purposely destroyed; after every vestige of civil administration had been obliterated, and after anarchy had thus been intentionally created among us; after governments had, by military force, been set up over us; after all our men who had been trained to public business were disfranchised, in order that we might be subjected to the control of the former slaves; and after adventurers had been encouraged to come in, and direct these emancipated slaves in their operations against us, and with their supe

rior skill aid them in plundering us; when, I say, all these measures were resorted to, purposely, to destroy our manhood, and render us the most degraded specimens of humanity; if, in the face of all these difficulties, we have by our innate mental and moral force as a race, again been able to stand erect, and challenge a comparison, as true men and women, with the best varieties of the great Caucasian race, may we not well be of good cheer and look to the future with renewed confidence?

We now stand ready to assist all the best elements in the North in restoring constitutional government, and honest and economical administration of public affairs. And if, as I suggested to the Confederates at Davidson College, we will all, but for a few years, labor as earnestly as we did during the civil war, we can present to the view of the civilized world, a state of material prosperity, as well as of high moral tone, that any community may be proud to exhibit.

Again, we should endeavor to repress all feelings of anger against the majority of the people of the North. From the beginning of the government slavery was the subject of contention. The discussion of a question of its nature, appealing to feeling as much as to reason, necessarily became exciting. Though in calmer times the wise govern countries, yet during periods of great excitement, the extreme men always lead the masses. As those rather remarkable for violence of feeling than statesmanship,'controlled the immediate movements, which precipitated the struggle on our side, so in the North men of more violence than principle directed the masses there.

When the war suddenly ended, as they had suffered severely from our efforts, they evidently at first dreaded a renewal of the contest by adversaries who had shown themselves so formidable. It was, therefore, not surprising that they wished to secure against all contingencies what they had, with so great an effort, won. The assassination of Lincoln, the vindictiveness of Johnson against us, in the first instance, and the later contest with him, whetted their anger and increased their violence. It is not strange, therefore, that extreme leaders, and selfish and greedy men, should have given shape and direction to their measures against us.

As the only issue which directly, and necessarily divided the sections, has been removed, we ought, on our side, to allow the recollections of the struggle to pass away. The energy and force with which they fought us give evidence of their vigor and manhood as a people. It is just as unfair to judge the majority of the people of the North

by the bad specimens we have seen among us, as it is for them to estimate us, as being like the noisy, malignant individuals here, who have only attempted to injure them by vituperative epithets.

From my own personal knowledge of the citizens of the Northern States, I am able to say that I have met no better specimens of humanity any where, than I have known in New England, the great Middle States, and in the Northwest. As they and we, had a common origin, are similar in race, language, and literature, and in the past, by joint efforts, achieved our independence, and established the most magnificent Republic that has existed upon the earth; and as we must in future, have a common government, and similar institutions, it would seem to be a high duty of every wise and good man, both in the North and in the South, to cause all the painful memories of the past to be forgotten. In this mode we can defeat the efforts of selfish and unprincipled demagogues to keep the country excited, that they may, by fanning the passions of sectional hate, acquire for themselves positions, to which their merits do not entitle them. And we may thus at no distant day, restore the administration of public affairs, to what it previously was in the brightest days of our past history.

SCHEME OF NATIONAL CURRENCY.

[So great is the present financial distress in the country, and such is the utter prostration of its general business that the following papers are presented. Upon the coming in of General Taylor's administration, in 1849, attention was directed to the condition of the currency. The State bank system was in operation, and though under it a currency was furnished sufficient to supply all local demands, yet those who traveled sustained some losses. North Carolina notes were two per cent. below par in New York sometimes, and those from States in the southwest, suffered a still greater depreciation.

The attention of the Secretary of the Treasury was directed to the subject of the best plan of improving the currency, and among other schemes it was proposed that the sub-Treasury should be converted into a bank of issue. Feeling, in common with most men of that day, averse to any institution that seemed to have a resemblance to a national bank, my attention had been directed to the subject.

Having had a conversation with Mr. Simeon Draper on the subject, at his suggestion, I put my views in the form of a letter to him, which he caused to be published in the Courier and Enquirer, of New York, and which was copied into the National Intelligencer, from which it is now reproduced.

It must be borne in mind that twenty-eight years ago, when this publication was made, the experience of the people of the United States was far less than it is at present. Nevertheless, many of the prominent features of our present system are substantially presented in it. But there are two striking differences between the plan then considered and our present system. In the first place, that did not propose to interfere with the then existing system of State banks. The main object was to furnish a currency, which should maintain a par value everywhere, as auxiliary to the existing system. In the second place the Treasury notes of the government were to be receivable for all dues to it, from whatever source they might come. That fact would have rendered them of equal or greater value than specie.

The doubt expressed, as to whether or not we might always have outstanding bonds enough of the United States to sustain a circulation of twenty millions of Treasury notes, is one that does not trouble us at present. Certain sentences that are italicised present suggestions of conditions that are now felt practically in most parts of the country:]

ASTOR HOUSE, October 8, 1849. DEAR SIR-Your favor was received a day or two since, and it gives pleasure to comply with your request that I would present in writing the outlines of the plan referred to in our conversation of last week.

While it is conceded by every body that the existing financial system must be changed in some respects, there seems to be a very general impression that the alterations necessary to meet the wants of the Government and of the community should not be accompanied by any great, radical, and sudden change of system. The plan referred to by me may perhaps be sufficiently understood, if stated concisely, in the following mode:

The Government should issue a certain amount of Treasury notes, (say ten or twenty millions, to be determined by law,) upon the following

conditions: